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PREFACE 
Because the field of probation is likely to be 
unfamiliar to most readers, I begin with what is admittedly 
a cursory overview of the area. A broader treatment of 
the topic of probation can be found in numerous other 
volumes (e.g., Dressler, 1969; Killinge~ Kerper, & Crom-
well, 1976; Senna & Siegel, 1981). I then attempt to 
review the specific nature of probation officers' tasks 
in Cook County, Illinois. This brief description is drawn 
from my three years of experience and research as an 
employee of the County's Adult Probation Department. It 
is hoped that this Preface will lend greater meaningfulness 
to the procedures, findings, and practical implications 
of my studies. 
Probation: History, Definitions, Functions 
Origin and Growth of Probation 
Of the numerous correctional reforms and innova-
tions which emerged in the nineteenth century few were 
as widely diffused or as readily adopted as probation. 
Probation is a judicial disposition entailing the condi-
tional release of a convicted offender into the community 
for a specified time under the supervision of the court 
and subject to certain conditions. Although it is rooted 
in such common law practices as the suspension of sentence 
iv 
(Grinnell, 1941), credit for the first actual implementa-
tion of probation is generally attributed to the unofficial 
and voluntary efforts of an altruistic Boston bootmaker, 
John Augustus, who between 1841 and 1859 acted as advisor 
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and surety for nearly 2,000 offenders. 
Augustus was an early and vociferous proponent of 
the rehabilitative approach to corrections, declaring that 
"the object of the law is to reform criminals and to pre-
vent crime and not to punish maliciously, or from a spirit 
of revenge" (Augustus, 1972, p. 23). Augustus' patently 
humanitarian and progressive treatment of offenders com-
prised a set of interventions that were designed to pro-
mote healthy changes and personal growth. The "father of 
probation" assisted criminals by supplying bail for a 
temporary postponement of their sentence and by performing 
the dual casework function of counseling and supervision 
during the period of release. If any of his charges were 
too poor to pay court costs, Augustus would advance them 
a loan and extend lodging and subsistence (Smith & Berlin, 
1979). Rudiments of selection appear in his method in 
the form of a brief conversation, a subjective judgment 
of the accused's "firm resolve" to remain temperate, and 
a firm determination of whether he was "not yet past all 
hope of reformation" (Dressler, 1969). 
During his time, other concerned citizens mimicked 
Augustus' efforts by putting up bail and offering 
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employment to the "less incorrigible" individuals brought 
before the magistrate. Their success with an appreciable 
number of these cases greatly impressed the court and was 
instrumental in inducing Massachusetts to become the fore-
runner in probation legislation. By virtue of the Proba-
tion Act of 1878, the law provided for the appointment of 
a paid probation officer for the courts of criminal juris-
diction in the city of Boston. The statute prescribed 
the duties of a probation officer as attendance in court, 
investigation of cases charged with or convicted of 
crimes and misdemeanors, recommendation to the court with 
regard to the advisability of using probation, submission 
of periodic reports to the chief of police, and rendering 
"such assistance and encouragement (to probationers) as 
will tend to prevent their again offending" (Chute & Bell, 
1956, p. 65). Thus, while the law did not explicitly 
create any new judicial power, its enactment was tanta-
mount to placing the state's stamp of approval on a 
judicial perogative already in use (Grinnell, 1941). 
It is important to note that the drafters of the 
statute clearly viewed probation as treatment: they 
included the proviso that those selected be "persons as 
may reasonably be expected to be reformed without punish-
ment." Of equal significance is the fact that no addi-
tional restrictions were expressly stipulated upon elig-
ibility for probation, other than the rehabilitativ·e 
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criterion. Probation was available to juvenile and adult, 
male and female, felon and misdemeanant, regardless of 
the particulars of the offense (Dressler, 1969). 
Statewide probation was instituted in Massachusetts 
in 1890, with a provision still appearing in many modern 
statutes, that the probation officer should not be an 
active member of the regular police force. However, this 
landmark legislation did not specifically grant to the 
court the power to suspend sentences indefinitely. 
Missouri in 1897, and Vermont in 1898, remedied this 
omission, although in Missouri the statute was labeled 
"An act relating to the parole of prisoners," and used 
the words "probation" and "parole" interchangeably (Kill-
inger, Kerper, & Cromwell, 1976). 
Several other states passed probation laws in the 
latter part of the nineteenth and in the beginning of the 
twentieth centuries. The statutes included many varia-
tions in applicability and organization. For example, 
Illinois (1899) and Minnesota (1899) provided only for 
juvenile probation; Rhode Island (1899) placed restric-
tions on eligibility, excluding persons convicted of 
certain offenses (Killinger, Kerper, & Cromwell, 1976). 
Rhode Island also regulated its probation services under 
a statewide, state-controlled administration, while Ver-
mont left the administration to individual, autonomously 
operated counties (Allen, Carlson, & Parks, 1979). 
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Although 33 states had allowed statutory provision for 
adult probation by 1915, it was not until 1956 that all 
states had granted authorization to the courts (President's 
Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Jus-
tice, 1967). 
Throughout its history, probation has connoted, 
among other things, a relatively mild form of punishment, 
a second chance for first offenders, and a manifestation 
of judicial grace (Vasoli, 1964). Probation as leniency 
is a viewpoint that is common in the general public and 
the media. Indeed, many contend that the probation of 
criminals is the equivalent of unrestricted release into 
the community. This perspective is primarily a byproduct 
of two factors (Barkdull, 1976). First, supporters of 
probation have been unable or unwilling to clearly argue 
that probation is indeed punishment, that it does reduce 
the freedom of individuals, and that it exposes them to 
an increased risk of future incarceration if they do not 
abide by the minimum standards of behavior. Second, 
probation has not been augmented by services which per-
suade the public to conceive of it as the symbolic ana-
logue of incarceration. In this sense, a sentence to 
probation fails to quell the desires of victims, police, 
and witnesses for equitable restitution. It should be 
parenthetically stated that although probation is popularly 
perceived as leniency, it does represent a curtailment of 
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liberty, a constraint of several areas of behavior, and 
a more serious labeling event than other alternatives, 
notably conditional discharge (Harris, 1982). 
Probation Definitions 
While there is considerable consensus among crimin-
ologists as to what probation should be, the term itself 
embraces a variety of interpretations. As a legal dis-
position, probation represents a sentence which permits 
an offender to retain his/her freedom in the community 
while under the supervision ofaprobation agency and subject 
to conditions imposed by the court. In reality, however, 
it is usually considered a disposition in lieu of sentenc-
ing (Reid, 1981). Basic eligibility for probation is 
fixed by statute. Generally, restrictions on eligibility 
prohibit the granting of probation for certain serious 
offenses (e.g., rape, armed violence, armed robbery) or 
to offenders with a prior felony conviction (Killinger, 
Kerper, & Cromwell, 1976). In its Standards Relating to 
Probation, the American Bar Association speaks of probation 
as the preferred form of sentencing, unless the court 
finds the public's safety jeopardized or the defendant in 
need of institutional treatment. They also recommend 
that the probation decision be rooted in the facts and 
circumstances of each case and based upon the availability 
of institutional and community resources (Carter & Wil-
kins, 1976). 
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The Model Penal Code and the National Advisory 
Commission on Criminal Justice standards and goals stress 
the following advantages of probation as an alternative 
sentence (Kerper, 1979): (a) it maximizes the liberty of 
the individual while serving the public interest; (b) it 
promotes the rehabilitation of the offender by continuing 
normal community contacts; (c) it avoids the negative 
and stultifying effects of confinement which often severe-
ly and unnecessarily complicate the reintegration of the 
offender into the community; (d) it minimizes the impact 
of the conviction upon innocent dependents of the offender; 
and (e) it greatly reduces the financial cost of an effec-
tive correctional system. 
In selecting probation as a viable sentencing alter-
native, the judge may also consider a number of additional 
factors. Some are based upon the recommendations of crim-
inal justice personnel, for example, the probation 
department's assessment of the defendant's "probation-
ability" or the prosecutor's willingness to plea bargain; 
while other factors refer to specific characteristics of 
the offender: his/her age, rehabilitative potential, 
criminal history, drug/alcohol involvement, and mental 
health status. In addition, a set of essential questions 
is usually considered in determining whether probation 
is granted. Does the defendant's attitude toward the 
offense indicate genuine remorse? Will being placed on 
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probation enable the defendant to pay adequate restitution 
to the victim? Will the granting of probation allow the 
defendant to provide support and care for his/her family? 
(Abadinsky, 1982). 
The length of probation sentences varies from state 
to state. The American Bar Association recommends that 
the term be two years for a misdemeanor conviction and five 
years for a felony. The Illinois statute delimits a max-
imum sentence of six months for a petty offense. Generally, 
states allow for an early termination of probation super-
vision (i.e., prior to the original, judicially ordered 
date of termination). This permits the Court some neces-
sary flexibility, since it is often difficult to settle 
upon an equitable term at the time of sentencing (Abadin-
sky, 1982) . 
A number of states authorize early termination 
without supplying statutory directives that specify when 
and how it is to be exercised; other jurisdictions pro-
vide explicit guidelines for early termination. Essen-
tially, a decision in favor of early release is rendered 
if it appears that the probationer has made a good adjust-
ment to his/her sentence and that further supervision or 
enforced compliance with other conditions is no longer 
necessary (Carter & Wilkins, 1976). At other times, the 
decision may not be indicative of an offender's readiness 
to complete his/her sentence, but rather a refle.ction .of 
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the need to keep caseloads down to manageable levels 
(Abadinsky, 1982). 
Social role. A second definition of probationregards 
it as a particular social role ascribed to an individual. 
In this sense, it is the "status of a person convicted of 
a crime or judged guilty of delinquency during a period of 
suspension of sentence or corrective treatment in which 
he/she is given liberty conditional on his/her good behav-
ior and in which the State through its agents by personal 
supervision attempts to assist him/her during good behav-
ior" (Rummey & Murphy, 1952, p. 6). Hence, for the offen-
der, probation status has implications different from the 
status of either free citizen or confined prisoner. 
Probation vs. parole. The final definition of proba-
tion is simply constructed in terms of how it differs from 
parole, the fundamental distinction being that parole 
presupposes a term of imprisonment prior to release under 
supervision while probation does not. At first glance 
this formulation appears axiomatic; however, its short-
comings grow clear when it is recognized that the probation 
statutes of a number of jurisdictions permit the sentencing 
judge to rule that a portion of the probation term be 
spent in prison or jail. Accordingly, it may be more 
appropriate to differentiate between parole and probation 
on the grounds that the former is administered by a parole 
board while the latter is a function of the Court (Vasoli, 
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1964) • 
The Goals of Probation 
The three essential aims of adult probation are: (a) 
the protection of the community, (b) the reintegration of 
criminal offenders, an9 (c) the servicing of the Court 
(Allen, Carlson, & Parks, 1979; Terwillinger & Adams, 1969). 
The probation officer is the primary agent or vehicle 
through which each of the above objectives is realized. 
Community protection. The process of achieving a 
secure community implies two basic tasks. First, probation 
officers must determine the degree to which offenders are 
likely to recidivate and/or identify which members of 
their caseloads pose a discernible threat to the public. 
In making these predictions of risk, officers examine a 
number of factors, including the criminal's prior record, 
use of drugs or alcohol, psychiatric history, familial 
relationships and report demeanor. Second, officers 
must devise and implement a supervision strategy that 
permits them to exercise a degree of surveillance and 
monitoring commensurate with the probationer's assessed 
dangerousness and likelihood of future criminal activity. 
It is the officer's duty as a control agent to insure that 
the conditions of probation (Senna & Siegel, 1981) are fully 
satisfied, to promptly investigate reports or indications 
of behavior that may result in the safety of others being 
jeopardized, and to initiate probation revocation proceed-
ings if indicated, i.e., to remove the offender from the 
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community if he/she has failed to satisfactorily complete 
the sentence (Smith & Berlin, 1979). 
Reintegration of· offenders. Reintegrating offenders 
into society requires an evaluation of probationer needs, 
and a diagnosis of major problem areas and deficiencies for 
the purpose of formulating a treatment plan that will 
allow offenders to fulfill the probation contact and make 
a reasonable adjustment to society (Senna & Siegel, 1981). 
In their efforts to rehabilitate, officers act primarily 
as counselors/psychotherapists, guiding the probationer 
through interpersonal difficulties, providing direction, 
and assisting him/her to acquire insight into past behav-
ior so that more socially acceptable and constructive 
responses will begin to emerge. Essentially, the probation 
officer's basic function in this area is to support the 
criminal in making important transitions: from lawabiding 
free citizen to convicted offender under supervision, and 
finally a return to free citizen (Wallace, 1974). 
Although the probation officer is usually the prin-
cipal agent of treatment, he/she is often unable to provide 
all of the interventions necessary to accomplish the 
successful reintegration of offenders. Limited depart-
mental facilities and personnel, coupled with large 
caseloads, demand the use of community resources. It is 
the task of the probation officer as resource broker to 
assess the service needs of the probationer, locate the 
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social service agencies which address those needs as their 
primary function, refer the probationer to the appropriate 
program, and follow-up to verify that the probationer 
actually received the services (Carlson & Parks, 1979). 
Should the required service not be available in the commun-
ity, it is the responsibility of the officer to encourage 
the development of that service. 
Servicing the Court 
While the two preceding objectives of probation are 
ultimately in the service of the Court, it is through the 
preparation of presentence investigations that the proba-
tion officer most directly fulfills his/her duty as an 
agent of the judiciary. The presentence report is intended 
to provide the sentencing judge with a comprehensive social 
and psychological portrait of a defendant (Carney, 1979). 
The report surveys the following vital areas: the defen-
dant's criminal record, educational background, physical 
and mental health, social history and financial status. 
Further, it provides a description of the offender's 
environment and present living conditions, the resources 
that will be available to assist the offender, and 
specific recommendations as to sentence, if requested by 
the court or required by statute. The probation officer 
may also contribute his/her opinion regarding the moti-
vations and ambitions of the defendant, an assessment of 
the offender's rendition of the circumstances surrounding 
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his/her criminal involvement, and an evaluation regarding 
an appropriate supervision and/or treatment plan. 
The presentence investigation serves a number of 
purposes (Senna & Siegel, 1981): 
1. The report aids the court in determining an 
appropriate sentence. Information contained within the 
investigation assists the court in deciding whether there 
is reason to maintain the case in the community, or whether 
institutionalization is indicated. 
2. It supports the supervising officer in his/her 
development of a treatment program in the event the offen-
der is granted probation. The social and psychological 
strengths and weaknesses of the offender as revealed in 
the report may be considered in devising a treatment 
strategy. 
3. It develops a body of knowledge that can aid 
prison or other institutional officials in the classifying, 
treating, and releasing functions. 
4. It furnishes the parole board with information 
that may be utilized in planning a proper parole program 
if and when the imprisoned offender is released. 
5. It exists as a source of data for systematic 
research in criminal justice; for example, researchers 
using these reports can identify the characteristics of 
criminals which correlate with or predict probation 
success or failure. 
The format and content of presentence investigations 
may vary between jurisdictions and also among individual 
probation officers within the same area. On the one hand, 
some departments require voluminous reports addressing 
every aspect of a defendant's life; other departments may 
direct officers to adhere to basic facts, such as the 
offender's age, race, sex, and previous criminal record. 
In addition, different probation officers working within 
a single department may bring their idiosyncratic styles 
to bear during the presentence investigations. For example, 
the "social work" oriented officer might stress psycholog-
ical data, while the "rule-enforcing" officer may focus 
on the offender's prior record and predictions of his/her 
dangerousness (Senna & Siegel, 1981). In short, individ-
ual differences among officers combined with variations 
in interdepartmental standards produce wide disparities 
in the manner in which presentence investigations are 
prepared and utilized. 
Probation Officers' Roles and Tasks 
Officer Role Typologies 
As suggested in the above discussion, probation 
officers are obliged to wear a number of different hats 
in their efforts to fulfill the three primary goals of 
probation: (a) community protection, (b) offender rein-
tegration, and (c) court service. Several very similar 
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typologies describing the various roles of officers have 
been constructed (Ohlin, 1956; Glaser, 1964; Jordan & 
Sasfy, 1974; Keve, 1962; Klochkars, 1972; Tomaino, 1975). 
The roles most often discussed in these typologies include: 
1. The punitive or law enforcement officer. The law 
enforcement officer is basically concerned with the preser-
vation of community safety through the control of proba-
tioners and a strict adherence to the stipulations of the 
sentence. Probation is conceptualized as a privilege, not 
a right. The probationer is usually perceived as a crim-
inal who should be continually monitored and closely 
supervised, i.e., a danger from whom society must be 
sedulously protected. The law enforcer frequently reminds 
his/her cases that probation will be revoked, without 
exception, if conditions are violated. This style of 
supervision emphasizes firmness, legal authority, and rule 
abidance. Interaction between the rule enforcer and 
probationers tends to be formal, official, and largely 
a manifestation of "one upmanship" on the part of the 
officer. The punitive officer finds satisfaction in up-
holding the law for its own sake, irrespective of whether 
the best interests of the probationer have been addressed. 
2. The welfare-therapeutic officer or social worker. 
The second type of officer identified in the literature 
is essentially the diametric opposite of the rule enforcer. 
The social worker, who strives to rehabilitate and 
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reintegrate offenders into the community, regards the 
conditions of probation as hindering or blocking an offen-
der's progress. The probation period is a time for a 
diagnosis of problems, an assessment of the probationer's 
life situation and resources, and a remediation of under-
lying pathologies and intrapsychic conflicts. The social 
worker cultivates a personal relationship with offenders 
in order to formulate a suitable treatment plan which will 
assist them in avoiding future criminal activity and in 
making their lives more productive. The officer's over-
riding motivation is grounded in the assumption that 
individuals are fundamentally good and will choose appro-
priate, legal behaviors once they are helped to understand 
themselves. This self-knowledge will promote growth, 
foster prosocial attitudes, and culminate in the satis-
factory observance of probationary rules. Within this 
context, an offender is seen as disturbed or troubled, a 
victim of circumstances, socially disadvantaged or psy-
chologically deprived, rather than an inveterate sociopath 
or a pariah of society. 
3. The passive time saver or civil servant. The 
probation officer who adopts the role of civil servant 
exhibits little concern for the welfare of the community 
or the probationer; his/her job is considered a sinecure, 
demanding a modicum of effort and personal commitment. 
The civil servant concentrates on maintaining or advancing 
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his/her position within the agency and finds no law-
enforcing or casework vocation in probation. Instead, 
this type of officer directs energy toward ascending the 
probation bureaucracy with the ultimate goal of retirement, 
pension, or entry into'another field such as law or police 
work. Consistent work attendance, proper and prompt 
completion of paperwork, and the kind of self-enhancement 
that results in salary increases are characteristic of the 
time saver. Their conduct on the job contributes to the 
smooth flow of office functioning; however, all respon-
sibilities are met minimally and mechanically. Although 
contact with offenders is regular, it is often conducted 
via mail-in or telephone reporting. The civil servant's 
duties, as he/she perceives them, are to instruct and 
advise probationers concerning failure to conform, apprise 
the court of the offender's criminal behavior or lack 
thereof, and to operate as an observer of progress as 
opposed to an initiator of behavioral change. 
4. The protective/synthetic officer. The final role 
identification of probation officers is distinguished by 
its recognition of both the treatment and control compo-
nents of probation. The synthetic officer's supervisory 
style reflects his/her desire to ~atisfy the basic orien-
tations of the rule enforcer and social worker. In doing 
so, he/she is (perhaps unknowingly) coming to grips with 
the fundamental dilemma of officers, i.e., that of forging 
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a reconciliation between the conflicting tensions arising 
from the legal and social service dimensions of probation 
work. The protective officer seeks to integrate concerns 
for monitoring and rehabilitation by conducting a separate 
evaluation of each case to determine which particular 
strategy will best protect the safety of the community 
while concurrently meeting the needs of the offender. 
This type of officer is most likely to develop a working 
relationship with community resource agencies and local 
police departments. Thus, he/she recognizes the decided 
complexity of probationers' common difficulties and 
acknowledges the inherent limitations of his/her position 
in working through these problems. 
Probation Officer Tasks in Cook County 
The officers of the Cook County Adult Probation 
Department, who served as subjects in the present research, 
can best be described as "synthetic officers" (see Lurigio, 
1981). That is, they perform a number of tasks throughout 
the probation process that are directed at achieving the 
dual objectives of community protection and offender 
rehabilitation. These tasks are both comprised of and 
based upon a set of discretionary decisions that determine 
the nature of the officer-offender relationship and the 
fate of the probationer in the system. There are four 
essential discretionary decisions which relate to: (a) 
supervision; (b) treatment; (c) early termination; and 
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(d) revocation. 
Supervision. The supervisory decision, which is 
central to the surveillance or control aspect of probation, 
consists of two components. The first component pertains 
to the actual frequency with which a probationer is dir-
ected to report to his/her officer. The frequency of 
contacts--although delimited by legal statute and specified 
at the time of sentencing--is commonly modified in accor-
dance with the Court's or officer's assessment of the 
offender's dangerousness (i.e., risk level) or likelihood 
of continued criminal behavior (i.e., potential threat 
to the community). Probationers may report on a monthly 
(the prescribed and most common frequency), a bimonthly, 
or a weekly basis. In general, more risky offenders are 
monitored more often. 
The type or mode of supervision is the second com-
ponent of the decision. The officer may monitor a pro-
bationer through office visits, telephone contacts, or 
mail-in reports. Usually, the offender's assessed level 
of risk determines the selection of a supervision mode. 
For example, dangerous or felony probationers are required 
to make regular visits to the probation office, whereas 
less serious offenders are allowed mail-in reports. 
Related to the determination of a supervisory mode is the 
officer's decision to assume a particular posture with 
different members of his/her caseload. Changes in posture 
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involve discernible shifts in a probation officer's atti-
tudes, focus, and emotional tone during contacts with 
offenders. More specifically, officers' supervisory 
styles ·are altered in response to three factors. The 
offenders': (a) typical report demeanor; (b) genuine 
willingness to cooperate in the rehabilitation process; 
and (c) expressed resolution to lead a productive and 
law abiding existence (e.g., find a job, finish school, 
refrain from gang-related activity). These factors are 
referred to generically as the probationer's "attitude." 
Offenders who are honest in their self-disclosures and 
willingly accept the conditions of their sentence are 
viewed as progressing satisfactorily and as possessing a 
"positive attitude." A "negative attitude," on the other 
hand, is reflected in a probationer's continued belliger-
ence, indifference, sarcasm, or blatant attempts to patron-
ize or ingratiate an officer. Such behaviors are regarded 
as indicative of a poor adjustment to probation (Lurigio, 
1982). 
Generally, positive and negative attitude cases are 
given differential treatment. Probation officers spend 
more time monitoring their "negative" cases, are stricter 
in their interpretation of rules, less willing to accept 
the veracity of self-reports, and quicker to impose 
penalties for any infractions. They "lay down the law 
early," "play by the rules," "accept no excuses," and 
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often brandish the threat of revocation to intimidate 
offenders who manifest signs of being a potential problem 
(i.e., express a negative attitude). In contrast, their 
"positive attitude" cases experience "softer treatment" as 
well as priority in terms of extra time on report days, 
rehabilitative efforts, and resource referrals. Officers 
explain this difference in case strategies by alluding to 
the "positive" group's cooperativeness, receptivity to 
recommendations, and their amenability to change. In short, 
behavior toward a "positive attitude" offender is clearly 
more empathic, involved, open, and essentially warm in 
affect~ whereas, an officer's conduct vis-a-vis a "nega-
tive attitude" probationer is overwhelmingly suspicious, 
detached, critical, and cool in its associated affect 
(Lurigio, 1981). 
At any point during the course of the probation 
period, an officer may decide to make collateral contacts 
or cultivate relationships with a probationer's spouse, 
parent, teacher, friends, employer, or representatives of 
other agencies serving the offender. Primarily, these 
contacts permit a verification of such information as res-
idence, employment, and the fulfillment of special condi-
tions. They are also an attempt to enlist the aid of 
significant others in the effort to control, rehabilitate, 
and reintegrate the offender. Finally, if the officer 
suspects that a case is currently involved in illegal 
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activities, he/she may submit requests for state and local 
bureau of investigation reports which detail any subsequent 
charges a probationer may have incurred during the period 
of the sentence. 
Treatment. The second discretionary decision con-
sists of an assessment of whether the probationer's needs 
require the utilization of counseling techniques or 
extra-departmental resources. This decision consists of 
a gross evaluation of the offender's mental health status 
(i.e., diagnosis), and an identification of major problem 
areas (e.g., emotional, physical, interpersonal, financial). 
During initial meetings with a probationer, the officer 
searches for tell-tale signs of drug/alcohol abuse, symp-
toms of serious psychological disorders (e.g., disorienta-
tion, bizarre ideation or behavior), intellectual deficits, 
and/or a lack of social or vocational skills. Probation 
officers in Cook County rely largely on their own sensi-
tivity, common sense, and subjective judgments to alert 
them to probationer needs and to direct them in formulating 
problem solving strategies. Also, the type of "counseling .. 
offered by Cook County officers follows a didactic, in-
structional pattern that fits better within a guardian-ward 
relationship model than within any of the psychotherapeutic 
models presently in use. Officers are reluctant to render 
treatment services because of the nature of their educa-
tional backgrounds which has not prepared them to conduct 
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actual psychotherapy sessions (Lurigio, 1981). 
Officers are faced with two limitations in selecting 
an appropriate treatment: (a) the time they may spend 
counseling or advising an offender is restricted due to 
large caseloads; and (b) the choice of available referrals 
is dictated by situations or factors outside the officer's 
control (e.g., general economic conditions that affect the 
number of job referrals, a lack of government funds limit-
ing the available openings in a drug treatment program). 
Hence, officers must be highly selective in choosing pro-
bationers who are most in need of treatment, and are most 
likely to benefit from an intervention program. Offenders 
who take the initiative in requesting services and/or are 
younger, have shorter prior records and display a "positive 
attitude" are generally considered the best candidates for 
counseling and adjunctive resources. 
Early termination. The officer has the option to 
make a recommendation for the early termination of a case 
if he/she has concluded that: (a) the offender is no 
longer a significant risk to the community; (b) the 
probationer's behavior has been exemplary (i.e., he/she 
has shown a resolve to take the necessary steps toward 
becoming a functional member of society); and (c) con-
tinuation of the sentence would not facilitate rehabili-
tative efforts or may disrupt the offender's pursuit of 
an alternate, noncriminal lifestyle (e.g., early 
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termination may be recommendation on the basis of an offen-
der's request to leave the state for gainful employment). 
In contrast, officers have similar power to effect exten-
sions of periods of supervision up to the expiration of 
the maximum sentence. ·It should be noted that final 
authority in this matter rests with the Court. However, 
because judges are so dependent on the information fur-
nished by probation officers, they generally concur with 
the officer's request if it appears reasonable (cf., Green-
berg & Ruback, 1982). 
The prospect of early termination exists as an 
incentive for "good behavior," and as a demonstration to 
others that cooperation and compliance with rules are 
rewarded. A key factor in the decision to recommend early 
termination is the regularity of the offender's reporting. 
If a probationer has been consistent in his/her contacts, 
it increases the likelihood that their case will be 
reviewed for early termination. Indeed, the "best pro-
bationers" are those who routinely report at their 
scheduled times. If a cancellation is unavoidable, these 
individuals promptly call their officers to inform them 
about the extenuating circumstances that prevented their 
attendance. Probationers who are frequently tardy, 
periodically skip appointments, and who belatedly call 
with untenable excuses for failing to report are evaluated 
very negatively. In fact, when queried about the progress 
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of a case, officers are likely to respond on the basis of 
a quick tally of the number of times the particular indi-
vidual has missed a report day during the preceding six 
months. 
Revocation. The final discretionary task of the 
probation officer involves the decision to initiate revo-
cation proceedings. In most circumstances, if the offender 
has perpetrated a crime during the probation term, his/her 
sentence is automatically revoked. However, if the viola-
tion does not entail the commission of a new offense, or 
if the rule-breaking conduct is not regarded as serious, 
the officer may evaluate the offender's criminal history, 
attitude, report behavior, and employment status prior to 
acting officially by filing a petition to the Court. A 
probationer who is seen as having potential for healthy 
change is often "given a pass" for relatively minor trans-
gressions. In essence, the officer performs a powerful 
screening function on the list of possible violations that 
are eventually brought to the Court's attention. 
Following the filing of a revocation petition, the 
officer must make a second decision relating to whether 
he/she will recommend "revocation" and a return to prison 
or "continuance" on probation in the community. This 
determination is based upon the same set of factors as 
the first. On occasion, the officer will suggest a short 
stay in jail when he/she feels that the probationer. has 
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"promise" but needs to be "jolted" by serving some "hard 
time." Obviously, the Court does not always act in accor-
dance with the probation officer's recommendations. None-
theless, as in the case of early termination, the Court 
abides by the officer's suggested course of action in a 
very large percentage of cases. 
Conclusion 
In conclusion, probation stands as a viable alterna-
tive to incarceration and is viewed by many experts as hav-
ing a significant impact on the joint effort to rehabilitate 
criminals and to reduce recidivism rates (Allen, Carlson, & 
Parks, 1979). As probation services and caseloads continue 
to expand, officers are faced with the burden of diagnos-
ing, supervising, and treating an overwhelming number of 
offenders. To meet this challenge, they often employ sub-
jective categorization strategies designed to classify 
probationers into groupings that permit both a rapid iden-
tification of needs and risk levels, and an efficient 
formulation of treatment and supervisory plans (Lurigio, 
1981) . The studies comprising this dissertation examine 
the nature of these groupings and their effect upon 
officers' judgments of cases. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
In social psychology, the research pendulum has swung 
decidedly toward cognitive methodologies, theories, and 
models to account for social phenomena. Rather than simply 
manipulating stimuli, measuring responses, and inferring 
processes, investigators have profitably turned to looking 
within the black box of cognition (Fiske, 1981). Arising 
from this approach is the relatively new area of social 
cognition which is at the interface of cognitive and social 
psychology. Social cognition has borrowed concepts, hypoth-
eses, measurement procedures,and paradigms from cognitive 
psychology to examine and explain how persons cognize 
their social world and social relationships (Taylor, 1981). 
Studies in this area have typically attempted to identify 
the cognitive structures and processes that underlie social 
perception, judgment, and behavior. Some questions of 
interest to social cognition researchers include how indi-
viduals infer the dispositions of others, how they select, 
store, and utilize data to form impressions of people 
(individuals and groups), and how they interpret the 
social environment according to their needs and attribu-
tions. (For examples of the cognitive approach to social 
psychology, see Carroll & Payne, 1976; Hastie, Ostrom, 
1 
2 
Ebbesen, Wyer, Hamilton, & Carlston, 1980; Higgins, Her~ 
man, & Zanna, 1981; and Nisbett & Ross, 1980; for histor-
ical overviews, see Manis, 1977; Taylor, 1981; and Zajonc, 
1980). 
As suggested above, research in social cognition 
draws upon the methods used by cognitive psychologists to 
study both processing strategies and internal representa-
tions of reality. The bulk of social cognition research 
relies heavily on memory measures to tap the incorporation 
of social knowledge into generic structures referred to 
as schemas. Along with other cognitive concepts, the 
schema notion in particular has interested numerous social 
investigators and has stimulated a large number of studies 
on a wide range of research topics (e.g., person percep-
tion, self-concept, political information-processing, 
attitudes, stereotyping). 
A schema is an abstract cognitive representation of 
organized prior knowledge, extracted from experiences with 
specific instances (Fiske & Linville, 1980). It guides 
the encoding, storage, and retrieval of information re-
lating to a defined stimulus domain (person, object, or 
event). A schema contains certain structural properties, 
including (usually) a label identifying its contents, 
general knowledge about the domain it represents, an 
enumeration of the interrelationships among its proper-
ties, a set of presumed (or default) values for key 
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attributes, and a number of specific illustrative exemplars 
(members of a schema with the most attributes in common 
with other members of the grouping and the fewest attri-
butes in common with constituents of other contrasting 
schemas) and instantiations (concrete instances or tangible 
manifestations of the schema). Hence, schema-based cog-
nition involves the processes of inference, i.e., given 
the applicability of a particular schema, people infer 
thematically-related attributes and events that may never 
be encountered (e.g., Bower, Black, & Turner, 1979; Cantor 
& Mischel, 1979), and organization, i.e., schemas are 
people's informal sets of principles or theories about 
how the world should operate (consistency) and about what 
goes with what (relevance) (Fiske, 1981). Both aspects of 
schematic processing emphasize the impact of prior know-
ledge on new inputs. 
The current body of social psychological research on 
schemas is characterized by a number of substantive and 
methodological shortcomings (See Fiske & Linville, 1980; 
Hastie, 1981; Taylor & Crocker, 1981). For example, 
investigators in the area have concentrated largely on the 
elicitation of consensual schemas such as prototypes for 
a librarian (Cohen, 1981), an extravert (Cantor & Mischel, 
1979), or an elderly person (Brewer, Dull, & Lui, 1981), 
and rather little on individual variation in schema avail-
ability, content, and use (how a schema is employed in 
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information processing) . 
Following theoretical discussions and empirical evi-
dence offered by Fiske and Kinder (1981), one would expect 
to find important differences in schema construction and 
application arising from higher levels of experience. That 
is, experts are likely to have more detailed and complex 
knowledge structures (schemas) than non-experts, and are 
more likely to possess the procedural skills to use their 
schemas to solve problems or complete tasks. This argu-
ment finds its parallel in cognitive psychologists' work 
on expert-novice differences. According to this litera-
ture, differences between experienced and nonexperienced 
subjects in a given domain can be tracedtothe effects of 
prolonged practice, or the acquisition of extensive know-
ledge (e.g., Chase & Simon, 1973). 
A second shortcoming of schema research relates to 
the failure of investigators to study the schemas of sub-
jects in real-world settings using realistic stimulus 
materials as opposed to one-dimensional verbal descriptors 
of behaviors and traits (Cohen, 1981). Schemas that are 
developed through actual experience are probably more com-
plex in structure, and richer and more meaningful in 
content than those suggested by laboratory studies. Per-
son memory experiments are a good illustration of a pro-
cedure with low ecological validity that has failed to 
provide particularly useful information about how people 
are perceived and represented by others. For example, the 
work of Cantor and Mischel (1979) and Taylor (1981) sug-
gests that subjects form impressions of individuals 
primarily on the basis.of roles rather than traits, but 
because person memory experiments typically involve learn-
ing lists of trait adjectives about a hypothetical target, 
this paradigm misses the level at which individuals are 
actually being categorized. 
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Finally, there have been virtually no attempts to 
identify the relationship between schemas and interpersonal 
behaviors, e.g., attention, inference, evaluation, and 
planning (Fiske & Linville, 1980). Basic research in 
social cognition has ignored behavior because its central 
concerns have primarily involved an examination of internal 
(cognitive) events. Notwithstanding the problematic nature 
of predicting responses from cognitive judgments (e.g., 
Schuman & Johnson, 1976), it is obvious that information 
processing factors mediate much of social behavior and 
social perception. According to Fiske and Linville (1980), 
the link between the schematic bases of cognition and 
behavior is "an untapped gold mine" for social cognition 
investigators. 
The present studies are designed to bridge some of 
the aforementioned gaps in schema research. Probation 
officers' judgments of criminals will serve as the arena 
in which to explore questions of schema content and use 
for several reasons. First, probation officers are "ex-
perts" whose job requires them to actively acquire and 
utilize information about probationers for the purpose of 
rendering decisions regarding treatment and monitoring. 
These decisions hinge upon officers' prior knowledge of 
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the characteristic behaviors and traits of various criminal 
types. It appears that this prior knowledge is: (a) 
highly organized; (b) abstracted from previous experiences 
with different groups of offenders; and (c) invoked 
during the judgment of each incoming case (Lurigio, 1981). 
Thus, officers' assessments of probationers represent a 
"real world" instance of schematic processing, and provide 
an interesting opportunity to examine psychologically-mean-
ingful representations of the social world. 
Second, my position at the Cook County Adult Proba-
tion Department allows ready access to both realistic 
stimulus materials (criminal cases) and a group of sub-
jects who varied in experience (a central variable in the 
studies), and provided me with the necessary background to 
make informed interpretations of results--especially those 
that demanded a working knowledge of the probation process 
as well as an understanding of officers' attendant duties 
and tasks. In sum, the probation department was a conven-
ient place to do the research with few practical restric-
tions, and a cooperative and accessible pool of subjects. 
Third, there was_ some evidence to support the notion 
of schema-based cognition among criminal justice experts. 
For example, Carroll and Wiener (1982) in a study of 
parole board members and Lurigio (1981) in a survey of 
probation officers reported that experts categorized 
offenders into schema-like groupings that contained infor-
mation about basic types of criminals including the nature 
of their criminal activity and its causes, social history, 
psychological profile, prognoses for treatment, and 
recommendations concerning levels of supervision and the 
appropriate use of resources. Hence, I had reasonable 
confidence that the study of probation officers would 
yield profitable findings. 
Finally, probation officers' schemas of criminals 
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seem not only to influence judgments, but are also inex-
tricably related to their activities as service providers 
and agents of the Court (Lurigio, 1981). In essence, how 
officers "think about" probationers dictates how they 
respond to probationers in terms of treatment interventions, 
control strategies, and referrals to adjunctive agencies. 
Therefore, the study of offender schemas may suggest how 
knowledge structures mediate behaviors. 
The literature review that follows is designed to 
present a comprehensive overview of a large and seemingly 
disconnected body of studies that are based upon or have 
made reference to the schema concept. A number of topics 
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are addressed including: (a) the definition of schemas 
and their constituent components and features; (b) the 
development of the con~truct and a summary of prominent 
areas of research that have examined schematic structures 
and processing; (c) schema change, and some of the liabil-
ities of schematic processing; (d) a brief review of 
investigations that compare groups of experts and non-
experts on the content and use of schemas in a variety of 
perceptual and problem solving domains; (e) a critical 
evaluation of the concept highlighting the problems 
involved in applying schemas to study social phenomena; 
and (f) a description of studies that bear directly upon 
the present research. 
CHAPTER II 
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
In approaching n~w situations and in forming impres-
sions of others, we bring to bear a wealth of past exper-
iences, beliefs, and feelings about similar situations and 
the persons within them. This storehouse of information 
supplies us with a variety of preconceptions or hypotheses 
concerning the events that are likely to transpire in a 
given social episode, and shapes our judgments of the 
behavior and dispositions of the episode's participants. 
It also actively guides our perceptions and interpretations 
of a wide range of episode variables (e.g., setting, pur-
pose, outcome), and influences what and how information 
about the episode is selected and retained in memory in 
order to: (a) arrive at a coherent, ordered, unified, 
expectation-confirming, and knowledge-consistent represen-
tation of the experience (Alba & Hasher, 1983), and (b) 
provide a subsequent basis for how the information will 
be used (cf. Nisbett & Ross, 1979). 
The cognitive structures and information processing 
strategies that are evoked in a ~articular situation are 
often a function of the kinds of structures or strategies 
we frequently or have recently accessed or applied in 
past episodes (Higgins & King, 1981), the purposes we 
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have in making judgments within the current situation 
(Cohen, 1981), and, perhaps most importantly, the charac-
teristics of the individual or individuals being perceived 
in the immediate situation. Other persons, who usually 
constitute the primary focus of our attention (Schneider, 
Hastorf, & Ellsworth, 1979), display certain physical 
traits, behavior, and/or indicators of group membership 
which may elicit one or more of our stereotypic notions 
concerning types of people. These internal categorizations 
of person-related experiences not only influence the 
assessments we make about others, but also determine how 
we respond to them (e.g., Synder, Tanke, & Berscheid, 
1977). Finally, the context (i.e., the external situation 
itself) provides essential information for the perception 
of social episodes (Cantor, 1981). Contextual factors 
include a number of cultural and physical features of the 
environment which place limits on the latitude of appro-
priate activities allowed to take place in a given setting, 
lend fuller meaning to an actor's behaviors and intentions 
(e.g., Jones & Davis, 1965), and make certain aspects of 
stimuli particularly salient and likely to receive 
attention (Taylor & Fiske, 1978). 
Our responses to social situations are therefore a 
product of the complex and dynamic interplay of relatively 
long-term perceiver variables such as knowledge structures, 
capacities and tendencies, and relatively short-term or 
immediate situational conditions (i.e., characteristics 
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of the actors being perceived and the physical surround-
ings) as they conspire;to shape cognitive activity and 
social interaction. Such an analysis highlights the 
interactive construction of the social world--both 
perceptions and behaviors--as a function of both internal/ 
cognitive and external/contextual components (Neisser, 
1976). Of particular importance to the present research 
are the higher-level cognitive structures that portray 
portions of a perceiver's social world knowledge; that 
is, associations between behavior and person-related 
elements that develop through experience and are stored 
in semantic memory. 
The Nature of Cognitive Schemas 
Schema Definitions 
Our cognitive conceptualizations of the world are 
represented in structures which are called schemas. A 
schema is an abstract or generic cluster of knowledge 
that specifies the constituent features and defining 
attributes of a stimulus domain and the network of assoc-
iations that is believed to hold among those features and 
attributes (Bobrow & Norman, 1975; Fiske & Linville, 
1980 ; Hastie, 1981; Rumelhart & Ortony, 1977; Taylor 
& Crocker, 1981; Winograd, 1975). A number of studies· 
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have demonstrated that schernas are important in understand-
ing, remembering, and thinking about such complex and 
diverse concepts as objects, persons, groups, social 
roles, situations, evertts, sequences of events, actions, 
and sequences of actions (Cantor & Mischel, 1979; Markus, 
1977; Schank & Abelson, 1977; Thorndyke & Yekovich, 1980). 
In addition, they contain hypotheses about incoming stim-
uli, which include plans for interpreting and gathering 
schema-related information (e.g., Miller, Galanter, & 
Pribrarn, 1960; Tesser, 1979). Hence, one of the chief 
functions of a schema is to provide an answer to the 
question, "What is it?" (Taylor & Crocker, 1981). 
Schernas have been shown useful to perceivers in a 
variety of tasks such as simple object and pattern 
recognition (Labov, 1973; Posner & Keele, 1968; Reed, 
1972), the making of judgments (Markus, 1977), text corn-
prehension (Anderson, 1977), problem solving (Taylor, 
Crocker, & D'Agostino, 1978), and impression formation 
(Hamilton, Katz, & Leirer, 1980). People have and use 
schernas for perceiving visual arrays, for understanding 
meaningful prose, for processing information about the 
natural world, for understanding'and perceiving others, 
and for perceiving and directing their own behavior 
(Tesser, 1978). They help to organize, structure, and 
comprehend new facts; they facilitate the encoding., 
storage, and retrieval of relevant information; they 
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affect the time it takes to process information, and the 
speed with which problems can be solved. Schemas are 
analogous to large filing systems for classifying, retain-
ing, and coordinating incoming sensory data (Taylor & 
Crocker, 1981). They also fulfill interpretive and 
inferential functions. That is, if information conveying 
some relevant attribute is unavailable from the stimulus 
itself or is ambiguous or is unavailable from memory, 
schemas allow for the "filling in" of such information 
(Minsky, 1975; Neisser, 1976; Rumelhart & Ortony, 1977; 
Schank & Abelson, 1977; Taylor & Crocker, 1981; Tesser, 
1978). In short, schemas are cumulative, holistic, and 
assimilative blends of knowledge (Spiro, 1977) that enable 
persons to deal effectively and efficiently with the 
information processing demands of a large and complex 
world. 
A Brief History of the Schema Concept 
The term "schema" dates back to Kant (1787), who 
developed the idea that people's experiences are collected 
together in memory and that these collections are defined 
by common elements. Because these common elements 
comprise categories of experiences, they permit a synthe-
sis of abstract knowledge that represents the category. 
According to Kant (1787), schemas as higher-order prin-
ciples can be understood without specific reference to 
any particular occurrence within a schematic category. 
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Hence, one identifies experiences of the category by re-
ferring to the general schema that describes the category. 
The neurologist Head (1920) adopted Kant's notion of a 
schema, and stated that anything entering consciousness 
is "charged with its relation to something that has gone 
before." In a similar vein, Woodworth (1938), in his 
classic text on experimental psychology, theorized that 
the process of remembering involved the "revival of one's 
own experiences." 
As a theoretical construct, the schema concept has 
been operative in psychology for more than fifty years. 
It was originally introducted into psychological research 
as a reaction to the associationist models of learning 
and memory (Hastie, 1981). In moving beyond simple 
experimental tasks, investigators discovered that the more 
traditional analyses spawned by Ebbinghaus' (1885) work 
failed to account for what was rapidly becoming a consid-
erable body of empirical evidence. While early associa-
tion theories predicted a literal representation of a 
stimuli in memory, researchers were uncovering large 
differences between the structure and content of a 
stimulus and its mental reproduction (Tulving & Donaldson, 
1972). Indeed, it wae shown that subjects in perception 
and memory experiments imported a considerable amount of 
prior knowledge that influenced their understanding arid 
retention of novel information (Hastie, 1981). 
15 
The use of schemas as explanatory mechanisms emerged 
in many branches of psychology with similar but slightly 
different meanings in each. For example, Gestalt psychol-
ogists found the concept of an abstract schema useful in 
describing memory for perceptual information (e.g., Wood-
worth, 1938). The Gestalt tradition has since produced a 
large literature demonstrating that verbal materials which 
are meaningfully or schematically organized are better 
remembered than nonschematic materials (e.g., Asch & 
Ebenholtz, 1962; Garner & Whitman, 1965; Katona, 1940; 
Turving & Pearlstone, 1966). Also, Piaget's (1926) work 
called upon schemas to explain the cognitive development 
of children. Finally, early researchers in problem solv-
ing (e.g., Betz, 1932; Flach, 1925; Selz, 1913, 1922) 
viewed schemas as solution methods or plans of operation 
guiding the problem solver's behavior. 
Cognitive schemas found their way into modern 
psychology primarily through the writings of Bartlett, 
and it is to him that most workers in the area acknowledge 
their debt. In 1932, Bartlett completed a book entitled, 
Remembering: A study in experimental and social psycho!-
~ which presented a series of experiments involving 
memory for complex literary material (e.g., brief stories, 
prose passages, pictures, and American Indian picture 
writings) . His central stimulus for testing the effects 
of time on the remembering of prose was the story known 
as "The War of the Ghosts." Bartlett reported that sub-
jects who had read the,narrative and were asked to recall 
and repeatedly reproduce its contents omitted and/or 
distorted essential details and introduced new elements 
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to the story. Such errors increased dramatically with the 
passage of time. Greater delays produced more elabora-
tions, inaccuracies, and truncations of the material. All 
that appeared to remain of the original version were 
"isolated but striking details" which seemed to correspond 
to subjects' preconceptions. Moreover, subsequent repro-
ductions by the same individual revealed that a persistent 
idiosyncratic outline or form emerged in the recall 
attempts. Bartlett concluded that subjects were recon-
structing the events of the story using a few details and 
an abstract cognitive schema as an elaboration plan. He 
summarized his findings as follows (Bartlett, 1932): 
Remembering is not the re-excitation of innumerable 
fixed, lifeless and fragmentary traces. It is an 
imaginative reconstruction, or construction, built 
out of organized past reactions or experience, and 
to a little outstanding detail which commonly appears 
in image or language form. (p. 213) 
Thus, according to Bartlett' (1932), schemas repre-
sent a mass of active organizations of past reactions or 
experiences. Any one schema is presumably the collective 
knowledge of a particular set of stimuli or a specific 
type of previous experience. Bartlett posited that the 
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changes he found in subjects' reproductions of prose re-
flected a dependence on schemas related to the story or 
onto which the story was mapped. As the retention interval 
increased, subjects relied increasingly on these general 
schemas during recall attempts. In other words, schemas 
provided the basis for reconstruction in memory (Zechmeis-
ter & Nyberg, 1982). Bartlett's work has been extremely 
influential. Indeed, much of the modern research on memory 
for narrative discourse can be essentially viewed as an 
extention of Bartlett's theories and methods with an 
emphasis on accounting for accurate reproduction as well 
as for errors (e.g., Rumelhart, 1975; Schank & Abelson, 
1975). 
The current resurgence of interest in cognitive 
schemas is manifested in three lines of research. The 
first, conducted in the area of artificial intelligence, 
has sought to define new data structures for encoding 
complex descriptions of the world (i.e., situations, 
events, and concepts) while endeavoring to construct 
language production and comprehension machines. The 
result has been a proliferation of higher-order represen-
tations that utilize some form of knowledge clustering 
such as "frames" (Kuipers, 1975; Minsky, 1975; Winograd, 
1975), "scripts" (Schank & Abelson, 1975, 1977), "defin-
itions" (Norman & Rumelhart, 1975), or other forms of 
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schemata (Moore & Newell, 1974; Schmidt, 1976). For 
example, scripts or event schemas organize and direct the 
understanding of a sequence of real-world activities. They 
may pertain to actions'involving specific occurrences 
(e.g., Bob and Carol's wedding), or routine, well prac-
tised behavioral scripts (e.g., eating at a restaurant, 
going to the dentist, attending a funeral) (e.g., Bower, 
Black, & Turner, 1979; Schank & Abelson, 1977). 
The second domain of research in which schemas have 
received considerable treatment has been that of memory 
for connected discourse. Principally inspired by Bart-
lett's seminal studies, several researchers have begun 
to extend and formalize his ideas by attempting to model 
the underlying memorial structures that are involved in 
the processing of prose passages. In particular, these 
investigators have developed the hypothesis that readers 
use previously learned schemas to facilitate the encod-
ing, comprehension, and remembering of simple narrative 
stories (Anderson, Reynolds, Schallert, & Goetz, 1976; 
Anderson, Spiro, & Anderson, 1977; Dooling & Christian-
sen, 1977; Kintsch, 1975; Kintsch & van Dijk, 1975, 1978; 
Mandler, 1978; Mandler & Johnson, 1977; Pichert & Ander-
son, 1977; Rurnelhart, 1975, 1977; Rurnelhart & Ortony, 
1977; Schank, 1975; Stein & Glenn, 1978; Thorndyke, 1976, 
1977, 1978; Thorndyke & Hayes-Roth, 1979; Winograd, 
1977) • 
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The field of social cognition, from which the 
present research arises, is the third and final area that 
has made extensive use of schemata as descriptive or 
explanatory concepts. (Refer to the introductory chapter 
for a discussion of the field.) Two general classes of 
cognitive schemas are commonly used by social perceivers, 
and reflect somewhat independent programs of study in 
social cognition (Taylor & Crocker, 1981). The first is 
person schemas. A person schema is an integrated cogni-
tive representation or impression of a specific individual 
(e.g., Hamilton, Katz, & Leirer, 1980; Taylor, Fiske, 
Etcoff, & Ruderman, 1978). The person portrayed may be 
a close friend, family member, etc., or someone who is 
only a transitory or casual acquaintance. Person schemas 
also include prototypic conceptions like introvert and 
extravert (Cantor & Mischel, 1977) and self-schemata 
(Markus, 1977). The second is role schemas, which include 
schemas for particular occupations; for example, fireman, 
doctor, college professor, librarian, or politician 
(e.g., Cohen, 1977, 1981, 1983); schemas for social 
roles, such as spouse, parent, or child; and generalized 
conceptions of categories of people such as Blacks or 
women. Some of this research, growing out of an interest 
in stereotyping, has been concerned with the cognitive 
processing biases that can result in and maintain inac~ 
curate representations of social groups. (See Hamilton 
[1981] for a review of the literature on the cognitive 
basis of stereotyping.) 
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As the above indicates, the schema construct has been 
used to study a wide range of topic areas in psychological 
research. Because the concept of a schema as an organizer 
of human experience is so encompassing, it is perhaps 
inevitable that various investigators and theoreticians have 
proposed models that differ in their explications of what a 
schema is, how it is structured, or how it is applied 
(Thorndyke & Yekovich, 1980). In spite of differing orien-
tations, several common assumptions underlie the various 
formulations of the concept. These commonalities include 
four putative properties of schemas: (a) schemas categor-
ize knowledge and experience, (b) schemas contain variables, 
(c) schemas are organized, structured entities, and (d) 
schemas affect the manner in which information is processed 
(i.e., encoded, stored, and retrieved) (cf. Hastie, 1981; 
Taylor & Crocker, 1981; Thorndyke & Yekovich, 1980). 
Schemas Categorize Knowledge and Experience 
Schemas embody conceptual knowledge that is encyclo-
pedic rather than definitional in nature. Although they 
can be expressed in language and applied toward understand-
ing language, they are not entirely or necessarily linguis-
tic (Rumelhart & Ortony, 1977). The contents of a schema 
may consist of sensory input or perceptual images (Cantor, 
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1981), affective components (Fiske, 1981), and well-learned 
behavioral routines or response strategies (Fiske & Kinder, 
1981). Hence, a schema is more than a verbal description, 
summary, or veridical copy of a phenomenon; it captures 
the totality of experience associated with the phenomenon, 
which includes information that is encoded and stored in a 
non-verbal manner (cf. Neisser, 1976). 
Schemas are abstract, symbolic representations of 
reality that specify the "normal constituent parts" of an 
object, person, event, etc., and the "relationships that 
normally hold between them" (Rumelhart & Ortony, 1977). 
Even when the essential characteristics of a schema are 
depicted, they are generally portrayed as characteristics 
that typically or commonly obtain. Hence, schemas are 
analogous to the "fuzzy" or prototype categories suggested 
by the work of Rosch and her colleagues (e.g., Rosch, 1975, 
1977; Rosch & Lloyd, 1976; Rosch & Mervis, 1975), as opposed 
to strictly defined sets of classifying schemes. For 
example, an individual's schema for a CRIMINAL comprises a 
configuration of correlated features (e.g., menacing 
appearance, male, Black, uneducated, violent, muscular, 
law breaking, ex-convict, belligerent, etc.), some of which 
distinguish the criminal from different person types (e.g., 
psychotics), and others which are shared in common by a 
variety of person types (e.g., football players can also 
be Black, menacing, violent, and belligerent). No actual 
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criminal would be expected to possess all the characteris-
tics of the schema; however, any subset of its character-
istics might describe a real or easily recognizable offender 
(cf. Cantor, 1981). 
It is assumed that each feature of the CRIMINAL 
schema is assigned a hypothetical weight which indicates its 
importance or centrality in defining the schema. Features 
that are considered significant in determing category 
membership are said to have high cue validity (Rosch & Mer-
vis, 1975). ("Law breaking" obviously has higher cue valid-
ity than "muscular.") Also, every feature of the schema 
will not be associated with all of its members (e.g., the 
Watergate conspirators were clearly not violent or unedu-
cated, but were nevertheless reputed by many to be crimin-
als). Thus, the constituents of a schema are often quite 
heterogeneous, resulting in a less than perfect nesting of 
the schema's features (Cantor, Smith, French, & Mezzich, 
1980). 
In addition, it is assumed that there exists a 
specific combination of features which constitutes the 
exemplar of the schema, i.e., the clearest case of,category 
membership containing maximal cue validity (Rosch, 1978). 
Instances are matched against (compared to) the exemplar 
in order to ascertain whether or not they are elements of 
the category. This comparison does not necessarily involve 
an analysis of individual features, but instead may be based 
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upon patterns of features that are not themselves dis-
tinguished (Wyer, 1980). The greater the overlap of fea-
tures, the more quickly, reliably, confidently, and accur-
ately the instance can be classified. Therefore, typical 
instances (i.e., those that share many features with the 
schema exemplar) are categorized more efficiently than 
atypical instances (Cantor et al., 1980). For example, a 
Black, uneducated, violent male who commits an armed 
robbery and shows contempt for the Judge at his trial, 
provides a more definitive case of a CRIMINAL schema match 
than does a White, male, college graduate who is arrested 
for pilfering items from a grocery store. Similarly, Rosch 
(1978) reported that subjects were able to easily classify 
a robin as a bird, whereas they showed marked disagreement 
in deciding whether to place a chicken in the same category. 
Further, categorizing a given instance into a particular 
schema is simplified if the exemplar of the schema is rich 
(as measured by the total number of its features) and 
distinct (as measured by the number of its features that 
are not shared by rival categories) (Rosch, Mervis, Gray, 
Johnson, & Boyes-Braem, 1976). In short, the instances of 
a schema vary in their typicality and ease of categoriza-
tion. Those that lie at the periphery or borderline of 
the schema (i.e., instances that share few features with 
the schema exemplar) are problematic in terms of determining 
their category membership (Cantor et al., 1980). 
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schema Variables 
The properties that define the features of a schema 
are represented as variables or slots that can be filled 
whenever the schema is used to structure and comprehend 
incoming information. Schema variables are best thought of 
as distributions of possible values. That is, a particular 
variable can take on any of a range of values with the 
likelihood of a single value being determined by its posi-
tion or typicality in this distribution. Hence, just as 
judgments regarding the fit between instances and schemas 
are not always clear-cut, the values of schema variables 
are also more or less probable, and rooted in the strength 
of one's expectations. 
Based on Hastie's (1981) notions pertaining to schema-
event relatedness and the memorability of information, it 
is suggested that variable-value relationships can be por-
trayed on a conditional probability continuum. Variable 
values that are likely have conditional probabilities closer 
to 1 [i.e., probability (value/variable) >.70], whereas 
values that are not likely are clustered at the opposite 
end of the probability dimension [i.e., probability (value/ 
variable) <.30]. Values that are unrelated or irrelevant 
to the variable are found in the middle range of conditional 
probabilities [i.e., probability (value/variable) = .50]. 
For example, a person's schema for an extravert may contain 
a variable relating to "party behavior." Likely values for 
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this variable given the extravert schema (i.e., those with 
conditional probabilities approximating 1) include garrulous, 
laughs loudly, sociable, outgoing, rambunctious, center of 
attention, etc. In contrast, unlikely values (i.e., those 
with conditional probabilities closer to 0) might consist 
of soft spoken, reticent, shy, easily embarrassed, does not 
dance, etc. Variable values falling in the middle range of 
probabilities (i.e., those that are irrelevant to the 
variable) comprise events such as drinks coke, smokes 
cigarettes, wears running shoes, etc. Events or values 
associated with intermediate conditional probabilities are 
difficult to specify because of their extreme heterogeneous-
ness. (Strictly speaking, events completely removed from 
the schema's domain of application also fall in the proba-
bility range of .50.) Hastie (1981) suggests that the 
identification of intermediate conditional probability val-
ues be restricted to events that are schema pertinent but 
undiagnostic as illustrated in the preceding example. 
When an assignment of values to variables has been 
made, a schema is said to have been instantiated. Instan-
tiation is the process by which a schema creates a descrip-
tion or representation from observations of a stimulus in 
its domain, i.e., the process of matching inputs to slots 
in the schema (Rumelhart & Ortony, 1977). Instantiation is 
analogous to the formulation of a "token" node in semantic· 
network models (e.g., Anderson & Bower, 1973) to represent 
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the specific occurrence of an abstract concept. When a 
schema is instantiated during comprehension, a copy of the 
general schema is constructed with data from the input 
stream occupying the variable slots. The process of instan-
tiation permits the organization and encoding of incoming 
information into a familiar, coherent, conceptual represen-
tation (Thorndyke & Yekovich, 1980) . 
Not every instantiation will match the expected values 
for schema variables; hence, there are constraints or 
limits on what values are acceptable (Rumelhart & Norman, 
1978). Therefore, the likelihood of a value given a vari-
able shifts as the variable's constraints are modified. 
Variable values are delimited by a number of elements, 
including the to-be-comprehended stimulus as well as the 
set of contextual and situational factors surrounding the 
stimulus. For example, one might have a schema for PERSONAL 
CRIME that would comprise three variables: a criminal, a 
victim, and an offense. On different occasions, the vari-
ables in the PERSONAL CRIME schema will assume various 
values as a function of the stimulus environment which pro-
vides referents for a mental representation of the event 
(Rumelhart & Ortony, 1977). 
Although the values of schema variables may vary 
according to certain defining aspects of the external 
environment, the interrelationships among the variables 
within a particular schema remain constant across times 
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and settings. In other words, because schemas express 
stereotypic knowledge, they constrain the form in which 
events can combine, while allowing flexibility in the seman-
tic content of the events themselves (Thorndyke & Yekovich, 
1980). Thus, it is the criminal who generally perpetrates 
the offense against the victim who suffers some sort of loss 
or injury, irrespective of the identity of the offender or 
victim or the nature· of the crime. 
Constraints on schema variables serve two fundamental 
purposes. First, they indicate what kinds of objects might 
realistically be associated with each variable, i.e., con-
straint values determine decisions about what is and what 
is not an instantiation of the schema. Second, constraints 
on schema variables allow good guesses to be made about the 
nature of unspecified variables when insufficient informa-
tion is provided by current input or memory, or when a 
stimulus configuration is so complex that the perceiver is 
unable to encode all its details (Rumelhart & Ortony, 1977; 
Taylor & Crocker, 1981). These inferred values are called 
default options (Minsky, 1975; Rumelhart & Ortony, 1977; 
Rumelhart & Norman, 1978; Schank & Abelson, 1977; Taylor 
& Crocker, 1981). Default options·presumably develop from 
experiences with instances of a schema and are thus typical 
qualities of the stimulus domain in question (Taylor & 
Crocker, 1981). 
The use of default options guides the process of 
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recognizing a particular phenomenon by suggesting what fea-
tures to look for and where to expect them, and by providing 
answers to questions for which observations have not yet 
been made (Kuipers, 197S). The latter application of de-
fault values allows a schematic representation to satisfy 
the "principle of continually available output" (Norman & 
Bobrow, 1975) which states that a cognitive search process 
should be able to provide a satisfactory outcome even when 
its analysis has not yet been completed. A lack of data 
or processing resources should result in a degradation of 
the quality of the output, but should not preclude any re-
sults from being produced. It should be noted that default 
options are not always fixed independently of the values of 
other variables within a schema. Instead, they are usually 
chosen on a conditional basis, i.e., the designation of a 
default value may depend upon the values already selected 
to fill the slots of the remaining variables (Rurnelhart & 
Ortony, 1977). In other words, values of variables that 
are inferred must be compatible or congruent with values 
of variables that are known. For example, if one learns 
that a victim died of stab wounds resulting from an apparent 
struggle with a would-be robber, and that an alleged murder 
Weapon was found close to the scene of the crime, but is 
not informed as to the exact composition of the weapon, 
one is not likely to surmise that it was a hand-gun or· 
garrote. 
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The Structure of Schemas 
The structural organization of schemas is character-
ized by a hierarchical relationship between a dominating 
schema and embedded or lower level schemas which may serve 
as "data" for the higher level schema. That is, more 
specific lower level schemas are linked with more abstract 
higher level schemas in subordinate/superordinate relation-
ships (Hamilton, 1981; Tesser, 1978). For example, the 
schema for a birthday party specifies and elaborates a more 
general PARTY schema. Although both share many of the same 
features, the variables of the birthday party schema are 
more precisely articulated than for the generic party. A 
party might have "food" as one of its variables, whereas a 
birthday party schema would specify "cake and ice cream" as 
its typical culinary delights. Thus, a particular schema's 
level in the schema hierarchy determines the constraints on 
its constituent properties (Thorndyke & Yekovich, 1980). 
Similarly, data stored within a schema constitute a 
pyramidal structure with abstract or general information 
contained at the uppermost levels and specific instances or 
examples of the schema occupying the lower levels (Hamilton, 
1981; Taylor & Crocker, 1981). At the most abstract level 
is a generic concept (e.g., family) that has central defin-
ing features (e.g., parents and siblings), and variables 
(e.g., sister). At this level of abstraction, the con-
straint values associated with the variables may accept a 
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wide range of values {e.g., 1,2,3,4 or more sisters). The 
most basic or primitive level of a schema consists of a 
number of specific instances, whereas the middle level con-
tains exemplars of the schema. Generally, the instances 
that are stored within a schema will be "good examples" of 
the schema, with instantiations of variables that probably 
approximate the default values of the schema {e.g., Rosch, 
1978). For example, when one's schema for gangster is 
evoked, the image of Al Capone may become available in 
memory. 
The separate elements of a schema, at any level, are 
woven together in an associative network or pattern that 
fashions a web of interconnecting nodes or pathways {cf., 
Hastie, 1980; Wyer & Carlston, 1979). Each piece of in-
formation (i.e., schematic node) is directly linked to the 
central concept or entry point. In addition, separate 
schematic nodes can be closely tied to each other. Hence, 
schemas are also horizontally structured (Hamilton, 1981) • 
The associative linkages between single elements may be a 
function of their (a) semantic similarity or conceptual 
overlap (i.e., different features may refer to the same 
superordinate concept); (b) temporal contiguity (e.g., in 
a script the elements are re1ated according to an ordered 
sequence of events); or (c) encoding specificity (e.g., 
the information may be linked because it was acquired 
during the same behavioral episode or within the same 
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social context) . 
Schemas are not only defined by a web of intraconnec-
tions among their individual elements, but they are also 
related to one another;via a rich interassociative network, 
particularly at the lower levels of greater specificity 
(Taylor & Crocker, 1981). Therefore, a single instance may 
be represented in several schemas, with between schema 
linkages indicating the cross references. Moreover, a 
schema that is itself a distinct cognitive representation 
can also serve as a specific illustration or example of one 
or more different schemas. For example, one's friend John 
may be included in his/her extravert and psychologist 
schemas as a concrete instance of each, while at the same 
time, the individual can possess a separate person schema 
for John that comprises his traits, physical appearance, 
characteristics, and attributes as well as a number of 
behaviors he has engaged in as manifestations of those 
attributes. 
Schematic Processing 
Schemas operate according to an underlying cognitive 
mechanism that processes incoming information. Schematic 
processing intervenes between the perception of a stimulus 
and its cognitive representation in such a manner that 
input is made more systematic and the resultant material 
which is stored in memory does not directly correspond to 
the original stimulus (Alba & Hasher, 1983). This 
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description emphasizes three points. 
First, it places the locus of information processing 
within the perceiver. Schemas constitute a portion of the 
contents of what is commonly referred to as the "black 
box." Although we clearly have not yet reached a level of 
sophistication that permits a precise localization of the 
neurological substrates that correspond to cognitive struc-
tures (i.e., schemas), it is nevertheless assumed that they 
are existing "bundles" of knowledge that people "carry 
about in their heads." Positing the cognitive contents of 
the black box is admittedly an act of theory, the impor-
tance of which is in providing a useful device for under-
standing and describing the relationships among input 
features (i.e., the nature of information, its source and 
the context in which it is received) and output variables 
(e.g., beliefs, judgments, attitudes, behaviors) (Fiske & 
Linville, 1980). 
Second, it suggests that schematic processing leads 
to a greater organization and clarification of information 
as opposed to greater randomness or uncertainty. Schemas 
simplify., categorize, and analyze incoming stimuli; they 
fill in missing components of incomplete stimulus configur-
ations, guide the search for additional data, and in some 
cases, amplify new information as it is encountered. Thus, 
schemas actively reconstruct and redefine stimuli in a 
process that renders them more recognizable and 
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comprehensible to the perceiver (Rumelhart & Ortony, 1977; 
Taylor & Crocker, 1981). 
Third, it implies that acquired information is modi-
fied and/or interpreted in a direction that is consistent 
with invoked schemas. Material is not represented as a 
veridical copy of the current environment, but is reshaped 
to fit pre-existing abstractions of reality. Therefore, 
schemas function in the service of adaptive efficiency 
rather than toward the achievement of precise and accurate 
cognitive reproductions of stimuli (Cantor, 1981). 
A collection of independent experiments employing 
different stimulus materials, dependent measures, and 
schematic constructs (e.g., person schemas, prototypes, 
stereotypes, scripts) has yielded a set of similar findings 
regarding the effects of schema evocation upon information 
processing. A body of research has demonstrated the ways 
that schemas can influence, bias, and distort the encod-
ing, representation, and retrieval of schema-relevant 
information, as well as inferences and judgments about 
schema-relevant stimuli (see Hastie, 1981; Nisbett & Ross, 
1980; and Taylor & Crocker, 1981 for reviews). 
In the field of social cognition, for example, con-
verging evidence has revealed that the schematic processing 
of information (i.e., processing that is guided by expec-
tations or preconceptions) produces: (a) more accurate 
recall of schema consistent material (e.g., Rothbart, 
~~"!!'-...... ....._ 
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Evans, & Fulero, 1979); (b) a bias-toward-schema effect 
leading to errors of commission, distortions in recall, 
and false recognition (e.g., Cantor & Mischel, 1979; Carl-
ston, 1980; Cohen, 197?; Higgins & Rholes, 1979; Synder & 
Uranowitz, 1978; Woll & Yopp, 1978); (c) higher recogni-
tion confidence of schema-related information (e.g., Tsuji-
moto, 1978); (d) greater resistance to the disconfirmation 
of schema-relevant facts (e.g., Markus, 1977); (e) signi-
ficant clustering in recall (e.g., Hamilton, Katz, & Leirer, 
1980); and (f) faster reaction times in problem solving 
and judgment tasks (e.g., Taylor, Crocker, & D'Agostino, 
1978; Ostrom, Lingle, Pryor, & Geva, 1980). 
The Executive Function and Schema Accessibility 
The entire memory apparatus presumably contains a 
multitude of schemata, any one of which may be activated 
in response to environmental stimuli. At any given time, 
however, only a few of them are relevant to the stimulus 
and are therefore necessary to fully process information. 
A method that randomly or haphazardly searches for appro-
priate knowledge structures would obviously be protracted 
and unwieldy, and could not possibly result in their 
efficient selection. The choice of likely schemata must 
therefore be systematic. What seems to be required is a 
Processing mechanism that is highly sensitive, not only to 
the immediate input and the context in which it occurs, but 
also to the content and organization of available knowledge. 
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Moreover, the mechanism must have the capacity to quickly 
analyze and weight these components (i.e., input, context, 
knowledge) in order to lead (more or less directly) to a 
schema or set of schemas that best matches the impinging 
information or sufficiently "accounts for the input" (Rum-
elhart & Ortony, 1977). 
Hence, it is proposed that schemas are embedded in a 
larger information processing system which is guided by an 
executive function. [For extensive discussions of the 
executive function in cognitive psychology, see Anderson 
(1975), Neisser (1966), and Tulving and Donaldson (1972).] 
The hypothesized tasks of the executive include (cf., Fiske 
& Linville, 1980): (a) abstracting schemas from specific 
instances or experiences (i.e., directing the basic pro-
cesses through which schemas are developed); (b) indexing 
schemas through concepts or labels to facilitate their 
organization and identification in memory; and (c) search-
ing for and evoking relevant schemas to process incoming 
data. 
Rumelhart and Ortony (1977) suggest that it is use-
ful to envisage the relationship between the executive 
function and a specific schema in terms of a computer-
programming metaphor in which the former is analogous to 
a master program, and the latter is viewed as a procedure 
that comprises a number of subroutines. One can think of 
the activation of a.schema (which is controlled by the 
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master program or executive) as paralleling the invocation 
of a procedure. Lower~order schemas, which are contained 
within a superordinate schema, are analogous to subroutines. 
Hence, the activation of subschemas is like the calling up 
of subroutines within a procedure. However, unlike ordi-
nary procedure calls in which the flow of control is only 
from procedure to subroutine, the flow of control in a 
schema operates in both directions. It is as though a given 
procedure not only can invoke its own subroutines, but can 
also be activated by the subroutines themselves. Thus, 
although the executive-based search for a schema can only 
proceed in one direction, the evocation process within a 
particular schema may occur in a reciprocal fashion between 
different levels. 
Schemas may therefore be evoked from the top-down 
(conceptually driven processing) or from the bottom-up 
(data or event driven processing) . Bobrow and Norman 
(1975) describe these types of processing as follows: 
"Conceptually driven processing tends to be top-down, 
driven by motives and goals and fitting input to expecta-
tions; event driven processing tends to be bottom-up, 
finding structures in which to imbed the input" (p. l40). 
Hence, bottom-up processing occurs when aspects of the 
input directly suggest or activate schemas which corres-
pond to them, or when subschemas activate or suggest the 
superordinate schemas in which they are nested. Top-down 
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processing, on the other hand, occurs when a sub- or super-
ordinate schema generates a search through the input data 
for instances that confirm schematic expectations or re-
semble the particular constituents which they subsume. 
For example, a probation officer is engaging in a 
top-down processing of case information when any pertient 
data is selected, reviewed, interpreted, and inferred from 
a standpoint consistent with the officer's preconceived 
notions about the types of characteristics or behaviors 
that are associated with a specific category or categories 
of offenders. In bottom up processing, an offender schema 
is evoked by the case information itself (e.g., knowing a 
probationer has been arrested for drug possession may 
invoke a "drug addict schema"). As each piece of infor-
mation is encountered, the officer attempts to comprehend 
its meaning by relating it to knowledge structures that are 
stored in long-term memory. The evaluation of cases is 
assumed to involve the simultaneous operation of concep-
tually driven and data driven processes (cf., Anderson, 
1975; Rose, 1981). Thus, an officer's judgments of an 
offender are determined by both his/her knowledge about 
crime and criminals, and the actual facts presented in 
the case. 
The readiness with which a schema is utilized in 
information processing is a function of its relative 
accessibility (Higgins & King, 1981). Schema accessibility 
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appears to be influenced by three factors: recency, fre-
quency, and salience (Higgins & King, 1981; Wyer & Srull, 
1981) . If a schema has been recently accessed and used in 
making a judgment or evaluation, the likelihood that itwill 
be reactivated and applied as a basis for judgments in the 
same or a different situation is increased. A study by 
Higgins, Rholes, and Jones (1977) illustrates this point. 
They had subjects make judgments about either helpfulness 
or dishonesty. Later, subjects were exposed to an ambig-
uous behavior description that could be interpreted as a 
manifestation of honesty or helpfulness (giving another 
student the answer to an exam question) . Subjects who had 
previously made helpfulness judgments viewed the behavior 
positively and rated the target person as more helpful, 
whereas subjects who had been making dishonesty judgments 
interpreted the behavior in an unfavorable light and rated 
the target as dishonest. Thus, exposure to personality 
trait terms in a priming task increased the accessibility 
of the construct (i.e., trait schema) designated by the 
terms, as indicated by subjects' tendency to use the primed 
construct to later characterize the stimulus person in an 
impression formation task. 1 Similarly, Carlson (1977) and 
1This research may be compared to the earlier work 
of Sherif and his colleagues (see Sherif and Hovland, 1961) 
Who were interested in the basic question of how judgments 
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Lingle and Ostrom (1979) found that subjects who had made 
judgments of a target person in response to stimulus 
information were more likely to use the judgments as a basis 
for later evaluations than to use the original stimulus 
information. 
The frequency with which a schema is activated also 
affects its accessibility, in part, because a schema that 
is activated frequently is likely to have been activated 
recently (Higgins & King, 1981; Srull & Wyer, 1980; Wyer 
& Srull, 1981). For example, Wyer and Srull (1980) pre-
sented subjects in an initial priming study with 6, 12, 24, 
or 48 behavioral instances of a trait construct and found 
a positive, generally monotonic relationship between the 
number of instances presented (the frequency of schema acti-
vation) and the extent to which a target person in a sub-
sequent impression formation task was characterized in 
are affected by the context in which they are embedded. 
Sherif and Hovland (1961), for example, found that a per-
son's judgments of attitude statements relating to an 
issue were a function of his/her initial attitude toward 
the issue. Statements that were close to a subject's posi-
tion (i.e., those falling within their latitude of accep-
tance) were assimilated and judged as more similar than 
they really were, whereas statements that were discrepant 
from their initial position (i.e •• those falling within 
their latitude of rejection) were contrasted and judged as 
less similar than they actually were. Whether assimilation 
or contrast effects occur was also shown to be influenced 
by a number of other factors such as the credibility of the 
source presenting a persuasive message about the issue at 
hand as well as the person's ego involvement in the issue 
(Wrightmen & Deaux, 1981). 
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terms of the construct. 
If the repeated activation of a schema is massed 
over an abbreviated period of time, then its accessibility 
will be somewhat transitory. If, however, the repeated 
activation is dispersed over a long period, then the 
accessibility effects will be relatively prolonged (Higgins, 
Feldman, & Ruble, 1980). Hence, variations in frequency 
of activation over time may lead to stable individual 
differences in the accessibility of schemas for different 
perceivers. Higgins and King (1981) have shown that dif-
ferences among people in construct accessibility can be 
chronic and context independent, and that the constructs 
which are accessible to a perceiver are a product of the 
kinds of information the perceiver has retained about 
others. Along similar lines, Markus and Smith (1981) have 
argued that the schemas individuals bring to bear in pro-
cessing information about others are those that are impor-
tant to their own self concepts. In one study, Markus and 
Fong (1979) reported that subjects who were schematic with 
respect to independence for themselves made more extreme 
judgments about the independence of another person than 
did subjects who were aschematic ·With respect to this 
trait. 
Finally, the relative accessibility of a schema is 
determined by salience. A stimlulus that is distinctive 
may elicit a schema which is relevant to that 
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distinctiveness. That is, individuals are more likely to 
categorize themselves and others along dimensions that are 
more striking or attention grabbing (McArthur, 1981). For 
example, a black in an·otherwise white group is more likely 
to evoke the "black person" schema than a black in a group 
of mixed racial composition or in an all black group. 
Studies by Taylor and her associates (Taylor, Fiske, Et-
coff, & Ruderman, 1978; Taylor, Fiske, Close, Anderson, 
Ruderman, 1975; see Taylor, 1981) exposed subjects to group 
discussions and found that the salient novel black in an 
all-white group and the salient novel female or male in a 
group of the opposite sex were rated as more prominent or 
influential on a number of measures than the same actors 
when they were less distinctive by virtue of appearing in 
racially or sexually balanced groups. The effect of momen-
tary salience on judgments and attributed responses has 
also been demonstrated in other studies (e.g., Shomer & 
Centers, 1970). In addition, there is some evidence that 
salience can cause increases in the accessibility of dif-
ferent aspects of a person's self-schema (McGuire, McGuire, 
Child, & Fujioka, 1978). McGuire and Padawer-Singer 
(1976), for example, found that the characteristics elemen-
tary school children included in their spontaneous self-
descriptions were a function of their distinctiveness 
within the classroom, with distinctive attributes being 
more likely to be mentioned (e.g., green eyes, foreign 
birthplace) . 
The Liabilities of Schematic Processing 
As illustrated in the preceding section, schemas are 
thought to play a fundamental role in the processing of 
information and are invoked during attentional, encoding, 
retrieval, and higher-order thought processes. However, 
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the use of schemas may result in information being processed 
selectively; consequently, inevitable biases may occur 
from their application. While schemas are essential to 
inputing structure and meaning to everyday perceptions, 
they can also be dysfunctional to the perceiver by leading 
to systematic distortions, errors in judgment, and infor-
mation loss. The liabilities of schematic processing stem 
from four sources: (a) the use of the wrong schema; (b) 
an illustory data base; (c) type-1 errors; and (d) 
illusory correlations (Taylor & Crocker, 1981). 
To the extent that schemas guide decisions and behav-
ior, operating with an incorrect schema can produce a number 
of negative consequences in cognitive processing, the first 
of which is inefficiency. That is, the time required to 
assimilate information and solve problems may be increased 
when an erroneous schema is used to recognize and interpret 
incoming data. In a study by Taylor, Crocker, and D'Agos-
tino (1978) subjects who employed cues suggested by a 
wrong schema as the basis for solving a "common attribute" 
task had slower decision times than did subjects applying 
the correct schema relevant cues or no cues (see also 
Bruner & Potter, 1964). 
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A second possible consequence of having an incorrect 
schema is inaccuracy. ·Individuals may make serious errors 
of inference by distorting incoming information to be con-
sistent with their schema. Errors may also arise from 
selectivity in recall, the insertion of default options, 
and a reinterpretation of ambiguous information (Taylor & 
Crocker, 1981). Langer and Abelson (1974) reported a 
seminal piece of research in which a group of clinicians 
were shown a videotape of a young male who had recently 
applied for a job and was being interviewed. Half of the 
subjects were falsely told that the interview was with a 
psychiatric patient and that their participation was part 
of a study of patient assessment, whereas the remaining 
subjects were led to believe that the actor was a job 
applicant and that they were involved in a study of employ-
ment interviewing. It was found that the "patient schema" 
resultedinthe perception of more psychopathology than the 
"job applicant schema," and that subjects distorted or 
redefined background data to be congruent with their 
schema (cf., Bower, 1977; Cohen, '1977; Rosenhan, 1973; 
Synder & Uranowitz, 1978; Zadny & Gerard, 1974). 
A third consequence of processing an incorrect schema 
is that once it has been misapplied, the perceiver may 
actually modify reality to conform to the schema. In the 
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case of mental illness, institutionalization itself may 
produce "secondary deviance" in which labeling a person as 
a patient contributes to the formation of a negative self-
concept (Schur, 1971), · ~reates or perpetuates imputed 
states or conditions (Becker, 1967), and sets the stage for 
enduring self-fulfilling prophecies (Lemert, 1951, 1967). 
This "self-fulfilling prophecy" effect has been demonstrated 
in a variety of contexts including the effects of teachers' 
evaluation reports on student performance (Rosenthal & 
Jacobson, 1968), the effect of anticipating that another 
will be hostile or competitive upon subsequent behavior 
toward that person (Synder & Swann, 1978), the effect of 
believing that physically attractive people are charming 
and bright (Synder, Tanke, & Berscheid, 1977), and the 
effect of stereotyped expectations on interracial inter-
actions (Word, Zanna, & Cooper, 1974). 
A second set of liabilities in schematic processing 
derive from the establishment of an illusory data base. 
An illusory data base is a collection of assumptions or 
inferences that do not actually exist in the stimulus 
information, but rather are contributed by the schema. It 
may be constructed by the use of default options, making 
inferences that are later stored as data independent of 
and in addition to the initial stimulus configuration, 
and/or an indiscriminate, single-minded application of a 
schema despite a less than perfect match with an evoking 
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stimulus (Taylor & Crocker, 1981). In a study demonstra-
ting how prior inferences may be incorporated in a sche-
matic representation, subjects were given a list of traits 
describing an individual and were then asked to judge how 
appropriate the individual was for a particular occupation. 
Later, they were told to list traits they thought would be 
characteristic of the person. 
Results showed that subjects listed the traits 
judged to be more descriptive of the occupation they had 
evaluated than the one they had not evaluated, even though 
all the subjects were presented the same information about 
the individual (Baumgardner, Leippe, & Ostrom, 1976; see 
also Geve, Lingle, bstrom, Leipee, & Baumgardner, 1978; 
Lingle & Ostrom, 1977). Subjects had apparently convinced 
themselves that the target person was suitable for the 
particular occupation and had used the inference to guide 
their subsequent judgments regarding his/her attributes. 
The third liability of schematic processing is the 
propensity for Type 1 errors (Taylor & Crocker, 1981); 
that is, the tendency to accept data as consistent with a 
schema when it is either neutral or inconsistent. Four 
features of schemas contribute to this bias: 
1. The data base stored with a schema comprises 
consistent or confirming instances. A study by Ross, 
Lepper, and Hubbard (1975) demonstrates this aspect. In 
their experiment, subjects were asked to distinguish 
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between real and bogus suicide notes. One group was 
falsely told that they had done relatively well on the 
task, while the others were erroneously informed that they 
had performed poorly. ·Afterward, although subjects were 
debriefed concerning the falsity of the feedback, their 
impressions of themselves as socially sensitive (or soc-
ially insensitive) persons persisted despite their aware-
ness that the performance evaluations were contrived. 
Subjects were able to maintain these beliefs by drawing 
on the relevant portion (i.e., data base) of their self-
schemas (e.g., sensitive me) and finding supportive examples 
of the behavior (e.g., me being sensitive) stored with the 
schemas. 
2. The criteria that indicate what is or is not a 
"match" to a schema are often loosely or broadly defined. 
For example, the layperson's schema for someone who is 
mentally ill includes the presumption that the person will 
behave in an unpredictable fashion (Nunnally, 1961). This 
makes the schema quite vague about what a mentally ill 
individual should not do in any particular situation. 
Hence, it becomes difficult or impossible to identify 
instances that clearly dispute the schema; information 
that is irrelevant or inconsistent with the schema is 
easily incorporated. 
3. Encountering schema inconsistent or incongruent 
information frequently results in a greater differentiation 
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of the schema rather than a complete revision or rejection 
of the structure. Evidence that person schemas consist of 
overarching general categories which encompass a number of 
more specific subcategories supports this prediction (Can-
tor & Mischel, 1979; Brewer, Dull, & Lui, 1981). Also, 
Taylor (1981) has suggested that when stereotypes are 
disconfirmed, persons do not discard or adjust the stereo-
type on some dimension; instead, they create a subcategory 
for the anomalous entity. For example, though a man may 
contend that women are basically dependent, passive, and 
fatuous, meeting an obviously intelligent, aggressive, and 
successful woman may compel him to develop a new classifi-
cation such as "castrating female," "bitchy broad," or 
"career woman," a variant to his general stereotype. 
Disconfirmations of a schema simply provide a basis for 
forming a new schema subtype, not revising the existing 
schema. 
Generally, when information is incongruent with a 
schema, the information may be repudiated as "bad data" 
and the instance stored with the schema will remain 
unchanged. For example, when an individual who exempli-
fies a person schema acts in a m~nner that is contrary to 
the schema, the behavior may be attributed to situational 
or unstable causes (Crocker, Hannah, & Weber, 1983; Deaux 
& Emswiller, 1974; Feldman-Summers & Kiesler, 1974; Heydan 
& Mischel, 1976; Kulik, in press). Thus, the incongruent 
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behavior may have minimal impact on either the representa-
tion of the individual· (Crocker, Hannah, & Weber, 1983) 
or more abstract levels of the schema. 
4. A single schema is typically evoked in the course 
of evaluating incoming stimuli; equally plausible or 
applicable schemas are not tested for their possible fit 
to the data. This point is aptly illustrated by what 
Ross (1977) calls the fundamental attribution error, i.e., 
inputing the cause of an act to the actor while underesti-
mating or ignoring the potential situational determinants 
of the behavior. For example, Ross, Amabile, and Stein-
metz (1977) told subjects to devise difficult questions to 
ask a contestant in a general knowledge quiz. Although 
the questioner applied his/her own idiosyncratic knowledge 
to develop the quesions, thus placing the contestant in a 
hindered position, the questioner, the contestant, and an 
observer all believed that the questioner was more know-
ledgable than the contestant, ignoring the obvious advan-
tage of the questioner. In effect, perceivers dismissed 
the role of external forces, in this case the social 
power of the questioner to define the nature of the inter-
action (see also Jones & Harris, ·1967; Taylor & Crocke.r, 
1978). 
The final liability of schematic processing stems 
from illusory correlations, i.e., systematic errors in 
judgments of the degree of covariation between two kinds 
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of events. A series of several studies has shown that 
psychiatrists and college students tend to overestimate 
correlations they expect to be present on projective tests 
(e.g., large eyes and paranoia), while underestimating or 
failing to report correlations that are present but unex-
pected (Chapman, 1967; Chapman & Chapman, 1967, 1969). 
Illusory correlations persist even when there is actually 
a strong negative relationship between two associatively 
connected events (Chapman & Chapman, 1969), when subjects 
are offered a reward ($20) for being accurate (Chapman & 
Chapman, 1967), and when subjects are given training and 
feedback to improve their relationship estimates (Golding 
& Rorer, 1972). This phenomenon has been demonstrated with 
three types of psychodiagnostic tests (Chapman & Chapman, 
1967, 1969; Starr & Katkin, 1969) as well as a number of 
other kinds of judgments (e.g., Jennings, Amabile, & Ross, 
1980), and has been shown to be a basis of stereotypic 
conceptions of social groups (Hamilton, 1976; Hamilton & 
Rose, 1980; McArthur & Friedman, 1980; Rothbart, Evans, 
& Fulero, 1979). Schemas produce illusory correlations 
by directing the search for evidence that is utilized in 
assessing covariation, and by making certain categori~s 
of evidence more available (i.e., easier to recall). 
Both processes lead to an overrepresentation of this 
evidence in judgments (see Crocker & Taylor, 1978). 
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Schema Change 
The preceding discussion recounted how schemas 
typically resist change, and the consequences of this 
resistance for social perceivers. The "unalterable" nature 
of schemas is both a blessing and a curse. As previously 
noted, some of the liabilities of schematic processing 
include misperceptions and distortions as well as bias and 
inaccuracy in making judgments. Nevertheless, a schema 
that remains stable contributes a sense of order and coher-
ence to stimuli that would otherwise be complex, unpre-
dictable, and often overwhelming. This order and predict-
ability would be lost if cognitive structures shifted in 
response to every piece of impinging information (Crocker, 
Fiske, & Taylor, in press). On the other hand, it is clear 
that schemas would be highly dysfunctional if they failed 
to change despite inconsistency with reality or ineffic-
iency in processing. There is evidence to suggest that 
schemas can be modified on the basis of actual experience 
(Neisser, 1976; Rumelhart & Norman, 1978; Rumelhart & 
Ortony, 1977). 
Schema change can basically occur in two ways (cf., 
Anderson, Kline, & Beasley, 1979) .. First, schemas develop 
with continued exposure to a variety of different instances 
which represent a specific phenomenon. A maturing schema 
evolves by assimilating the relevant features of the 
increasingly complex array of stimuli which it encounters 
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over time (Flavell, 1963; Inhelder & Piaget, 1964). This 
is change by accretion: adding new data structures to the 
existing data base of memory, following the organization 
already present (Rumelhart & Norman, 1978). The second 
form of change is accomplished through the process of 
accommodation which involves restructuring the schema to 
account for incongruent information, i.e., information that 
is improbable given the schema (Hastie, 1981). Incongru-
ency produces change by forcing the perceiver to alter 
his/her previous knowledge in the face of evidence that is 
contrary to prior expectations. For example, if the schema 
portraying my best friend Bill centers around his honesty 
and integrity, and I recently discover he has stolen my 
wallet, then it is probable that I will modify my existing 
representation of Bill in order to adjust to this new and 
inconsistent input. (Unless I attribute his action to 
situational instead of dispositional causes, in which case, 
the episode would have a minimal effect on my impression). 
The likelihood that incongruent information will lead 
to schema change is determined by three sets of factors 
(See Crocker, Fiske, & Taylor, in press). The first set of 
factors relates to features of the information itself. 
Various studies indicate that incongruent information pro-
duces a greater impact on schema content and structure if 
it is: (a) processed without placing great demands on the 
perceiver's memory load; (b) moderately discrepant rather 
than mildly or highly discrepant with the schema; (c) un-
ambiguous, i.e., clear in its meaning or implications; 
(d) dispersed over a number of instances as opposed to 
concentrated in a few; ' and (e) judged to be highly rele-
vant to the schema. 2 
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The second set of factors concerns characteristics of 
knowledge structures that lead to or resist change. In 
general, schemas that are least responsive to incongruent 
information are: (a) well developed (i.e., contain large 
quantities of schema congruent information); (b) compactly 
organized (i.e., comprised of numerous links among separate 
schema components); (c) difficult to access or activate 
(it is obvious that information cannot modify a schema 
that has not been evoked); and (d) logically or practically 
undisconfirmable. A logically undisconfirmable schema is 
one that fails to specify what types of instances or 
2Theories of information integration suggest that a 
number of similar factors affect the relative weight 
attached to a piece of information in impression formation. 
These include: (a) the order of the information, i.e., 
information presented earlier in the judgment process is 
given greater weight than later information; (b) the rele-
vancy of the information to the particular judgment being 
made, i.e., pertinent information is assigned more weight 
than unrelated information; (c) redundancy of the infer~ 
mation, i.e., information that is repetitive is given less 
Weight than information that goes beyond the facts already 
Presented; and (d) the source of the information, i.e., 
information emanating from a credible source is generally 
given greater emphasis than information from a less 
respected or discredited source. 
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occurrences should not occur when the schema is invoked; 
a practically undisconfirmable schema cannot be invalidated 
because there is little opportunity for perceivers to ob-
tain information that is inconsistent with the schema (cf., 
Reeder & Brewer, 1979). 
The last set of factors that affects the impact of 
incongruency on schema change is associated with the per-
ceiver. Differences in a person's receptivity to incon-
gruent information is primarily a function of the amount of 
experience he/she has had in a given domain. (A discussion 
of expert-novice differences in schema content and use is 
presented in the following section of this review.) Ex-
perts' schemas are more extensive, integrated, rapidly 
retrieved, and cohesive than the schemas of novices (Fiske 
& Kinder, 1981). Despite the vast store of information 
available to them, they are able to utilize and organize it 
efficiently. Specifically, a tighter organization of in-
formation implies that experts can retain more in short-
term memory. Therefore, in encountering incongruent input 
the experienced perceiver possesses both the on-line 
capacity to process the inconsistent data--which is more 
difficult and time-consuming to process than congruent_ 
information (Brewer, Dull, & Lui, 1981)--and the knowledge 
to make efficient use of the data in moderating judgments 
(Fiske, Kinder, & Larter, in press). Hence, it would seem 
that experts' schemas are more likely to be influenced by 
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incongruency than nonexperts' schemas. On the other hand, 
as stated earlier, the highly organized nature of experts' 
schemas may also make them less amenable to change. Clearly, 
further studies are needed to clarify the relationship be-
tween expertise and schema modification. 
Finally, for incongruent information to instigate 
schema change, the perceiver's motivation or goals must 
promote accuracy over the maintenance of existing knowledge 
structures. Although little research has addressed what 
conditions might give rise to an accuracy orientation, one 
likely condition is outcome dependency (i.e., when one's 
outcomes are directly dependent upon one's inferences, one 
may be highly motivated to be accurate). Indeed, prelim-
inary evidence suggests that outcome dependency does encour-
age the processing of incongruent information (Erber, 
Fiske, & Swann, 1983). 
Schema change can be initiated at one or more levels 
including: the variables themselves (e.g., variables may 
be inserted/dropped from the schema, or the strength of 
association between a variable and a schema may increase/ 
decrease); the default options of a particular variable 
(e.g., attributes of the option may be altered or it ~ay 
becompletelyreplaced by a different option); the con-
straints that define a variable's limits (e.g., the 
variable's range of values may increase in latitude or 
become more restrictive; in the extreme, the variable may 
be replaced by a constant term); and the horizontal or 
vertical structures of the schema (e.g., a schema may 
change by acquiring a more hierarchical structure or more 
levels of abstraction, or subcategories may be added or 
dropped at any specific level of abstraction) . 
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Three theoretical models have been proposed to expli-
cate the process of schema change: the bookkeeping, conver-
sion, and subtype models. The first two were originally 
formulated by Rothbart (1981) to explain stereotype change; 
however, they also provide a useful account of change in 
other types of social schemas. The third model, which is 
equally useful and also discussed in the context of stereo-
type change, was offered by Taylor (1981). 
The bookkeeping model suggests that people implicitly 
monitor and compare the number or relative proportion of 
schema consistent and inconsistent instances. Change 
results when the balance is gradually tipped in favor of 
disconfirming events (i.e., those that deviate systematical-
ly from the schema). In this view, schema revision is an 
incremental process of piece-meal adjustments or "fine-
tuning" in response to each new piece of pertinent infor-
mation (See also Rumelhart & Norman, 1978). The conversion 
model proposes that schema change occurs in all-or-none 
fashion, and is produced by a few critical and highly 
salient disconfirming instances. That is, information 
which strongly contradicts the schema elicits sudden and 
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dramatic changes in the schema. The third model, called 
subtyping, involves the development of separate lower-
level categories. According to this approach, schema 
change can be described as a means toward specification in 
which encompassing or overarching concepts become more 
differentiated. Disconfirming instances, which cannot be 
easily assimilated into the larger schema are regarded as 
unrepresentative of the overall grouping. New subcategor-
ies emerge to portray these members, who may still possess 
the defining features of the schema, but who are also 
characterized by a set of contradictory attributes which 
distinguish the subcategory from other schema constituents. 
Weber and Crocker (in press) performed a series of 
experiments comparing the three models. In their studies, 
subjects were presented with information about two stereo-
typic groups (librarians and lawyers). Individuals in the 
groups were described by three behaviors, one-third of 
which were incongruent with the schema. In some conditions, 
the inconsistent information was dispersed so that each 
individual performed one inconsistent behavior, in other 
conditions the inconsistent information was concentrated 
among a few individuals such that .one-third of the indlvid-
uals completely disconfirmed the schema and two-thirds 
completely confirmed it. Results generally supported the 
subtyping model of change when incongruent behaviors 
described only a few members of the group, whereas the 
bookkeeping model of change explained the findings when 
many members of the group were described by incongruent 
behaviors. 
The Expert and Novice: Differences in Schema Content and 
Use 
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The mechanisms of schema change imply that repeated 
exposure to the various instances of a stimulus domain lead 
to the development and modification of the cognitive struc-
tures that depict them. Whether change occurs through 
assimilation or accommodation, or whether one accounts for 
change by bookkeeping, conversion, or subtyping, the basic 
and underlying factor in schema revision appears to be the 
perceiver's experience. For example, in the bookkeeping 
model, schema alteration hinges upon the accumulation of 
disconfirming evidence; similarly, the subtyping approach 
presumes contact with different members of a category. Both 
processes involve making a schema more elaborate and differ-
entiated through encounters with a growing number of 
schematic instances. Hence, one would expect that experts, 
who by definition have amassed considerable experience with 
a given object or activity, would possess' a more extensive 
schematic representation of the phenomenon. 
Indeed, a wealth of empirical evidence collected in 
a number of diverse domains such as chess (e.g., Chase, 
1978; Simon, 1973b), bridge (e.g., Engle & Bukstel, 
1978), go (e.g., Reitman, 1976), computer programming 
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(e.g., Adelson, 1981), physics (e.g., Simon & Simon, 1980), 
algebra (e.g., Chiesi, Spilich, & Voss, 1979), politics 
(e.g., Fiske & Kinder, 1981), and social cognition (e.g., 
Markus & Smith, 1981) consistently reveals that the know-
ledge structures (i.e., schemas) of experts and novices 
differ in both declarative knowledge (descriptions of 
attributes) and procedural knowledge (rules or strategies 
for the use of that knowledge). Experts' knowledge struc-
tures are vaster, more organized, and more interconnected 
than the structures of novices. Also, experts use their 
schemas more effectively and efficiently in comprehending 
information and in solving problems (Fiske & Dyer, 1982). 
Perceptual Domains. A reviewofthe visual-spatial 
skills literature demonstrates the superior capacity 
of experts to encode and retrieve perceptual patterns 
including chess board configurations, bridge hands, 
and computer programs. Pioneering work on perception 
in chess was done by deGroot and his colleagues (deGroot, 
1965, 1966; Jongman, 1968). The basic procedure util-
ized in their studies was to present subjects with a 
chess position and ask them to ascertain the best move 
while they were thinking aloud about their strategy. 
In his attempt to identify aspects of chess skill that 
differentiated master from weaker players, deGroot 
(1965) was unable to find any gross dissimilarities in 
thought processes between the two groups (e.g., search 
heuristics and depth of search) . Contrary to a widely 
accepted misconception, master players typically explored 
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a smaller number of possible moves than less accomplished 
players; however, theywere adept at selecting the "right" 
moves quickly, whereas weaker players spent inordinate time 
analyzing the consequences of "bad" moves. In addition, 
deGroot (1965) reported an intriguing difference between 
masters and novices. Master players showed an ability to 
reconstruct chess positions after viewing the board for 
very brief intervals (5 to 10 seconds). This result could 
not be accounted for by the superior visual short-term 
memory capacity of the expert because, when random patterns 
of chess pieces were placed on the board, recall was equally 
poor for master and weaker players. The finding suggested 
that chess masters retain a store of meaningful constella-
tions of pieces or familiar board patterns that are struc-
tured and labeled in memory and therefore readily retrieved 
during recall. 
A series of experiments by Chase and Simon (1973a, 
1973b) involving memory and perception, isolated and de-
fined the chunks into which chess information was coded 
by experts and novices. Pauses in recall were adopted by 
Chase and Simon (1973a) as indicators of the boundaries of 
the chunks. They utilized two techniques in their study: 
a perception task requiring players to reconstruct a 
position while it remained in full view behind a partition, 
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and a memory task, similar to deGroot's (1965) task, requir-
ing players to remember a position after a short exposure. 
Results revealed that skilled players grouped chess pieces 
into highly stereotyped-chunks or patterns. These patterns 
consisted of circumscribed clusters of pieces in very local-
ized regions of the chess board. The pieces within in a 
pattern were organized on the basis of both the visual 
(color, proximity) and functional (attack, defense) fea-
tures of chess play. Further, masters exhibited superior 
recall of board positions, demonstrated an ability to per-
ceive familiar patterns more quickly, retained more infor-
mation in memory, and retrieved successive chunks of infor-
mation from long-term memory significantly faster and in 
larger patterns compared to less experienced players. 
Chase and Simon (1973b) concluded that skilled chess 
performance can be explained by the master's large cogni-
tive repertoire of hierarchically organized chess board 
patterns (i.e., schemas) that are constructed through hours 
of practice and stored in long-term memory. Thus, it is 
the contents of the expert's mental representations of the 
game, not the components of his/her thought strategies 
while the game is being played that is critical in deter-
mining the quality of outcome. It seems clear that chess 
expertise resides in the rapid "perceptual" recognition 
processes that tap the master's long-term knowledge base. 
The findings of Chase and Simon (1973a, 1973b) have been 
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replicated in a number of other studies (Charness, 1976; 
Chi, 1978; Ellis, 1973; Frey & Adesman, 1976; Goldin, 1978, 
1979; Lane & Robertson, 1979) . 
Engle and Bukstel (1978) studied mnemonic and percep-
tual ability among bridge players of differing levels of 
expertise (expert, life master, average player, and novice). 
The findings of four tournament-simulation tasks essentially 
confirmed the results of the chess experiments. Subjects 
with more experience were able to recall and reconstruct 
meaningful hands with greater accuracy and deftness than 
those with less experience in the game; performance with 
unstructured stimuli showed little difference across level 
of expertise. Moreover, bridge experts displayed superior 
memory for hands they had played, and were able to plan 
hands and generate bids faster and more accurately. It was 
argued that accomplished bridge players with "supranormal" 
memory are able to utilize their prior experience to con-
figure and chunk information in more efficient ways than 
players of less expertise. Similarly, Charness (1979) 
reported that bridge expertise, like chess, also depends 
upon long-term knowledge and fast-access pattern recogni-
tion which are associated with winning strategies and 
correct lines of play. Finally, Eisenstadt and Kareev 
(1975) and Reitman (1976) studied master and beginner 
players of the oriental games of go and gomuku and found 
that, once again, experts had superior memory for meaningful 
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game board patterns. 
A more recent study examined how expert and novice 
computer programmers represent and use programming concepts 
(Adelson, 1981). Subjects were presented with 16 lines of 
computer statements that could be organized in accordance 
with procedure (i.e., the 16 lines could form three distinct 
programs) or by syntax (i.e., each of the lines could be 
grouped into one of five categories). Findings suggested 
that: (a) the chunk size recalled by experts was larger 
than that of novices, resulting in more lines being recalled 
by the former; (b) there was greater similarity of recall 
order among the experts than among the novices; and (c) 
novices utilized a syntax-based organization, whereas the 
experts employed a more hierarchical organization based on 
procedural principles. In short, the computer experts 
showed greater memory capacity for the task, performed more 
rapidly, and retained knowledge in more abstract categories 
than novices. In a similar investigation, McKeithen, Reit-
man, Rueter, & Hirtle (1981) compared the knowledge struc-
tures of beginner, intermediate, and expert computer pro-
grammers, and reported that increases in the level of 
expertise were accompanied by changes in recall performance 
and knowledge organization. Experts correctly recalled a 
greater number of meaningful program lines than did inter-
mediates, who performed better than beginners. Differences 
in the organization of the recalled material were also 
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uncovered: beginning programmers' organizations were 
grounded in a rich variety of common-language associations 
to programming concepts; intermediate programmers mani-
fested mixtures of proqramming and common-language assoc-
iations; experts evinced highly similar organizations 
based clearly on programming knowledge (cf., Egan & 
Schwartz, 1979, in a study of electronic technicians). 
Problem-solving and non-perceptual domains. The 
ability to solve physics problems has also been explored 
with regard to level of expertise. Simon and Simon (1978) 
studied the performance of an expert and a novice subject 
on a kinematic problem by comparing their verbal proto-
cols under think aloud instructions. Examination of the 
protocols indicated differences in problem-solving strat-
egies and facility. The expert applied what Simon and 
Simon (1978) referred to as "physical intuition" (the capac-
ity of the expert physicist to rapidly solve problems with-
out a great deal of conscious deliberation, analogous to 
the nonanalytic nature of the chess master's perceptual 
ability to select appropriate moves); that is, he initially 
translated the English prose of the problem statements into 
physical representations, then used those representa~ions 
to select and instantiate the proper equations. In other 
words, the expert subject accessed a schema that contained 
the essential elements of the problem as well as the formu-
las and steps corresponding to its satisfactory solution. 
By doing so, the expert appeared to proceed more system-
atically and efficiently enroute to the solution, and com-
pleted the problem in less than one-quarter of the time, 
while making fewer errors (cf., Larkin, McDermott, Simon, 
& Simon, 1980). 
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Using a categorization task, Chi and Glaser (1979) 
demonstrated that expert physicists rapidly classified 
physics problems according to underlying central principles 
(e.g., Newton's second law), whereas novices grouped prob-
lems on the basis of the physical entities contained in 
the problem (e.g., an incline plane problem). The ability to 
categorize problems quickly (45 seconds per problem, includ-
ing reading time) suggests the existence of problem-type 
schemas. Once a relevant schema has been activated in 
response to the cues in the problem statements, the expert 
physicist can proceed to systematically work top-down within 
the invoked schema to search for the correct procedure in 
solving the particular problem (see Chi, Feltovich, & 
Glaser, 1979 for a fuller description of the expert physi-
cist's schematic processing of physics problems). 
Comparable findings were reported in studies of ex-
perts' comprehension and solution of algebra word problems 
(Hinsley, Hayes, & Simon, 1977). Results indicated that 
experts organized their knowledge of algebra problems in a 
number of categories (e.g., a triangle schema, a distance-
rate schema, a scale conversion schema) which contained 
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special heuristics used in formulating problems, selecting 
useful algebraic equations and diagrams, and making judg-
ments about the relative importance of presented problem 
information. Hence, subject's schematic representations of 
the algebra problems directed what aspects of the problems 
they attended to, what information they expected and regard-
ed as central to the problems, and what types of processing 
strategies they adopted in solving the problems. 
The notion of relative expertise has been applied in 
testing the effects of involvement on political cognition. 
Research has shown that subjects at a high level of political 
sophistication possess schemas about governments that are 
more complicated and elaborate than those presented by 
subjects with little or no experience in the political 
arena (Fiske & Kinder, 1981). Variations in political 
involvement also were correlated with different strategies 
for processing information. For example, in a study by 
Fiske, Kinder, and Larter (in press) political novices and 
experts read a description of a previously unknown third 
world country under the expectation (prior schema set) that 
it was communist, democratic, or unspecified. 
Results indicated that political novices relied · 
heavily on consensual schemas in making judgments about the 
country, organized information mechanically (i.e., by con-
sistency), and made strong schema-relevant inferences. In 
contrast, political experts focused on the complexities and 
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ambiguities of the description; experts tempered their 
inferences in response to salient schema-based inconsis-
tencies in the material. Correlational data revealed that 
for experts, but not for novices, the moderation of infer-
ences was mediated by their organization of recall in terms 
of inconsistency. Expert/novice differences in schema use 
suggest that more cognitively involved persons can be more 
sensitive to the complexities of presented information. 
Experts in the Fiske, Kinder, and Larter (in press) study 
appeared to be highly cognizant of the actual data they 
encountered. In dealing with new information, the expert 
has a compact prior knowledge structure containing congruent 
information that can be utilized efficiently with minimum 
strain on his/her processing capacity. Thus, there is 
enough capacity remaining to effectively process incongru-
ent information. 
The differential use of high-level knowledge struc-
tures or schemas among experienced and non-experienced 
persons has also been found in the domain of baseball. 
Chiesi, Spilich, and Voss (1979) reported differences be-
tween experts and novices in the recall of baseball events. 
Although high-and-low baseball knowledge individuals · 
recalled an equivalent number of isolated sentences of 
domain-relevant information, experts performed better than 
nonexperts in the recall of event sequences. This differ-
ence was attributed to the experts' ability to relate the 
events to the game's hierarchical goal structure of win-
ning, scoring runs, and advancing runners. 
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Finally, in the area of social cognition, the work of 
Markus and her associates (Markus, 1977; Markus, Crane, 
Bernstein, & Siladi, 1982; Markus, Crane, & Siladi, 1978; 
Markus, Sentis, & Hamill, 1979) has demonstrated that the 
existence of self-schemata (i.e., experience-based indi-
vidual differences in self-knowledge) influences the pro-
cessing of information about the self with respect to per-
sonality traits, sex-roles, physical appearance, and 
creativity. In brief, these studies revealed that persons 
with self-schemata in a particular domain when compared to 
aschematics (individuals who were sans schemata in the 
domain) were able to readily: (a) evaluate new information 
with respect to its relevance to the domain; (b) process 
information about the self in the given domain (e.g., make 
judgments and decisions); (c) retrieve behavioral evidence 
in these areas; (d) predict future behavior in the domain; 
and (e) resist information that is contrary to the pre-
vailing schema. 
Summary. Research examining differences between 
experts and novices in schematic content and proces- -
sing clearly suggests that the schemas of experts are 
better formulated, more detailed, and complex, and 
contain a tightly organized network of information 
that is built from practice and/or 
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experience within a specific domain. It is likely that 
experts' schemas contain more concepts, larger chunks of 
knowledge, and more linkage among the concepts. These 
differences in the structure of experts' schemas are related 
to differences in strategies for the use of schematic con-
tent. Experts group and reduce incoming information in a 
manner that allows for rapid and efficient retrieval by 
relating the information to a long-term knowledge base. 
Instead of perceiving and remembering individual pieces of 
information, they process meaningful chunks of information, 
making their perception more efficient and their recall 
performance much higher. Further, their superior ability 
to solve problems is a function of schema-based heuristics 
and sophisticated abstract categorization strategies. In 
comparison to novices, experts are less diverted by super-
ficial characteristics, and can more easily identify the 
fundamental elements of a problem. 
A Critical Evaluation of the Schema Concept 
The foregoing review of the extant literature reveals 
that a considerable portion of the results of current re-
search in human memory and cognition either has been pre-
dicted or explained by the schema ·concept. Schema theory 
has prompted investigators to consider a number of issues 
concerning the parameters of memory and comprehension, and 
has provided a powerful framework in which to interpret a 
collection of findings emerging from different areas of 
psychology (e.g., perception, memory, social, cognitive). 
In short, the notion of a cognitive schema truly revital-
ized theory and experimentation regarding how knowledge is 
structured and information is processed. 
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Schema theory proposes that perception, understanding, 
and memory are a joint product of the interaction of new 
information with stored knowledge. The basic assumption of 
the theory is that an individual's prior experience, expec-
tations, and goals will influence how he/she encodes, stores, 
and remembers incoming data. Hence, the existence of schemas 
is predicated upon the operation of five fundamental under-
lying processes: (a) selection (schemas direct the encoding 
of information, i.e., what is stored in memory is a highly 
selected subset of what is encountered in reality, only 
information that is relevant to a presently activated schema 
will be encoded); (b) abstraction (memory is not a verbatim 
record, rather, the central aspects or core meaning of a 
stimulus are given priority during encoding while the non-
essential features of the stimulus are lost); (c) integra-
tion (incoming information is combined with previously 
acquired schema-based information which is invoked during 
the encoding episode); (d) interpretation (schemas guide 
any inferences that are made about missing information; 
they also elaborate and distort information in a schema-
consistent direction; and (e) reconstruction (memories 
are reproduced or recreated by combining the accessible 
details of a stimulus representation with domain-related 
prior knowledge) • 
Empirical evidence which clearly supported the exis-
tence of these five processes would argue strongly for a 
schematic model of memory. Nevertheless, even if one were 
to accept the actuality of such findings, one could still 
insist that ultimately the cognitive approach upon which 
schema theory is grounded, must be integrated with--even 
superceded by--a physiological one. That is, if schemas 
70 
are ever to become a "proven" (i.e., reified) component of 
memory/cognition, they will eventually have to be under-
stood in terms of additional levels of analyses. Identify-
ing the neurological localization and arrangement of schemas 
(i.e., discovering their embodiment in the anatomy of the 
brain) would certainly elucidate many of the unanswered 
questions researchers have relating to cognitive structures 
and mechanisms. 
Despite an impressive array of results that is con-
sistent with the schema model and its predictions, the best 
one may conclude is that traditional theories of cognition 
and memory fail to fully explicate experimental findings. 
Essentially, none of the research·has incontrovertibly 
established schemas as the foundational structures of pro-
cessing or storage. Until recently it has merely generated 
results that cannot be adequately explained by common sense 
analyses or alternate perspectives (e.g., simple 
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associationist models or purely perceptual theories) (Ander-
son, 1980; Smith, 1980). However, a timely review of the 
literature by Alba and Hasher (1983) suggests that different 
theoretical models and available empirical evidence may 
account for or refute findings previously interpreted in a 
schematic framework. They report a series of studies which 
indicates that the recall of complex stimuli is not depen-
dent upon or closely tied to the activation of prior know-
ledge, and that memory for complex stimuli is far richer 
and detailed than schematic processing would allow. 
In their review, Alba and Hasher (1983) also proffered 
a recently developed model of memory which they advanced as 
an alternative to schema theory. The model, forurnlated by 
Johnson and Raye (1981), posits that information retained in 
memory consists of both exogenous (derived from the percep-
tual episode) and endogenous (created by reasoning, imagin-
ation, and thought) traces. The process through which an 
individual differentiates between the two types is called 
reality monitoring. Each trace consists of a number of 
attributes (e.g., spatial, contextual, sensory, semantic) 
that define typical classes of internally--and externally--
generated memories. The comparative amount of these attri-
butes serves as the basis for distinguishing memory traces. 
When a trace is retrieved, the information that identifies 
its source (person-produced or stimulus-produced) is used 
to determine whether the trace was part of the original 
stimulus. Generally, the distinction between internally--
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and externally--derived traces is clear. However, on some 
occasions, differences may be ambiguous, or the criteria! 
discriminative attribute information may become inaccess-
ible. In either situation, a person would be unable to 
correctly ascertain the trace's source-of-origin (i.e., 
he/she would confuse internally generated memory traces 
with traces resulting from the encoding of the external 
stimulus array). The reality monitoring model is able to 
explain a variety of mnemonic errors which are predicted by 
schema theory, including: reconstructive errors, inference 
errors, and false recognition errors. 
Conceptual clarity. The schema concept and its 
attendant research may also be attacked on substantive and 
methodological grounds. For example, attempts to formulate 
general schema theories of memory are plagued by a number 
of shortcomings. Although the schema model is quite sue-
cessful as a descriptive theory--for example, it provides 
both a vocabulary and conceptual framework for the represen-
tation of knowledge (Thorndyke & Yekovich, 1980)--it is 
surrounded by fuzzy conceptual boundaries. Definitions 
• 
of the concept and its variants (prototypes, frames, 
scripts) are often so vague that it is not clear what, if 
anything, they exclude (Martin, 1982). Their usage by 
theoreticians and experimenters is highly individualistic, 
and has thus precluded the establishment of a common core 
of basic meaning that permits a differentiation of both 
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related and incompatible conceptions (see Taylor & Crocker, 
1981). Consequently, schema research suffers from a lack 
of consensual operationalization (i.e., the link between 
the conceptual definition of schemas and their operational 
specification is tenuous (Fiske & Linville, 1980). 
Testability. The second area of theoretical weakness 
in the schema model is its lack of specification of detailed 
processes for manipulating and instantiating schemata: How 
can an experimenter be certain that a schema is truly being 
activated, and if so, whether it i's the schema of interest? 
It has not been determined what schemas will be evoked or 
precisely how they are evoked. Similarly, little is current-
ly known about the mechanisms that direct the application of 
particular schemas in particular situations: Is schema 
activation controlled by cues that are predominant in the 
stimulus configuration or by the schema's availability in 
the mind of the perceiver, or both? In addition, research-
ers have yet to identify the schematic mechanisms that 
affect variables such as recall and reaction time, and to 
define the elements or limits of schematic functioning: 
Are different dependent measures mediated by the same or 
independent schematic processes? 'What are subjects doing 
when they are not reasoning schematically? What happens 
in memory when a schema is invoked repeatedly? Does repe-
titious use of a schema facilitate or interfere with its 
effectiveness as a memory organizer? Finally, a major 
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deficit of schema theory is the absence of a clear articu-
lation of how schemas develop and change: What is the pre-
cise nature of the processes through which schemas are 
abstracted from reality~? How does experience result in 
greater schema complexity? 
Predictability. The lack of a coherent theoretical 
analysis of schematic processing has rendered the schema 
concept untestable and unfalsefiable. The current state 
of "schema theory" provides the basis for nothing more than 
demonstration studies rather than the more sophisticated 
approach of competitive model testing. The schema concept 
is presently loose enough to incorporate contradictory 
hypothesis and patterns of empirical evidence. Also, re-
searchers are guilty of glibly offering explanations of 
results without a priori or firmly grounded theoretical 
predictions, and of constructing elaborate cognitive frame-
works that can account for any finding. Thus, although the 
schema model does entail some structural and process 
assumptions, it is so vaguely specified that it is able 
to explain post hoc virtually any set of available data. 
Whereas many results are consistent with the notion of 
schema-based processing, it is difficult to unearth any 
findings that are inconsistent with it (Thorndyke & Yeko-
vich, 1980; Fiske & Linville, 1980). In short, the absence 
of formal constraints on schema theory leads to an absence 
of systematic operating assumptions across empirical 
investigations, thereby building in an ability to remain 
impervious to disconfirmation and an inability to yield 
precise predictability in studies. 
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For example, schema theory posits, and investigators 
have found that schema-consistent material is better re-
called than schema-inconsistent material (e.g., Cohen, 1977; 
Hamilton et al., 1980; Rothbart et al., 1979; Synder & 
Cantor, 1979; Synder & Uranowitz, 1978). Inasmuch as 
schemas guide the search for information, stimuli that con-
stitute a good match to a schema are more likely to be 
encoded than schema-incongruent stimuli. Moreover, if the 
incongruent material is encoded, it will probably be more 
difficult to retrieve than schema-consistent material 
because of the purported role of schemas in the organiza-
tion of information and in memory search at recall. Ob-
versely, schema theory and research also predicts and 
supports the hypothesis that inconsistent information will 
be more salient and memorable due to its distinctiveness 
vis-a-vis the schema (e.g., Hamilton & Gilford, 1976; 
Hastie & Kumar, 1979; Hastie & Mazur, 1978; Srull, 1981). 
Such information requires additional cognitive work to be 
incorporated into the schema, and is therefore said to be 
deeply processed and available for recall (Hastie, 1981). 
Similarly, contradictory predictions exist regarding 
the issue of whether schematic processing is more or less 
rapid than aschematic processing. It is argued that 
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schematic processing will be faster because of the well 
organized and more easily accessible content of a schema 
(Markus, 1977); alternately, it is suggested that schematic 
processing is slower b~cause both the input and data base 
(i.e., schema) that has been evoked must be processed 
(e.g., Rogers, Kuper, & Kirker, 1977). In light of these 
inconsistent predictions and results, investigators must be 
called upon to identify the varying conditions under which 
"conflicting" findings are to be expected. More specifical-
ly, it appears that interactions may be operating to produce 
seemingly contradictory evidence. However, researchers 
have done little to specify the nature of these possible 
interactions. This would necessitate a delineation of 
both the factors involved and the pattern of anticipated 
outcomes. 
The failure of schema theory to satisfy the criteria 
of testability and prediction seems to be due principally 
to a lack of theoretical development in two areas which 
suggest directions for future research: (a) a specifica-
tion of the domains of knowledge for which schemas exist 
and are used, and (b) an elucidation of the complex cogni-
tive processes that operate on an~ utilize the schema~ 
(i.e., a precise description of how schemas are activated 
and used during the comprehension, storage, and retrieval 
of information [Thorndyke & Yekovich, 1980; Fiske & Lin-
ville, 1980]). 
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Constraining the number and types of schemas involves 
an explication of the conditions under which they are de-
veloped and discriminated. It is currently unclear how 
minute in specificity schemas can be. For example, it is 
assumed that persons have a schema for "going to a restaur-
ant" (Schank & Abelson, 1977; Bower et al., 1979). Do 
individuals also possess schemas for "attending a play" or 
"buying a pretzel on the street corner in New York City?" 
Perhaps as Rumelhart and Ortony (1977) suggest, when a per-
ceiver is faced with a novel situation that does not pre-
cisely match any available schema, the situation is compre-
hended through the process of schema generalization in which 
the variable constraints of an available schema are modi-
fied to provide a representation of the newly encountered 
stimulus. Basically, instead of creating an entirely new 
schema to interpret every novel input, an existing, higher-
level schema which appears relevant to the input is invoked 
and modified to fit the data. More theorizing and research 
is clearly needed to explicate this process (i.e., to 
explain when and how schema generalization occurs). 
The second area of limited theoretical development 
is in the specification of detailed mechanisms for manipu-
lating and instantiating schemas. If veritably thousands 
of schemas reside in memory, then it is plausible that 
many of them may be applicable in comprehending and en-
coding events in a particular situation (cf., Anderson & 
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Pichert, 1978; Baker, 1978; Thorndyke, 1979). As previous-
ly discussed, the question of schema selection has been 
addressed by positing the so-called executive function. 
However, elaborations of this function and investigations 
designed to infer its existence and operation have been 
conspicuously absent from recent models of schematic 
processing. 
In sum, until schema theory is formulated in a falsi-
fiable form, its validity will remain in question. What is 
required is the development of an overall cognitive or gen-
eral process model that generates precise and testable pre-
dictions concerning the effect of schemata on the components 
of information processing. More theoretical and empirical 
attention should be given to the specification of criteria 
for identifying a "package of facts" in long-term memory 
as a schema. Such an analysis will undoubtedly serve to 
make schema-related propositions more researchable. By 
itself, the schema concept is much less useful than when 
it is embedded in a well-specified theory of process. 
The notion of a schematic representation per se yields 
ambiguous or contradictory hypotheses concerning schematic 
functioning. However, when it is. nested in a larger cog-
nitive framework, it provides fertile ground for the con-
struction and testing of predictive theories about the 
organization and functioning of human judgment and memory. 
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The Use of Schemas in Diagnosis and Prediction 
Despite the limitations discussed above, the schema 
construct still has great value for the current studies in 
that it provides a structural mechanism which represents 
prior experience and creates high-level units that are 
evoked by experts during assessment and decision-making. 
A number of studies that are directly relevant to the pre-
sent research indicate that schemas are a useful theoreti-
cal tool for investigations of how experts place people 
into diagnostic categories and how they make predictions 
about future behavior. For example, Cantor et al. (1980) 
proposed that psychiatrists classify patients by sorting 
them into "fuzzy categories" on the basis of their resem-
blance to the exemplar of the category. In order to test 
this hypothesis, trained psychiatrists were presented with 
actual, unedited case histories of psychotics and were 
asked to make a diagnosis for each of the patients. They 
found that psychiatrists were highly reliable, confident, 
and accurate in their diagnosis of patients who shared 
many features in common with the prototype (i.e., the most 
typical or representative number of a group) for a diagnos-
tic category. The psychiatrists were considerably less 
reliable, confident, and accurate in their judgments 
about non-prototypical patients. On the basis of this 
evidence, Cantor et al. (1980) argued that the schema 
approach best captures the way clinicians think about and 
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use diagnostic groupings. 
Research by Carroll and his associates provides some 
evidence supporting the activation and use of schemas among 
expert parole decision~makers. In a pilot study by Carroll 
and Wiener (1982) parole board members were asked to con-
struct cases on the basis of 16 critical variables (e.g., 
criminal record, current offense, prison sentence, alcohol/ 
drug abuse, employment history). Details pertaining to each 
of the variables were written as prose statements using the 
narrative style of actual parole cases and placed onto 
small cards which were organized in separate piles accord-
ing to information categories. Subjects were instructed to 
create a description of realistic inmates using the 16 
information categories. Five discernible schema types 
emerged: (a) the impulsive auto thief, (b) the armed 
robber, (c) the drug dealer, (d) the passion murderer, and 
(e) the fraudulent credit card user. 
In a related study, Carroll, Galegher, and Wiener 
(1982) analyzed parole board members' judgments of the 
causes of crime in a sample of over 200 parole interviews. 
Results demonstrated that experts' assessments of the 
etiology of crime were organized according to categories 
that contained hypotheses about criminal involvement, and 
recommendations concerning treatment and expected progno-
sis. Five causal categorizations and their constituent 
subgroupings were found: (a) person (lack of control, 
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easily influenced, immature, mental problems, acting 
"smart," poor attitude, aggressive), (b) money (monetary 
gain, get money, family needs, no job), (c) drugs, (d) 
alcohol, and (e) environment (victim precipitated, influ-
ence of associates, domestic problems, environment). This 
schematic classification of cases was significantly related 
to release recommendations, prognosis for supervision, and 
assessments of the risk of future crime. Similar to clin-
icians who diagnose patients by placing them into "fuzzy 
categories" (Cantor et al., 1980), parole decision makers 
seem to identify criminals as "types." These types not 
only appear to contain information that is central to the 
decision to grant parole, but they also comprise informa-
tion describing different patterns of criminal and social 
behavior, causes for this behavior, and treatments to remedy 
these causes (Carroll et al., 1982). 
Converging on the findings of Carroll et al. (1982) 
are results indicating the existence of schemas among 
probation officers. In a series of interviews aimed at 
explicating officers' evaluations of offenders for risk 
classification and treatment, Lurigio (1981) reported that 
probation officers described sue~ factors as drug use, 
unemployment, influence of associates, absence of family 
ties, and immaturity as causes of criminals' failure to 
satisfactorily complete probation. For example, the 
"drug offender" was offered as a type of probationer who 
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is highly unlikely to finish his/her sentence. The "drug 
offender" category included information (suppositions) about 
the probationer's potential for future criminal behavior, 
his/her interpersonal relationships, the kinds of crimes 
likely to be on the record, reasons why the offender has 
committed crimes, explanations regarding the individual's 
preoccupation with drugs, and a prognosis for rehabilitation. 
Summary 
In summary, notwithstanding a number of conceptual, 
theoretical, and empirical deficiencies, the schema con-
struct has been usefully applied as a descriptive and ex-
planatory mechanism across a wide range of psychological 
research (perceptual, cognitive, social). A schema is 
defined as a hierarchically organized, abstract cognitive 
structure that represents an individual's accumulated 
knowledge, beliefs, and expectations regarding a defined 
stimulus domain (person, object, or event) . Schemas 
specify the central features and relevant attributes (i.e., 
variables) comprising a phenomenon and the interrelations 
among those attributes. In addition, they lend meaning 
to experience, guide the encoding, storage, and retrieval 
of information, and allow a perceiver to make inferences 
about data that aremissing from a stimulus configuration. 
The evocation of any schema in a specific situation is 
controlled by the executive function, and is determined 
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by that schema's relative accessibility. 
Although schematic processing can be advantageous to 
a perceiver, it may also result in information loss as well 
as a number of perceptual, interpretative, and judgmental 
errors. However, a schema that is sensitive to the features 
of incoming stimuli (i.e., one that changes or adapts in 
response to incoming stimuli) is less likely to lead to 
error. Essentially, schema change occurs through the pro-
cesses of assimilation and accommodation. In the former, 
schemas incorporate information by adding details to an 
existing base of knowledge; whereas, in the latter, the 
actual structure of a schema is modified to account for 
inconsistent data. Both processes are influenced by the 
type and degree of experiences a person has in a given area 
of knowledge. Hence, perceivers vary in the extent to which 
they have well-developed schemas for particular stimulus 
domains. For example, the schemas of experts are generally 
more detailed, organized, and complex than those of nonex-
perts. Consequently, experts are better able to invoke and 
use schemas to remember information and solve problems in 
a variety of tasks. Further, it has been demonstrated 
that the schemas of experts have a significant impact upon 
the manner in which they make assessments and predictions 
about others. The work of this dissertation explores 
whether probation officers qua "experts" in the criminal 
justic system organize their knowledge of offenders into 
schematic groupings, and if so, how these schemas affect 
the judgments of criminal cases. 
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CHAPTER III 
METHODS 
Overview 
The present investigations were designed to examine 
the nature of offender schemas among probation officers and 
to assess how these schemas influence the judgment of crim·-
inal cases. The first study explored the existence and 
content of schemas through interviews with officers concern-
ing the composition of their caseloads. Officers with 
different assignments (Criminal and Municipal) and levels of 
experience (expert and novice) were compared on schema detail 
and number. The purposes of the second investigation were 
to validate the findings of Study 1 and to uncover any 
additional schemas of probationers. In this study, officers 
and clerical personnel were asked to sort index cards--each 
of which contained one piece of information from one of 
seven different information categories (e.g., crime type, 
demographics, prior record). The information categories 
portrayed eight of the schematic cases that emerged from 
the initial investigation. Subjects arranged the cards on 
an information board in order to recreate the eight c~ses. 
It was predicted that officers would be able to accurately 
complete the task, whereas nonofficers would fail to repro-
duce the schema types of Study 1. As in the first study, 
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comparisons were made between expert-novice and criminal-
municipal officers. The third study tested the effect of 
schematic cases on information processing. Subjects were 
presented with schematic and nonschematic cases and were 
instructed to judge the cases on a number of dimensions 
(e.g., report behavior, propensity for future criminal 
activity) . It was hypothesized that schematic cases would 
be judged faster, and with greater confidence and ease when 
compared to nonschematic cases. 
Study 1 
The first investigation was essentially a pilot study 
to clarify probation officers' schemas of criminal offenders. 
The primary purpose of the research was fourfold: (a) to 
provide evidence concerning the existence of schemas and 
their contents; (b) to suggest how officers may utilize 
schemas in making supervisory and treatment decisions about 
probationers; (c) to explore intergroup differences in 
schema availability, content, richness, and use (Of para-
mount interest was the comparison between expert and non-
expert officers); and (d) to collect data that could be used 
in the construction of materials for subsequent studies. 
Participants 
Forty probation officers of the Cook County Adult 
Probation Department of Illinois served as respondents in 
the study. Officers were selected on the basis of their 
schedule availability and willingness to cooperate in the 
research. The sample was divided into equal proportions 
according to their sex, race (White, Black, Hispanic), and 
experience. Experience·was dichotomized by a median split 
of the number of years employed as a probation officer in 
the respondent sample. Those with less than three years 
of duty were defined as "novices" and those with three 
years or more were considered "experienced." The mean age 
of the participants was 30, with a range of 23 to 39. 
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Additionally, the sample consisted of an equal number 
of criminal and municipal division officers. Each division 
grouping was composed of an equivalent proportion of 
experts and novices. The criminal-municipal distinction 
is one of geographic location, caseload composition, and 
officers' court activities. Basically, municipal officers 
supervise offenders who have committed crimes in the sur-
rounding suburbs of Chicago. Their cases, which are 
assigned to them according to the geographic residence of 
probationers, characteristically comprise first-time mis-
demeanants, white-collar criminals, petty thieves, and shop-
lifters. In contrast, criminal division officers receive 
cases on the basis of permanent courtroom assignments; 
Criminal caseloads are more likely to contain felons, hard-
core inner city criminals, recidivists, gang affiliates, and 
members of minority groups. Unlike municipal officers, 
criminal division probation officers generally follow a 
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case from its inception to its termination and are individ-
ually responsible for the full range of courtroom functions. 
Procedure 
The method of inquiry consisted of a semistructured 
interview organized around standard questions but individ-
ualized by the interviewer to each participant. Subjects 
were informed that the investigation was an exploration of 
the kinds of categories or groupings officers utilize in 
differentiating among their cases. It was made explicit 
that the study focused on officers' subjective assessments 
or perceptions of probationers as opposed to any systematic 
strategies they may employ in classifying their cases for 
supervision. Respondents were then presented with a short 
description of how stereotypes and preconceived notions of 
persons can affect an individual's impressions and judgments 
of others. Two examples of probationer "types" suggested 
by an earlier study (i.e., the drug offender and the high 
risk probationer) were offered as illustrations (see Lurigio, 
1981). The schema concept and its relevance to the present 
research were also briefly explained. Finally, participants 
were asked to discuss the various groupings (schemas) of 
probationers that characterize their caseloads. Fiske, 
Kinder, and Larter (1979) have successfully used such a 
procedure to elicit consensual schemas by asking subjects 
to name various types of political systems and to provide a 
distinctive set of attributes for each. It should be noted 
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that a concerted effort was made to uncover schemas via a 
systematic and unbiased process. Throughout the interview, 
officers were assured of the anonymity of their responses 
and were reminded to answer all questions with candor and 
thoroughness. All interview protocols were recorded as field 
notes. 
Interview topic areas. Topic areas were developed 
from a conceptual analysis of probation officers' tasks. It 
seemed reasonable to expect that if probation officers 
actually possessed schematic categorizations of offenders, 
these would contain information drawn from the contents of 
case files, the nature of officers' duties as well as their 
immediate objectives and ultimate goals as agents of the 
Court. For each schema mentioned, five topic areas or con-
tent domains were tapped: (a) criteria! attributes, (b) 
report demeanor, (c) supervision/treatment, (d) attributions 
of crime causality, and (e) prognosis. Table 1 provides 
sample questions for the five content domains. 
Schema definitions. A set of criteria was established 
to assess whether a given depiction of an offender type was 
an exemplification of "true" schema evocation. First, a 
schema was defined as an abstract .cognitive representation 
of a probationer which was reported with a degree of detail, 
specificity, and meaningfulness roughly corresponding to 
Rosch's (1977) basic level of categorization. Descriptions 
that were obviously applicable to a single or small number of 
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Table 1 
Interview Content Domains and Sample Questions 
Content Domain 
1. Criteria! Attributes 
2. Report Demeanor 
3. Supervision 
4. Attributions 
5. Prognosis3 
Questions 
What are the basic or core 
elements of the schema type? 
What traits differentiate the 
schema type from other categor-
ies which are closely related? 
Is the offender regular in his 
reporting? On report days, is 
the probationer respectful, 
discourteous, cooperative, etc.? 
How often is the offender type 
required to report? What kinds 
of extra-departmental services 
are recommended in the treatment 
of the probationer? 
Why do you think this particular 
type of probationer became 
involved in criminal activity? 
Is the cause of criminal 
behavior temporary or permanent? 
Is the offender likely to become 
involved in future criminal 
activity? What's the probabil-
ity the probationer will violate 
the conditions of his/her 
sentence? 
3Attributions are inferences regarding the causes of 
events or the properties of people or things that have 
causal efficacy. Attribution theory is concerned with the 
efforts of individuals to acquire a knowledge of the char-
acteristics, intentions, or internal states of others from 
their overt responses. A person making an attribution asks 
such questions, "Who is responsible?," "How responsible is 
he?," "What is it about the person that impelled him to act 
this way?." 
Weiner's (1974) model of attributions in achievement 
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Table 1 (continued) 
settings may be applied toward understanding attributions 
about crime and criminals. Weiner's model posits three 
dimensions or aspects upon which attributions vary: (a) 
whether the cause of the event is internal (i.e., something 
about the actor) or external (i.e., something about the 
actor's environment); (b) whether the cause is stable and 
enduring over time or relatively unstable and transient; 
and (c) whether the cause is intended by the actor or rela-
tively unintentional. For each evoked schema type, respon-
dents were asked to speculate upon the etiology of criminal 
behavior by arranging the cause or causes on the above 
attributional dimensions. 
criminals were not interpreted as evidence of schematic 
processing. Such examples were likely to reflect unique, 
idiosyncratic instances rather than instantiations of a 
category. (These are not to be confused with descriptions 
of offenders that were expressly presented as exemplars of 
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a schema type.) At the other extreme were elaborations that 
embodied a large portion of an officer's caseload. These 
were also discarded because they referred to overly-broad, 
nebulous representations of probationers as opposed to dis-
crete subtypes or categories (i.e., in Rosch's terms, the 
commonality among elements within the category was minimal) . 
Second, a specification of a probationer type was 
recorded as a schema if it provided a unified and internally 
consistent portrait of an offender (i.e., the depiction was 
logically and temporally ordered, and unfolded in a smooth 
flowing, story-like fashion). Further, schematic groupings 
were those in which the officer responded clearly and 
sufficiently to the set of questions relating to the five 
content domains. If a probation officer was unable to fully 
address one or more of the topic areas, his/her data were 
dropped from consideration (e.g., a category label that was 
offered without additional information or elaboration was 
not coded as a schema). Essentially, probationer schemas 
closely resembled realistic case histories of offenders and 
can be aptly described as neatly packaged "bundles" of know-
ledge tied together by a common thread or organizing theme 
(cf., Wyer & Srull, 1980). In short, loosely constructed, 
incongruous or incomplete portrayals were not regarded as 
schematic instances. 
Third, four respondents discussed typologies that 
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seemed to be grounded in textbook, theoretical, or actuarial 
approaches to the classification of offenders. These were 
also excluded from the analyses inasmuch as they basically 
involved the application of empirically derived and objec-
tively scored scales that placed probationers into groups 
according to risk assessments and/or treatment recommenda-
tions. (In any event, these categorizations would not have 
been recorded because of their lack of general agreement or 
consensus.) In addition, categories that were based upon 
Court Judges' directives were not eligible for coding. 
Hence, for purposes of the present research, schema types 
were restricted to subjective groupings fashioned primarily 
from officers' experience with and active supervision of 
probationers. 
Schema matching and labeling. Probation officers' 
typologies were matched for commonality by comparing their 
responses to the content domains of each category elicited. 4 
The initial step in the matching procedure involved ari 
4All data coding and analyses were performed by the 
investigator. 
94 
examination of the 179 schema types mentioned by the par-
ticipants to ascertain whether there was any consensus on 
the criteria! attribute domain. Common responses were 
grouped together and a further inspection of the remaining 
topic areas was conducted. Commonality was determined on 
the basis of whether the central elements or gist of 
officers' replies to the content domain questions were 
consistent. Schemas were considered equivalent if their 
separate descriptions agreed on the criteria! attribute 
domain plus at least two of the other four topic areas. 
Schema labels were provided by the investigator and are 
intended to capture the essential qualities of the offender 
categories. 5 
Content coding. A coding scheme was designed to 
analyze the contents of the 40 interview protocols. Par-
ticipants' replies were differentiated and tallied accord-
ing to units of information. An information unit was 
defined as a single statement or idea (e.g., "This type 
of probationer gets into crime because he has some real 
psychological problems," "A burglar is different from a 
5The labels are considered· important because it is 
assumed that type names or "category concepts" play a cen-
tral role in the encoding, storage, .and retrieval of 
schematic information. Future studies could be usefully 
directed at ascertaining whether probation officers concur 
with these designations and, more generally, at identifying 
the type names that officers spontaneously employ to des-
cribe criminal offenders. 
thief in his degree of professionalism"). Repetitious 
responses conveying the same underlying semantic meaning 
were not counted as separate information units. Each 
schema from each subject was scored for the number of 
information units it contained. 
Study 2 
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The findings of Study 1 clearly suggested the exis-
tence of shared offender schemas. A shortcoming inherent 
in the method, however, was that it relied on the interview-
er to be neutral in eliciting and interpreting data (i.e., 
it contained none of the requisite controls for reliabil-
ity or validity). For example, the coding of interview 
protocols was based heavily on subjective criteria and was 
not conducted by a coder who was blind to the hypotheses/ 
purposes of the research. Hence, it was possible that 
demand characteristics and experimenter effects produced 
an apparently meaningful description that may have been 
overly biased. The second study addressed this issue by 
employing a card sort paradigm similar to that of Carroll 
and Wiener (1982) which provides a more precise and rigor-
ous methodology for detecting schemas. Study 2 serv~d 
primarily to validate the results of Study 1, and secon-
darily to identify additional schemas of probationers. 
Participants 
Subjects were 20 officers of the Cook County Adult 
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Probation Department. Participation was voluntary, and 
was restricted to individuals who were not respondents in 
Study 1. As in the previous study, officers were divided 
into expert and novice groups according to their number of 
years employed as a probation officer, and into criminal 
and municipal groups on the basis of their assignments. 
There were an equal number of experts and novices in both 
the criminal and municipal groups. The median age of the 
sample was 32; 65% were male, 50% Caucasian, 40% Black, 
and 10% Hispanic. 
A non-equivalent control group comprising 20 members 
of the Department's clerical personnel was also recruited. 
These workers perform a number of duties including filing, 
typing, answering telephones, scheduling revocation hear-
ings, and logging in-coming cases. The performance of 
their jobs does not require direct contact with probation-
ers nor are they responsible for supervising and evaluating 
cases. Although the clerical staff obviously has more 
knowledge regarding the procedural and legal aspects of 
probation than the general population, there is no appar-
ent reason to expect that the group should possess elabor-
ate or organized schemas of offenders--at least not to the 
same degree or extent as probation officers. 
Materials 
A sample of 10 probation officers who had partici-
pated in Study 1 were asked to provide one or two actual 
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cases that were highly representative of the schema types 
they discussed in the interview. For example, if the 
respondent had a schema for burglars, he/she was instructed 
to identify one or more cases from his/her caseload that 
best exemplified the category. The files of selected 
cases were examined for material such as PSI reports, 
criminal histories, record sheets chronicling report 
behavior, termination status summaries, and synopses of 
offenders' use of resources. Thirty-six cases were 
reviewed. In general, the information contained in real 
cases corresponded to officers' schematic descriptions; 
however, in some instances their characterizations of pro-
totypic offenders did not precisely match the details in 
actual files. 6 Nevertheless, the 10 core schemas of 
Study 1, as a group, bore a strong and unmistakable 
resemblance to authentic probation cases. 
Information was extracted from files and combined 
with the results of the interview for the purpose of 
creating 10 realistic schematic cases representing the 
offender types found in Study 1. Schematic cases contained 
information about each of the following categories: (a) 
~chemas of offenders are by definition categories 
that are abstracted from experiences, and represent exem-
plars or composites of "real" criminal types. Therefore, 
a one-to-one correspondence between the features of the 
constructed schematic cases and actual probation cases was 
not expected. 
98 
crime (the offense for which the probationer was sentenced); 
(b) prior record (a list of crimes likely to have been 
committed by the offender and a description of the range of 
his/her past criminal involvement); (c) demographics (age, 
race, and sex); (d) social/psychological profile (evalua-
tions of the probationer's mental status, interpersonal-
familial relationships and social milieu, as well as attri-
butions about the cause(s) of the offender's criminal behav-
ior); (e) report behavior (a summary of the probationer's 
typical demeanor during'contacts with his/her officer); 
(f) treatment (recommendations concerning levels of super-
vision and the use of counseling and resources); and (g) 
prognoses (a prediction of the offender's success or failure 
while on probation and the likelihood of his/her continued 
criminal involvement) . 
Procedure 
The procedure used in this study is similar to the 
approach that Carroll and Wiener (1982) adopted in their 
investigation of expert parole decision makers. Each item 
of information about each of the seven categories was typed 
on a 3 x 5 index card and stacked in separate piles accord-
ing to information type. The info~mation was written as 
prose statements using the style and examples of real 
probation files. The subject's task was to select one card 
from each pile in order to recreate eight realistic cases. 7 
It was assumed that officers would arrange the cards in a 
99 
manner which reflected their underlying schematic represen-
tations of offenders (i.e., schemas would emerge as the 
organizing principle for constructing the cases); whereas 
clerical subjects' reconstructions would be essentially a 
random combination of the cards or based upon popular con-
ceptions of criminal types. On each trial, the order of 
information cards within the seven piles and the sequential 
ordering of categories between piles were randomized. The 
cases were formed by sorting the information cards on a 
board approximately five feet in length and three feet in 
height. The numbers 1-8 were placed across the top of the 
board (eight columns corresponding to the eight cases) and 
the numbers 1-7 were placed down the left side (seven rows 
corresponding to the seven information categories) . Fifty-
7A pretest with a small sample of officers (n = 8) 
revealed that the use of 10 cases (70 information cards) 
presented an unmanageable and time consuming task for sub-
jects to accomplish. Decreasing the number of cases to 
eight by removing the two least detailed schema types of 
Study 1 ("Conman" and "Violent Macho Man") made the task 
more workable, both in terms of the time that was required 
to complete the procedure and in the ease and efficiency 
with which the information cards were handled and organized. 
The pretest also recommended the adoption of the information 
board. Subjects reported that the ability to view cards 
already placed in completed cases was very helpful i~ con-
structing later cases, and in rearranging cards between 
cases. In addition, the pretest suggested that the seman-
tic relations between statements may have acted as cues in 
matching the information cards within a category. To avoid 
this problem, all words or phrases with high associative 
connections were either modified or removed from the cards. 
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six evenly spaced hooks served as holders for the informa-
tion cards. Subjects were informed that the purpose of 
the study was to examine how they organize their caseloads 
into different types of probationers. Participants were 
scheduled individually and were read the following instruc-
tions: 
In front of you are piles of index cards. Each pile 
consists of a set of cards that contain information 
relating to a case variable. Each card has a separate 
piece of information written on it. Your task is to 
put together the cards to form eight different crimin-
al cases which have been constructed from interviews 
with probation officers, actual case files, and pre-
sentence investigations. Every case you assemble 
should consist of seven cards--one from each of the 
information piles. Start with any pile you wish and 
choose from the piles in any order you desire. You 
may change the arrangement of the cards as you go 
along. Remember, there is no actual right or wrong 
way to do it. Rely on your subjective judgments. 
Familiarize yourself with all of the cards before you 
begin. There is no time limit. 
Subjects were unobtrusively timed and observed while 
performing the task. At the conclusion of the procedure, 
the participants were asked a series of questions relating 
to: (a) their reactions to the task; (b) the components 
of the organizing strategy they employed to compose cases; 
(c) the kinds of labels or category designations they be-
lieved would capture the essentia~ nature of their eight 
constructed cases; (d) explanations of why certain pieces 
of information "naturally" fit together in some cases and 
not in others; and (e) a more in-depth discussion of the 
constructed offender types, including an estimate of the 
prevalence of each in the Department's caseload, and an 
elaboration of the five content domains of Study 1. Upon 
completing the task, subjects were debriefed. During the 
debriefing, they received an explanation of the purpose 
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of the investigation and were thanked for their participa-
tion. 
Study 3 
Taken together, Studies 1 and 2 strongly supported the 
notion that probation officers organize their knowledge 
about crime and criminals into consensual schemas of 
offenders. The final study explored the extent to which 
schemas influence how officers handle case information in 
making judgments concerning probationrs. More specifically, 
the third investigation tested for any differences in the 
processing of schematic and nonschematic cases. The liter-
ature suggests three possible processing effects: speed, 
ease, and confidence. 
Speed and ease. A number of experiments in cognitive 
psychology consistently show that, if a perceiver has a 
schema for a particular stimulus domain, information rele-
vant to that domain will be processed more quickly than 
irrelevant information or information for which a schema 
has not been developed (Taylor & Crocker, 1981). This 
effect has also been demonstrated in the area of social 
cognition. For example, in a study of self-schemata, 
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Markus (1977) identified two groups of subjects who had 
schemas about themselves for the traits of dependence or 
independence, and a third group of subjects who were 
aschematic on those traits. Subjects were instructed to 
read words portraying a mixture of schema relevant and 
neutral adjectives and to press a button indicating whether 
the adjectives were self-descriptive. It was reported that 
subjects with self schemas (either for dependence or inde-
pendence) responded significantly faster to schema relevant 
words than did aschematics. There were no differences, 
however, among the three groups in the processing time for 
schema neutral adjectives. Similarly, Markus and Smith 
(1981) compared subjects who had masculine self schemas with 
those who did not (i.e., aschematics) and obtained the same 
results. (See also Keenan & Baillert [1980] and Kuiper & 
Rogers [1979] .) 
Comparable effects were also revealed in a problem-
solving experiment by Taylor, Crocker, and D'Agostino 
(1978). Subjects were presented with problems that con-
tained schema-relevant cues, schema-irrelevant cues, or 
no cues (control) . Problems with schema-relevant cues 
were solved faster than control problems, and control 
problems were solved faster than problems with schema-
irrelevant cues. Finally, Lingle and Ostrom (1979) con-
ducted a series of investigations showing that subjects 
who had formed a schema about a target person based on an 
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earlier judgment (e.g., the suitability of the target for 
a designated occupation) took significantly less time to 
make a second similar judgment than a second dissimilar 
judgment. 
Whereas the above findings indicate that schema rele-
vant information is processed faster, other data suggest 
that attending to schema-relevant material may result in 
longer processing times than attending to schema irrelevant 
material. For example, Markus (1977) reported that sche-
matics spent more time processing information when confronted 
with false feedback on a schema-relevant attribute than did 
aschematics. Also, Markus, Sentis, and Hammill (1978) 
found that subjects with "weight schemas'' (i.e., obese 
subjects) took longer to process schema-relevant material 
than subjects who did not possess a self-schema relating to 
that dimension. In a conceptually similar study, Rogers, 
Kuiper, and Kirker (1977) had subjects make a series of 
ratings on a list of adjectives. For some adjectives they 
made self-reference ratings (i.e., "Does this word describe 
you?"); for others they made structural, phonemic, and 
semantic ratings. Rogers et al. (1977) reported that 
subjects who rated the adjectives' in terms of self-reference 
were significantly slower in identifying information in a 
recall task than were subjects who rated the material for 
its structural, phonemic, or semantic characteristics. 
Taylor and Crocker (1981) summarized the schematic processing 
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time literature by concluding that, in general, information 
which is central, redundant, or evaluatively consistent to 
a schema will be processed more rapidly than information 
which is peripheral, novel, or evaluatively mixed. 
Evidence that schemas influence the ease of informa-
tion processing comes primarily from the work of Rosch and 
her associates on the cognitive representation of semantic 
categories. For example, it was found that subjects rated 
prototypic instances of categories as significantly easier 
to recognize and classify than nonprototypic instances 
(see Rosch & Lloyd, 1978). 
Confidence. Some studies suggest that schema-based 
processing may also affect the confidence with which per-
sons make judgments. A study by Cantor et al. (1980), 
which was discussed earlier, revealed that psychiatrists' 
diagnoses of patients who resembled the prototype for a 
diagnostic category were made with significantly greater 
confidence than the diagnoses of nonprototypic patients. 
Markus and Smith (1981) presented groups of masculine 
schematic and aschematic subjects with a film depicting a 
male college student in his dorm. The actor's behaviors 
consisted of both stereotypic masbuline (e.g., crushirig a 
beer can, reading Playboy) and neutral activities (e.g., 
eating an apple, doing homework). Later subjects were 
asked to judge whether a list of schema consistent, incon-
sistent, and irrelevant adjectives were descriptive or 
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nondescriptive of the actor. Findings demonstrated that 
schematic subjects were significantly more confident in 
making "not him" judgments to all types of words than were 
aschematics indicating that having a schema on one dimen-
sion (masculinity) allowed subjects to develop a clearer 
image of the actor in general and to reject a variety of 
possible attributes with high conviction. Further, Cohen 
(1983) reported that subjects were significantly more 
confident when rating the representativeness of attributes 
that were highly consistent or inconsistent with an occu-
pation prototype (e.g., waitress) as compared to attributes 
that were neutral to the protoype. Finally, in a recent 
study, Ferguson, Rule, and Carlson (1983) found that 
subjects were more confident of the accuracy of their per-
formance on a word recognition task when they had previously 
rated the words on their self-descriptiveness (i.e., when 
the words evoked their self schemas) than when the words 
had been rated for their descriptiveness of other persons. 
As shown in Studies 1 and 2, officers' schemas of 
offenders represent extensive and structured knowledge 
about probationers that comprises inferences relating to 
treatment/supervision strategies and report behavior as well 
as prognoses regarding future criminal activity. The argu-
ment underlying the main hypotheses of the third study was 
that when an officer has to make judgments about a proba-
tioner who "matches" a specific schema, then these judgments 
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are made easily and quickly because the information re-
quired for the judgment is highly organized and readily 
retrieved. Judgments concerning nonschematic cases, on 
the other hand, necessitate more cognitive work which 
entails a thorough search through memory for case-related 
information, an integration of this information, and a 
determination of its relevance to the current assessment. 
In accordance with the preceding argument and the 
aforementioned findings, it was predicted that subjects 
would process schematic cases with greater rapidity, ease, 
and confidence than nonschematic cases. Schematic proces-
sing was examined by asking expert officers to evaluate 
schematic and nonschematic cases on four schema-relevant 
dimensions, and to rate the confidence and ease with which 
these evaluations were made. Also, the time subjects spent 
in judging the cases was recorded. 
It should be noted that Study 3 focused on a property 
of the stimulus material whereas the main thrust of Studies 
1 and 2 was the comparison between expert and novice judges. 
An implicit assumption of the third investigation was that 
cognitive representations of offenders are available to 
experienced officers .and therefore they were able to dis-
tinguish between the schematic and nonschematic cases 
presented in the experimental task. Presumably, it is this 
distinction that produces differences in how information 
is processed. In other words, because schematic cases 
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evoke knowledge structures (and nonschematic cases do not) 
they influence officers' assessments of probationers in a 
direction consistent with the hypothesized effects. 
Participants 
Twenty expert probation officers, one-half of whom 
are assigned to the criminal division and one-half to the 
municipal division, were selected for the third investiga-
tion. The sample was also evenly divided between men and 
women, and Blacks and Whites. Officers who were subjects 
in Study 2 were not asked to participate, inasmuch as their 
experience in the Study and their knowledge of the Study's 
findings, may have alerted them to the purpose of the third 
investigation and therefore biased their responses. Data 
from three of the original respondents were discarded after 
it was discovered they had been participants in the second 
study. Additional officers were recruited to replace them. 
Materials 
On the basis of actual probation files and the find-
ings of Studies 1 and 2, a set of four schematic cases were 
constructed: "Burglar," "Drug Addict," "Female Welfare 
Fraud," and "White Collar." These offender types were 
chosen because they exhibited: {a) a relatively high· level 
of detail in the interview as measured by mean information 
units; (b) the highest number of correct schema type 
matches in the card sort task; and {c) the highest degree 
of cohesiveness on the cluster analysis. Information was 
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drawn from the schematic descriptions of Study 1, the 
responses to the post-task questions of Study 2, as well 
as the files of the "representative" cases that were util-
ized in developing the ~timulus materials for Study 2, in 
order to create realistic case histories depicting each of 
the four schema types. The case histories comprised data 
that were based upon the four "case information items" of 
Study 2 (demographics, crime type, prior record, social/ 
psychological profile) and were written in a narrative 
style patterned after actual P.S.I. reports. Hence, cases 
were prepared in a format intended to enhance their appar-
ent authenticity, thereby increasing subjects' involvement 
in the experimental task. 
To more precisely assess the effect that schematic 
cases may have upon information processing and officer 
judgments, two additional sets of comparison cases were 
created: mixed schematic and real cases. The mixed sche-
matic cases were formed by combining the case histories of 
the "Suburb Kid" and "Gangbanger" types, and the "Uncle 
Tom" and "Con Man" schemas. 8 (Each of these cases were 
developed in the same manner as the schematic case 
8 Mixed schematic versions were designed to provide 
a set of comparison cases that were decidedly nonsche-
matic. The cases chosen for mixing were selected on the 
basis of whether they would yield plausible case histories 
when combined. 
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histories.) For example, the demographic and crime type 
data of the "Suburb Kid" were matched with the prior record 
and social/psychological profile of the "Gangbanger" to 
produce the first version of the mixed schema set. The 
second version of this type was created by combining the 
first two categories of the "Gangbanger" description (demo-
graphics, crime type) with the second two categories of the 
"Suburb Kid'' description (prior record, social/psychological 
profile). This procedure was repeated with the "Uncle Tom" 
and "Con Man" schemas to yield a total of four mixed cases. 
In addition, 20 P.S.I. reports were selected from a sample 
of approximately 200 that were written during the years 
1979-1981. 9 The files of these 20 P.S.I. cases were then 
checked for other pertinent materials (e.g., prior record 
summaries, verifications of employment or education, psy-
chiatric reports, previous probation records). From these 
sources, 20 real cases were prepared in the same format as 
the four schematic and four mixed schematic cases. 
During the construction of the 28 case histories (four 
schematic, four mixed, twenty real), an attempt was made to 
equate the descriptions on such factors as overall length 
9The sample of P.S.I. reports were copies of actual 
files that were made available to me during earlier studies 
which I conducted for the purpose of identifying risk 
factors among Cook County probationers. 
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(determined by the total number of words per case), mean 
sentence length and sentence complexity, level of vocabu-
lary use, and reading time. To provide a more objective 
confirmation of case comparability, five judges were each 
asked to evaluate a series of the four schematic, the four 
mixed, and four different real cases on the aforementioned 
variables. 10 Their suggestions led to the modification of 
the structure and wording of nine cases. (It should be 
noted that any changes that were made did not affect the 
essential nature or content of the cases.) 
Two of the judges were also instructed to: (a) 
record the reading times for each of the 28 cases, and 
(b) rate the cases on their verisimilitude (i.e., a judg-
ment of how closely the constructed cases resembled actual 
probation cases) using a seven-point scale ranging from 
not at all similar to highly similar, and on their internal 
consistency (i.e., a judgment of whether the information 
both within and between the four "case information" cate-
gories was plausibly or sensibly organized) . A seven-
point scale was also used for this rating, ranging from 
not at all consistent to highly consistent. The range and 
lOThe judges were employees of the Cook County 
Adult Probation Department whose job requires them to 
routinely read through and process case files. 
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variance of reading times, which were combined for the two 
judges, were both minimal, suggesting that the lengths of 
the cases were basically equivalent. Further, the cases 
were rated highly on realism (M = 5.85) and consistency 
(M = 5.47). Analyses of variance yielded no differences 
between the three types of cases on reading time, consis-
tency, or verisimilitude (all E's > .10). The interjudge 
agreement as measured by correlations on the ratings was . 85 
for verisimilitude and .79 for consistency. 
Procedure 
Each subject was presented with four cases: two 
schematic, one mixed schematic and one real case. The six 
combinations of schematic case pairs were randomly combined 
with pairs of mixed schematic and real cases (which were 
also randomly matched), such that each schematic case 
was presented ten times, each mixed schematic case five 
times, and each real case one time. Twenty sets of four 
cases were formed. The order of cases within each of the 
sets was randomized. Prior to each trial, a set was ran-
domly chosen without replacement. 
Subjects were told that their task was to carefully 
read and evaluate four actual criminal cases for the purpose 
of making a number of judgments that are comparable to 
the assessments they make in their day-to-day activities 
as probation officers. The judgments consisted of four 
questions relating to the "treatment-inference" items of 
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Study 2 (report behavior, treatment/supervision, prognosis). 
Also, a question asking the subject to rate the typicality 
of a case (i.e., how closely the offender resembled other 
members of his/her caseload) on a seven-point scale, rang-
ing from not at all similar to highly similar, was included 
as a check on the case manipulation. 
Report behavior judgments were measured by rating 
the offender on both his/her cooperativeness during con-
tacts, and his/her regularity in reporting on assigned 
days. An assessment of a case's prognosis was made by 
rating the probationer's likelihood of successfully com-
pleting his/her sentence. All ratings were done on a seven-
point scale. The item referring to treatment/supervision 
was presented as an open-ended question that asked the 
respondent to provide a list of recommended extra-depart-
mental referrals for the case, and to discuss the nature 
of the counseling and monitoring strategies he/she would 
employ with the offender, including the frequency and mode 
of contact. Following each of the inference items were 
two questions relating tothe confidence (a determination of 
how certain or sure subjects felt their response was 
accurate or valid), and difficulty (the relative ease-with 
which subjects responded to an item) which subjects exper-
ienced in making the case judgments. Confidence ratings 
were collected on a seven-point scale ranging from not at 
all confident to highly confident; the rating of judgment 
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difficulty was also on a seven-point scale that ranged 
from not at all difficult to extremely difficult. The 
total time subjects spent in completing the inferential 
items was recorded for'each case. Reading time was not in-
cluded in this measure. Before respondents evaluated the 
four cases, they were presented with a practice case to 
familiarize them with the materials and procedure, and to 
avoid the possible impact that the novelty of the task may 
have had on the response time of initial cases. 
After completing the four cases, subjects were de-
briefed about the true nature of the study. In postexper-
imental interviews, no subjects expressed suspicions about 
the actual purpose of the investigation or admitted to 
having any prior knowledge about it. Officers also stated 
that they were unaware that their response times were being 
measured. Respondents were thanked for their participation, 
and asked not to discuss the study with fellow officers 
until it was finalized. (See Appendices A and B for a sam-
ple of the presented case histories of Study 3 and a copy 
of the case assessment questions and judgment scales.) 
CHAPTER IV 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
Study 1 
Types of Schemas 
An inspection of interview protocols revealed a set 
of 10 core schemas, each reported by 13 or more of the 40 
participants. These are displayed in Table 2 with an 
identifying label for each and a synopsis of the data 
relating to the five content domains. No a priori standard 
was adopted to delimit a cut-off point for core schemas. 
However, an obvious break in the number of officers dis-
cussing each of the various types appeared at 13, inasmuch 
as the remaining schemas were provided by 7 or fewer of the 
respondents. Findings indicated that among the ten core 
types, "Burglar" (mean information units = 11. 85) was the 
most data-rich category, whereas the "Con Man" (mean in-
formation units = 4.8) schema was the least detailed. 
Secondary schemas (i.e., those described by less than 20% 
of the respondents) accounted for 17% of the total n~~ber 
of evoked categories. 
Number of Schemas 
Analyses of results by race, sex, and officer 
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Table 2 
A Summary of the Five Content Domains 
Relating to Schema Types 
SCHEMA TYPE - BURGLAR 
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Criteria! Attributes - Highly professional; commits 
only burglaries; criminal habits well learned - performed 
with confidence and skill; relatively intelligent; small 
in physical stature. 
Report Demeanor - Consistent in reporting; makes an 
effort to give the officer the impression he is not engaged 
in criminal activities; changes address often. 
Supervision - Close supervision, frequent B. of I. 
checks, "hard-nosed" treatment during report days; 
verification of employment/residence at every stated change. 
Attributions - Internal - stable - intentional (adop-
tion of crimnal lifestyle) . 
Prognosis - Poor - likely to continue in criminal 
profession (this is all he knows and he is relatively 
successful at it) • 
SCHEMA TYPE - DRUG ADDICT 
Criteria! Attributes - Noticeably psychologically 
disturbed; devoid of social, interpersonal skills; the 
use of drugs permeates his entire existence; very depen-
dent on others (uses people like drugs); physically 
emaciated, disheveled. 
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Table 2 
DRUG ADDICT (continued) 
Report Demeanor - Inconsistent in reporting; 
' frequently late for appointments; lies about drug use. 
Supervision - Drug treatment is essential, officer 
works closely with drug rehab personnel, physical tests 
for the presence of drugs are mandatory. 
Attributions - Internal - stable - intentional (low 
self-esteem) . 
Prognosis - Guarded - If drug habit is corrected, 
criminal behavior will cease. 
SCHEMA TYPE - GANGBANGER 
Criteria! Attributes - Typical juvenile delinquent, 
a tough kid, usually Latin; membership in street gang 
gives meaning to life, a sense of self-worth; dress and 
distinguishing markings reflect gang affiliation. 
Report Demeanor - Fairly consistent in reporting but 
does not always cooperate; important to project a tough 
guy image; not receptive to recommendations for behavior 
change. 
Supervision - Regular superv,ision (once per month 
in-person reporting); confrontation during sessions is 
important, frequent challenging of gang involvement; 
resources offered-- GED, employment services. 
Table 2 
GANGBANGER (continued) 
Attributions - External - unstable - unintentional 
(gang affiliation) . 
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Prognosis - Guarded - Is not likely to become involved 
in future crime if he ends his gang affiliation. 
SCHEMA TYPE - UNCLE TOM 
Criterial Attributes - Older Black male, uneducated, 
generally respects the law but sees crime as the only 
means of support; has done some prison time; family is 
important; periodically employed as a menial laborer. 
Report Demeanor - Very consistent in reporting, takes 
direction well, willing to participate in the rehabilitative 
process. 
Supervision - After six months, phone-in, mail-in 
reporting is allowed; report accommodations are made to 
insure that the offender's employment is not disrupted. 
Attributions - External - stable - unintentional 
(environmental factors) . 
Prognosis - Excellent - Is afraid to return to 
prison. 
SCHEMA TYPE - FEMALE WELFARE FRAUD 
Criterial Attributes - Young Black woman, willingly 
manipulated/controlled by men; has children out of wedlock 
by different fathers; likely to have turned tricks for 
Table 2 
FEMALE WELFARE FRAUD (continued) 
money; a survivor at any cost. 
Report Demeanor - Changes address often, generally 
late on report days, uses the care of children as an 
excuse for non-reporting. 
Supervision - Regular supervision (once per month 
in-person reporting); restitution payments must be 
stringently enforced. 
Attributions - External - unstable - unintentional 
(forced by male partners). 
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Prognosis - Guarded - If she can disengage herself 
from destructive relationships progress toward rehabilita-
tion may ensue (has capability to live alternate lifestyle). 
SCHEMA TYPE - CAREER/CON MAN 
Criterial Attributes - A true criminal, amoral, 
asocial; owns big car, expensive clothes, stable of women; 
often a pimp; an opportunist, fast talker with plenty of 
street smarts; long and varied prior record; knows how 
to work the system, always on the con. 
Report Demeanor - Fairly consistent in reporting; 
extremely deceptive, falsely cooperative, frequently dis-
honest about his residence; looks for ways to "get 
around" conditions. 
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Table 2 
CAREER/CON MAN (continued) 
Supervision - Close supervision, bi-monthly state and 
local B of I checks, monthly verification of employment/ 
residence; no reporting accommodations are made; officer 
vigorously exercises authority, threats of violation are 
frequent. 
Attributions - Internal - stable - intentional (lack 
of moral development). 
Prognosis - Extremely Poor - continued criminal 
activity and an extended prison sentence are inevitable. 
SCHEMA TYPE - VIOLENT/MACHO MAN 
Criterial Attributes - Extremely low tolerance for 
stress, highly prone to violence, a literal powder keg; 
usually a Latin with alcohol problems; a married man with 
highly traditional attitudes about family, religion, sex, 
etc.,; believes difficulties can be solved through force. 
Report Demeanor - Consistent in reporting; the least 
manageable on report days; often openly confronts the 
officer, blatantly verbally aggressive, disrespectful in 
tone, speech, demeanor. 
Supervision - Regular supervision (once per month in-
person reporting); resources offered --alcohol treatment. 
Attributions - Internal - stable - intentional (low 
tolerance for stress). 
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Table 2 
VIOLENT/MACHO MAN (continued) 
Prognosis - Guarded - Quite labile, easily instigated 
to aggress. 
SCHEMA TYPE - SUBURB KID 
Criterial Attributes - White, young male residing in 
affluent areas surrounding the city; intelligent, usually 
attending college or has plans for higher education; lacks 
responsibility, does crime for kicks; parents rescue him 
from difficulties. 
Report Demeanor- Haphazard report behavior initially, 
becomes consistent later; parents frequently accompany 
him to sessions and often call to inquire about progress 
or to complain about his behavior. 
Supervision - Regular supervision (once per month in-
person reporting); frequent contacts with family are made; 
after first year phone-ins are allowed; rules must be 
explicitly set and enforced; resources offered -- family 
therapy, psychological counseling. 
Attributions - External - unstable - unintentional 
(peer pressures). 
Prognosis - Good - Closely involved with family; 
has learned lesson. 
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Table 2 
SCHEMA TYPE - DUMB HILLBILLY 
Criteria! Attributes - Appalachian White male, border-
line mental retardate; Southern in dress, speech, demeanor; 
commits a variety of petty crimes; usually his entire fam-
ily (e.g., parents, siblings, spouse) becomes involved in 
criminal activity as a way of life. 
Report Demeanor - Report behavior is inconsistent, 
does not purposely miss sessions but simply forgets appoint-
ment times; makes an effort to comply with the conditions 
of his sentence; demonstrates a desire to please the 
officer, but often finds it difficult to comprehend his/her 
directives. 
Supervision - Close supervision; a high degree of 
structuring is indicated; offender requires guidance and 
direction at each meeting; officer must communicate with 
the offender at an understandable level. 
Attributions - Internal - stable - unintentional 
(lacks intellect, good judgment). 
Prognosis - Poor - Does not have intellectual capac-
ity to avoid destructive behavior. 
SCHEMA TYPE - WHITE COLLAR 
Criteria! Attributes - White, male, mid-30's; gen-
uinely middle-class, an upstanding member of the community, 
the man-next-door type; an educated, successful person 
Table 2 
WHITE COLLAR (continued) 
with a stable family and employment history; no prior 
record. 
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Report Demeanor - Very consistent in reporting; 
condescending toward the officer, indignant at times, 
feels he is above the system; expects special privileges. 
Supervision - Very loose supervision; officer is 
careful to protect the confidentiality of the offender; 
reporting is scheduled to work around the probationer's 
employment responsibilites. 
Attributions - External - unstable - intentional 
(viewed circumstance as opportunity for easy money). 
Prognosis - Excellent - Criminal activity is too 
costly (may lose family/job, etc.). 
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assignment showed no differences in the mean number of 
schemas (all ~·s,£ >.20) and no differences among separate 
comparisons of the number of subjects describing the 10 
schema types (all ! 2 's,. £ >.25). However, a significant 
difference did emerge between the mean number of schemas 
presented by expert (~ = 4.1) and novice (~ = 4.8) offi-
cers, t(38) = 2.08, £ <.05. In addition, there were 
differences in the percentage of expert versus nonexpert 
subjects elaborating specific schema types (see Table 3). 
A tenable explanation for the greater number of 
schemas offered by novices may derive from a tendency to 
relate categories that are more nascent and/or speculative 
in nature. That is borne out by the fact that 85% of the 
least reported schemas (i.e., those discussed by less than 
20% of the respondents) were provided by nonexperts. These 
groupings were also the most loosely constructed and com-
prised the fewest units of information. Experienced 
officers seem to restrict their conceptualizations of 
officers to cognitive representations that are more clearly 
formed, salient, and central to their caseloads. The 
smaller number of schemas for experts suggests that this 
group has settled upon a more efficient and parsimonious 
strategy for organizing probationers and that they may be 
less inclined to individuate the constituents of their 
caseloads. The shared superficial characteristics of 
cases seem not to influence experts as much as nonexperts. 
Table 3 
Number of Expert and Novice Officers Invoking the Schema Types, 
Mean Information Units, and Efficiency Index 
Schema Typea 
Burglar 
Drug Addict 
Gangbanger 
Uncle Tom 
Female Welfare Fraud 
Career/Con Man 
Violent/Macho Man 
Suburb Kid 
Dumb Hillbilly 
White Collar 
Probation Officers 
Expert Novice 
n 
14 
10 
12 
10 
9 
5 
4 
3 
3 
8 
n 
6* 
10 
4* 
4 
5 
9 
10 
11* 
11* 
5 
Probation Officers 
Expert Novice 
14.3 9.4 
12.8 4.7 
12.7 8.3 
11.7 9.9 
9.9 5.7 
5.3 4.3 
6.2 4.2 
8.9 5.1 
9.9 6.1 
10.8 11.3 
Efficiency 
Indexb 
.66 
.37 
.65 
.85 
.58 
.81 
.68 
.57 
.62 
1.05 
aChi-squar~ tests with 1 degree of freedom were performed to determine whether 
there was a significant difference between the number of expert and novice officers 
discussing each of the schema types. 
bEfficiency Index= Novice Mean/Expert Mean *E <.05 
1-' 
N 
~ 
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Indeed, the schemas mentioned by a proportionately greater 
number of experienced respondents may be those that have 
more practical significance in terms of both the frequency 
with which a "type of 6ffender" is assigned to an officer, 
and whether or not the categorization contributes to more 
effective treatment and supervision. 
Differences in Schema Types 
Differences in the number of separate schema types, 
as shown in Table 3, may be partially a function of the 
non-random respondent selection process. The sample of 
novices consisted of a disproportionate percentage of 
officers who work in geographic districts in which the 
"Suburb Kid" and "Dumb Hillbilly" are more likely to be 
found due to the socioeconomic status and ethnic composi-
tion of neighborhoods. 
The apparent ease with which experts invoke the 
"Gangbanger" schema seems to emerge from their learned 
ability to recognize the subtle trappings and characteris-
tic demeanor of gang members. Gang affiliates, who fre-
quently strive to conceal their group activities from 
officers, commit a variety of petty crimes which may or 
may not be related to their membership. Thus, distinguish-
ing the "Gangbanger" from a common misdemeanant is often 
difficult for the novice officer. Only 25% of the non-
experts, compared to 80% of the experienced officers, were 
able to detail the identifying markings, speech, dress, 
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etc. of a typical gang member. A similar circumstance 
obtains for the burglary schema. Initially, burglars as 
a group appear to be a heterogeneous collection of criminals 
whose only point of similarity is the offense for which 
they were sentenced. Data suggest that increased contact 
with these probationers has led experts to identify essen-
tial underlying threads of commonality which synthesize a 
loose collection of offenders into a discrete, verifiable 
category. 
Richness of Schemas 
Examination of subjects' responses demonstrated 
further differences between novice and expert officers. 
Results indicated that experts presented a significantly 
greater number of mean information units (M = 10.94) than 
did nonexperts (~ = 6.22), ~(38) = 5.68, E <.01. This 
finding suggests greater schema complexity and richness 
among more experienced probation officers when compared to 
a group with less than three years of service. A simple 
"efficiency index" was created in order to yield direct 
comparisons between experienced and novice officers on 
each of the schema types. It was computed by the following 
formula: 
EI = NE 
E 
where NE equals the mean information units of the nonex-
perts and E equals the mean information units of the 
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expert group. 
Inspecting the results of this analysis in Table 3, 
it can be seen that in 9 out of 10 instances, novices 
provided a less complete description of the probationer 
schemas. Further, among the experienced group there was 
a strong positive relationship (r(8) = .81, E <.01) between 
the number of respondents invoking a schema type and the 
mean number of information units corresponding to the 
type. The correlation in the novice group was also signi-
ficant but in the negative direction (r(8) = -.79, E <.01). 
This result is consistent with the earlier finding that 
novices tend to discuss schemas that are less fully devel-
oped or firmly constructed. In addition, it may indicate 
that nonexperts were more sensitive to the demand charac-
teristics of the investigative procedure as reflected by 
their apparent concern with providing the interviewer with 
as many categories as possible irrespective of whether 
the groupings were sufficiently detailed. Moreover, the 
schemas evoked most frequently among the novice group 
(i.e., "Dumb Hillbilly", "Suburb Kid") are those that 
represent relatively recent additions to caseloads. (This 
is substantiated by officers' reports and department 
statistics.) Intuitively, one would expect these schemas 
to be the least elaborate. Perhaps these categories were 
also available to experts, but they were unwilling to 
discuss them because of their lack of richness. 
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A stepwise multiple regression analysis of information 
clearly supports the above conclusions. The results given 
in Table 4 show that response position, expertise, and 
schema type emerge as significant predictors of mean infor-
mation units. These three variables explain more than 60% 
of the variance in schema length (~ = .78, F(ll,29) = 19.91, 
E <.001). Again, officers with greater experience provided 
more elaborate schemas. It was also revealed that the ten 
core schema types differed significantly in richness. 
Moreover, there is strong evidence suggesting a serial 
position effect on schema density. That is, schemas that 
were evoked early in the order of presentation contained 
much greater detail than those elicited at later stages in 
the interview. It is important to note that after con-
trolling for schema type and serial position, experienced 
officers still give significantly richer schemas than 
novices (!(1,29) = 39.13, E <.001). 
To summarize, novice respondents presented schema 
types that were relatively simple and impoverished. In 
contrast, the schemas of experienced probation officers 
may be described as a rich, interrelated network of infor-
mation relating probationer traits and supervision strate-
gies. Moreover, the details of expert schemas were organ-
ized in a systematic fashion. Hence, it appears that 
experienced officers not only possess greater knowledge 
of prototypical offenders, but they also make more 
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Table 4 
Stepwise Regression Analysis of the Variables 
That Affect Schema Richness 
Variable in order 
of insertion into 
regression equation Multiple R Beta F 
Schema Type a .56 a 7.40** 
Response Position .71 -.516 70.96** 
Years Employed .78 .355 39.13** 
(Expertise) 
aSchema type was entered as a set of nine dummy 
variables preceding the inclusion of the other variables. 
**E <.001 
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connections between separate pieces of schematic data. It 
was my impression that novices related probationer char-
acteristics to treatment in a very simple-minded manner, 
whereas officers with expertise did so with a high degree 
of sophistication and facility, indicating both a funda-
mental difference in schema use and the greater descriptive 
utility of experienced respondents' categorizations. 
Experts' schemas were more clearly articulated, higher in 
differentiation and vividness, elaborated with increased 
certainty, and were volunteered more readily and spontan-
eously (i.e., fewer probes were required to elicit details 
and less time was spent in evoking schemas) suggesting 
greater cognitive availability. Further, experienced 
probation officers provided more concrete examples of 
present and/or past members of their caseloads who instan-
tiated the schema types. Nearly twice as many experts 
mentioned actual schematic cases when compared to nonex-
perts, (~2 (l,N = 40)= 10.25, E <.01). 
Study 2 
Sorting Strategies 
All subjects treated the task as meaningful, and 
reported that the information presented in the study 
realistically portrayed the types of probation cases found 
in Cook County. Moreover, officers indicated that the task 
called upon many facets of actual probation work. For 
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example, when assigned a new case, their objective is to 
make predictions about future risk and potential for reha-
bilitation by evaluating essentially the same set of case 
variables contained in ,the cards (demographics, crime type, 
prior record, etc.). It was the investigator's impression 
that probation officers approached the task more systema-
tically and studiously than did clerical personnel; the 
latter appeared to handle the information with less confi-
dence, control, and deliberation. Officers' apparent "ego 
involvement" in the procedure stemmed from a common concern 
that their performance would somehow reflect their compe-
tence. In fact, many officers quipped that the study was 
a "disguised test" of their abilities. 
Officers began constructing a large number of cases 
with current offense, and followed with demographics and 
prior record, respectively. Of the 160 "offender schemas" 
composed by probation officers, offense was used first in 
93%, while 60% contained the offense-demographics-prior 
record sequence as the first three information items. 
Table 5 shows the median order of use for the seven infor-
mation categories. Officers in Cook County focus primarily 
on the monitoring and control of .cases. Hence, the t~iad 
of offense, record, and demographics is highly informative 
(i.e., salient) because these variables are deemed funda-
mental in making assessments of future criminality 
(Lurigio, 1981). In addition, the above three factors 
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were often mentioned as critical elements in the criteria! 
attribute domain of Study 1; therefore, they frequently 
represent the central or defining pieces of information 
in an offender schema. ' Offense and prior record were also 
shown to be essential items in a similar study by Carroll 
and Wiener (1982). In their investigation, parole decision 
makers constructed cases in a card sorting task by gen-
erally beginning with current offense, and then adding 
criminal record and sentence. In contrast, as reported in 
Table 5, no consistent trend in the ordering of information 
was found in an analysis of the clerical staffs' sequences 
of card placements. 
There was a basic difference in the kind of strategy 
that the officer and clerical groups employed in construct-
ing the cases. Seventy-five percent of the officers sorted 
the cards in a vertical orientation, i.e., by completing 
one column before moving to the next; whereas eighty 
percent of the clerical staff members organized the infor-
mation horizontally, i.e., by placing the cards from left 
to right in sequential rows. (It should be noted that the 
five officers who adopted a horizontal strategy were nov-
ices.) This finding su~gests that probation officers may 
have had a clear or well-developed conceptualization of a 
case and its components before placing the cards on the 
board. When questioned about their card sorting approaches, 
a large percentage of officers (80%) reported that they 
133 
Table 5 
Median Order of Use for Information Categories 
Information Category Officer Clerical 
Crime Type (Offense) 1.03 4.17 
Demographics 2.33 3.44 
Prior Record 3.13 4.88 
Social/Psychological Profile 4.41 3.38 
Treatment 5.48 4.67 
Report Behavior 5.75 3.87 
Prognoses 6.95 4.28 
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formed the categories case-by-case, as opposed to making a 
series of separate or independent matches between any two 
or more of the information cards. To illustrate, consider 
these statements by one of the officers: 
I was able to see the entire version of a case before 
I put it together. It was like I had a picture of these 
cases in my head and the cards were the different parts 
of the pictures. All of them fit together into a 
complete whole for each case. I didn't feel like I 
was just stringing together a bunch of facts. (Subject 
017) 
In contrast, clerical personnel, and half of the 
novice officers (N = 5), built their cases on a piecemeal 
basis by organizing the cards in a seemingly hierarchical 
fashion. That is, they distributed all seven items from 
one category across offenders and proceeded to the next 
category. The differential sorting strategies of officers 
and clerical workers may indicate that the former processed 
the information in a top-down or conceptually-driven manner 
(i.e., they were guided by a superordinate description or 
abstract category) . In other words, officers imposed 
their knowledge structures (schemas) on the data in order 
to ascertain how the case variables were related in the 
different offender groupings. Their high-level knowledge 
determined their interpretation of the low-level perceptual 
units (information cards). The strategy of the clerical 
subjects and novice officers, on the other hand, was con-
trolled by data-driven or bottom-up processing (i.e., the 
information cards served as the foundation upon which their 
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categories were constructed). In sum, officers' typolo-
gies were a reflection of their preexisting schemas, 
whereas clerical categorizations were foremost a function 
of the presented information, and emerged after the cases 
were formed. 
Task Accuracy of Probation Officers and Clerical Staff 
For each subject, the number of correct schema type 
matches (i.e., accuracy) was computed for each of the eight 
schematic cases. This was done by comparing the cases con-
structed by the participants (i.e., obtained sorting pat-
terns) with those that were created to portray the schema 
types found in Study 1 (i.e., a priori categorizations). 
In addition, a set of 40 "random subjects," which provided 
accuracy scores analogous to actual subjects' scores (i.e., 
each random subject produced a "number of correct matches" 
score for each schema type), was obtained via a computer 
program that generated random combinations of the 56 infor-
mation cards such that each random subject's cases had one 
card from each information category. Random subjects' 
scores were compared to actual subjects' scores to test 
whether the groups (officer and clerical) performed signi-
ficantly better than chance. 
A two-way repeated measures analysis of variance 
(ANOVA: Group Membership [officer vs. clerical) x Schema 
type [burglar vs. drug addict, etc.) was performed on the 
accuracy scores. As expected, the effect of group 
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membership was highly significant, F(l,38) = 59.02, E <.001, 
indicating that, overall, officers (~ = 4.8) were more 
accurate than non-officers (M = 3.1) in completing the 
task. This finding demonstrates that the effort to remove 
any inherent connections between different information card 
statements was generally successful. That is, it appears 
that subjects were unable to construct the cases solely 
on the basis of any logical or lexical associations between 
the cards. Further, the finding confirms the validity of 
schemas and clearly suggests that officers' categoriza-
tions represent more than a common-sensical organizing of 
separate pieces of case information. 
A significant main effect of schema type, ~(7,266) = 
15.70, £ <.01 was also found. This main effect, however, 
was qualified by a significant Group Membership x Schema 
Type interaction, ~(7,266) = 5.07, £ <.01. Simple main 
effects tests were conducted to examine the nature of this 
interaction (Winer, 1971). As shown in Table 6, the analy-
sis revealed that officers were significantly more accurate 
than clerical workers in reproducing six of the eight 
schematic cases, and were slightly more accurate on the 
other two. Also, both officers, 'F(l,38) = 167.22, £·<.001, 
and clerical staff persons, F(l,38) = 33.40, £ <.01 con-
structed the cases more successfully than a random combin-
ation of the cards. Finally, there were reliable differ-
ences among the eight schema types within both the officer, 
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Table 6 
Mean Number of Correct Schema Type Matches 
SCHEMA TYPE GROUP 
Officers Clerical 
Burglar 5.35 3.65** 
Drug Addict 5.65 3.05** 
Gangbanger 4.05 3.30 
Uncle Tom 3.50 2.75 
Female Welfare Fraud 5.80 3.70** 
Suburb Kid 4.70 2.95** 
Dumb Hillbilly 3.40 2.50* 
White Collar 5.95 3.30** 
NOTE. Simple effects tests were performed to compare 
the officer and clerical groups. See Winer (1971) for an 
explanation of the procedures for pooling heterogeneous 
sources of variance and estimating degrees of freedom 
in simple effects tests following significant interactions 
in a repeated measures ANOVA. 
*£ <.05 
**£ <.01 
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f(7,222) = 21.63, E <.01, and clerical, F(7,266) = 2.90, 
E <.01 groups. Tests on the differences between all 
possible pairs of means were done by the Newman-Keuls pro-
cedure (Winer, 1971), ~nd are reported in Table 7. Officers 
seem to be most skillful at recreating cases that are 
either highly salient because of their distinctiveness or 
low prevalence ("White Collar," "Female Welfare Fraud") or 
highly problematic, i.e., require close surveillance or 
intensive treatment ("Burglar," "Drug Addict"). Moreover, 
two of the four schema types with the greatest number of 
correct matches, "White Collar" (~ = 5.95) and "Burglar" 
(~ = 5.35) were also the two most detailed schemas evoked 
in Study 1. 
An examination of the mean accuracy scores displayed 
in Table 6 reveals that "Female Welfare Fraud'' (~ = 3.70), 
"Burglar" (~ = 3.65), and "White Collar" (~ = 3.30) are 
also the categories of probationers most correctly repro-
duced in the clerical group. A possible explanation of this 
finding is that these offenders bear a strong resemblance to 
popular conceptions of various "criminal types" as depicted 
in the media. Indeed, 70% of the clerical participants 
mentioned that television, newspapers and/or movies were 
the primary source(s) of their criminal stereotypes. For 
example, the "White Collar" probationer is typically des-
cribed as a middle-class, educated White who opportunis-
tically commits a first-time offense, cooperatively completes 
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Table 7 
Summary of the Newman Keuls' Test for Differences Between 
the Mean Number of Correct Schema Type Matches 
SCHEMA TYPE 
SCHEMA TYPE 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
1. Dumb Hillbilly ns ns ** ** ** ** ** 
2. Uncle Tom ns ** ** ** ** ** 
3. Gangbanger ns ** ** ** ** 
4. Suburb Kid ns ** ** ** 
5. Burglar ns ** ** 
6. Drug Addict ns ** 
7. Female Welfare 
Fraud ns 
8. White Collar 
NOTE. Only those differences found in the officer 
groups are presented. Within the clerical group, "Dumb 
Hillbilly" differed from "Female Welfare Fraud" and 
"Burglar" at the .05 level. 
**E. <.01 
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his sentence and is no longer a threat to society. In con-
trast, the "Burglar" epitomizes the consensual notion of a 
hardened criminal, i.e., he is a young, Black male, the 
product of an impoverished environment, who has a lengthy 
criminal record and no respect for authority, dispassion-
ately views illegal activity as a profession, and who will 
likely spend the majority of his life incarcerated. The 
"Female Welfare Fraud" type is a clear example of the 
dependent, Black ghetto mother who struggles to fend for 
her children while falling prey to an unscrupulous and 
manipulating man. A majority of clerical subjects (75%), 
who were able to provide a label for their constructed 
cases, described one or more of the above groupings. 
Expert and Novice Probation Officers' Accuracy 
Probation Officers' accuracy scores were further 
analyzed with a 2 x 2 x 8 repeated measures analysis of 
variance with Expertise (expert vs. novice) and Assignment 
(criminal vs. municipal) as between-subjects factors and 
schema type (burglar vs. drug addict, etc.) as a within-
subjects factor. Results failed to demonstrate a main 
effect of assignment (F<l) or a significant Expertise x 
Assignment interaction (F<l). These findings are consis-
tent with the evidence of Study 1 which showed no differ-
ences between municipal and criminal officers on schema 
richness or number. However, the analysis did yield a 
significant main effect of expertise, ~(1,16) = 8.84, E < 
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.01, indicating that experienced officers (M = 5.26, SD = 
2.11) were able to reproduce the cases with greater accur-
acy than novice officers (M = 4.33, SD = 4.83). Addition-
ally, a significant main effect of schema type emerged, 
~(7,112) = 16.51, E <.01; however, it was qualified by 
two significant interactions: Assignment x Schema Type, 
~(7,112) = 3.29, E <.01 and Expertise x Schema Type, F 
(7,112) = 2.11, E <.05. The three-way interaction of 
Assignment x Expertise x Schema Type did not approach sig-
nificance (F<l). 
Simple effect comparisons were performed to examine 
the two-way interactions. As can be seen in Table 8, 
municipal and criminal division officers differed in 
accuracy on two of the eight schematic groupings: "Gang-
hanger" and "Suburb Kid." These differences can be 
accounted for by the differential occurrence of offender 
types in caseloads. Simply stated, criminal division 
officers are more likely to supervise "inner city Hispanics" 
and "housing project Blacks"--two groups that tend to 
become involved in gang membership and activity. Municipal 
division officers, on the other hand, are assigned a com-
paratively larger number of suburban offenders and are 
therefore more likely to encounter probationers whose 
criminal and social backgrounds are comparable to the 
"Suburb Kid" type (i.e., middle class, White, educated). 
An obvious conclusion is that officers develop stronger 
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Table 8 
Mean Number of Correct Schema Type Matches for the 
Officer Group by Expertise and Assignment 
SCHEMA TYPE ExEerience Assignment 
ExEert Novice Criminal MuniciEal 
Burglar 6.1 4.6* 5.3 5.4 
Drug Addict 6.4 4.9* 6.0 5.3 
Gangbanger 3.9 4.2 5.0 3.1** 
Uncle Tom 4.2 2.8* 3.5 3.5 
Female Welfare 
Fraud 6.3 5.3 6.0 5.6 
Suburb Kid 4.6 4.8 4.1 5.3* 
Dumb Hillbilly 4.0 2.8* 3.2 3.6 
White Collar 6.6 5.3* 5.7 6.2 
*E. <.05 
**E. <.01 
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schemas for offenders with whom they have direct contact 
and experience during assessment, monitoring, and treat-
ment. In addition, experts appear to be more accurate in 
identifying categories,of probationers that are less 
recognizable as discrete groupings ("Burglar," "Drug 
Addict," "Uncle Tom," and "Dumb Hillbilly") (see Table 8). 
Similar findings emerged in Study 1, where it was shown 
that experienced officers evinced a superior ability to 
pool together a loose collection of cases in forming in-
tegrated schemas of offenders. Finally, there were signi-
ficant differences between schema types within both the 
expert and novice groups. These differences were analyzed 
with the Newman-Keuls procedure and are presented in Table 
9. 
The analysis of officers' accuracy scores was com-
pleted by comparing the number of errors made by experts 
and novices on each of the seven information categories. 
Initially, the categories were dichotomized into two sets. 
The first consisted of "case information items" that bas-
ically identify who the offender is (demographics, crime 
type, social/psychological profile and past record); the 
second comprised "treatment-infer.ence items" that either 
predict offenders' receptivity to officers' rehabilitative 
efforts (report behavior and prognoses) or recommend appro-
priate supervision levels and treatment interventions for 
the different criminal types (treatment). Although all 
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Table 9 
Summary of the Newman Keuls' Test for Differences Between 
Mean Number of Correct Schema Type Matches Within the 
Expert and Novice Officer Groups 
EXPERTS 
Schema TyEe 
SCHEMA TYPE 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
1. Gangbanger ns ns ns ** ** ** ** 
2. Dumb Hillbilly ns ns ** ** ** ** 
3. Uncle Tom ns ** ** ** ** 
4. Suburb Kid ** ** ** ** 
5. Burglar ns ns ns 
6. Female Welfare 
Fraud ns ns 
7. Drug Addict ns 
8. White Collar 
NOVICES 
Schema TyEe 
SCHEMA TYPE 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
1. Uncle Tom ns ** ** ** ** ** ** 
2. Dumb Hillbilly ** ** ** ** ** ** 
3. Gangbanger ns ns ns * * 
4. Burglar ns ns ns ns 
5. Suburb Kid ns ns ns 
6. Drug Addict ns ns 
7. Female Welfare 
Fraud ns 
8. White Collar 
*E. <.05 
**E. <.01 
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the components of an offender schema are presumably devel-
oped and modified through officer experience, the informa-
tion represented by the "treatment-inference items" is based 
more directly upon the actual supervision of probationers 
than the information contained in the case information 
categories. Hence, it was predicted that experts would 
be more accurate than non-experts in matching the "treat-
ment-inference items" because of their extensive contacts 
with a greater number and variety of offenders. 
To test this hypothesis, it was necessary to be 
relatively certain that a schema had been invoked before 
making a determination of comparative accuracy. Therefore, 
only those schemas in which officers' had matched three or 
all of the "case information items" were included in the 
analyses. 11 In order to account for overall levels of 
accuracy, separate t-tests were conducted on subjects' 
"treatment-inference item" scores for schemas that con-
tained three "case information item" matches and for 
schemas that contained four "case information item" matches. 
lhcase information items" represent the central or 
defining elements of an offender category in a manner analo-
gous to the criterial attribute domain of Study 1. Hence, 
one may reasonably conclude that officers who have matched 
those items for a particular case are actually invoking the 
same schema. This provided a reference point for compar-
ing the accuracy of expert and novice officers on the 
"treatment inference items." 
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Consistent with the prediction, experts were more accurate 
than novices in placing "treatment-inference items" in the 
correct case for both the three, ~(18) = 2.71, E <.05 and 
four, t(l8) = 5.25, E ~.001 "case information item" 
schemas. 
An additional analysis was performed to test for a 
difference in the accuracy of expert and novice officers 
in matching "case information items." The number of con-
structed cases that contained three or four correctly placed 
"case information items" was recorded for each officer. 
The results of a t-test comparing the mean number of these 
cases did not yield a significant difference between the 
expert (M = 5.15) and novice (~ = 4.97) groups, t(l8) = 1.35, 
ns. This finding supports the above conclusion that the 
superior performance of experienced officers derives from 
their differentially greater skill to accurately identify 
"treatment-inference item" matches and not "case informa-
tion item" matches. 
Sorting Times 
The length of time in minutes that subjects spent 
completing the task was analyzed by t-tests. Results 
revealed that officers (M = 36.5 min., SD = 4.47) took 
more time in sorting the cards than non-officers (M = 21.65 
min., SD = 5.38), t(38) = 6.15, E <.01. Also, it was found 
that novice officers (M = 29.10 min., SD = 4.15) performed 
significantly faster than expert officers (M = 43.50 min., 
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SD = 4.77), !(18) = 5.21, E <.01. Perhaps, these data 
lend further credence to the notion that probation officers 
(especially those with more experience) were invoking 
schemas of offenders while sorting the cards, whereas 
clerical personnel were combining the facts by haphazardly 
matching the information categories, or on the basis of more 
general or popular conceptions of criminals. Accordingly, 
officers' completion times were increased because both the 
input (case variables) and their data base of experience 
(schemas) required processing (cf., Markus, 1974). In line 
with the findings of Study 1, it is presumed that novices' 
schematic representations are less extensive than experts', 
and therefore their processing time was also less lengthy 
than experienced officers. 
One could alternately argue, however, that schema 
evocation should have resulted in faster sorting times. 
Indeed, a number of studies suggest such an outcome (see 
Taylor & Crocker, 1981). The card sorting procedure pre-
sented subjects with a novel challenge which has no para-
llel in their regular duties. Hence, they searched their 
memories for pertinent information and strategies that 
might have assisted them in structuring and completing the 
task. Officers (especially experts) had more knowledge to 
explore, more options to consider, and more relevant 
experiences to examine when compared to clerical staff 
members. If the task had required subjects to recognize 
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or differentiate between types of cases or to make familiar 
judgments about offenders, then it would be more likely that 
possessing schemas would lead to quicker responses. Fin-
ally, officers' longer :completion times may simply have 
been a function of greater evaluation apprehension (i.e., 
because officers had more ego-involvement in the task they 
took longer to complete it) . 
Cluster Analysis 
Subject-generated card sortings were also subjected 
to a categorical cluster analysis that organized constructed 
cases into similar groupings--with each subject providing 
one case per grouping (SAS Manual, 1982). Results revealed 
that officers' response patterns optimally clustered into 
nine offender configurations (schemas) that evidenced a 
significant degree of associative cohesiveness within 
clusters and a small degree of similarity between clusters 
(cubic clustering criterion (CCC) = 21.21, R2 = .35). In 
contrast, the analysis yielded negative CCC scores for 
clerical subjects' data, suggesting poor or "loose" 
groupings of cases (i.e., there was high within cluster 
variance and low between cluster variance) (SAS Manual, 
p. 420). 
An attempt was made to identify the underlying 
schemas embodied in the resultant nine clusters of offender 
types by (a) comparing the cases contained in each of the 
groupings with the set of schematic cases that were created 
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from probation files; and (b) examining officers' re-
sponses to the post-task questions which asked them to 
label and describe their categorizations. As shown in 
Table 10, three new schema types were found: "Project 
Black," "Barroom Brawler," and "Shoplifter.'' In addition, 
four of the core schemas uncovered in Study 1 were vali-
dated: "White Collar," "Female Welfare Fraud," "Drug 
Addict," and "Burglar." I was unable to clearly define 
the two remaining clusters. 
Summary and Conclusions 
The results of the second study clearly demonstrate 
that the schemas of offenders found in the first investi-
gation were not merely an artifact of the methods employed 
to collect and interpret the data. Officers' apparent 
facility at reconstructing the cases, coupled with the 
strong groupings that emerged from the clustering proce-
dure, suggest that stereotypic, consensual categories of 
probationers may serve as a framework for the assessment 
and treatment of caseloads in Cook County. The validity 
of these categories was given further support by the "con-
trol group's" inability to assemble the types as accu~ately 
as officers, and by the failure of the group's constructions 
to form any discernible clusters. Hence, there is a firm 
basis to conclude that probation officers' schemas repre-
sent more than simple interfeature associations (.i.e., 
Table 10 
A Description of the Offender Schemas Suggested 
by the Cluster Analysis 
SCHEMA TYPE - BARROOM BRAWLER 
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Criteria! Attributes - Ethnic White; blue collar 
conservative; hates members of minority groups; concerned 
with preserving the "purity" of his neighborhood; has a 
drinking problem that leads to assaultive behavior; 
married with children (may be abusive) . 
Report Demeanor - Consistent in reporting; generally 
cooperative but may be boisterous and aggressive. 
Supervision - Regular supervision (once per month 
in-person reporting); discussion of alcohol abuse; 
resources offered -- alcohol treatment, family therapy. 
Attributions - Internal - stable - intentional 
(drinking caused by low self-esteem; proving of mascu-
linity is important) • 
Prognosis - Fair - If alcoholism is recognized and 
treated the offender will not become involved in future 
incidents. 
SCHEMA TYPE - PROJECT BLACK 
Criteria! Attributes - Young, Black male, resides in 
housing project; "cocky" attitude, uneducated; involved 
in gang activity, "hates police"; can be very dangerous; 
Table 10 
PROJECT BLACK (continued) 
extensive juvenile record; has spent time in jail. 
Report Demeanor -·very inconsistent; likely to be 
violated for nonreporting; arrogant and challenging. 
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Suoervision - Close supervision; monthly local B of 
I checks; officer must set strict rules/limits throughout 
the sentence; offender should be ordered to appear before 
the Judge if uncooperative. 
Attributions - External - stable - intentional 
(victim of society, product of fatherless home and "ghetto 
mentality"). 
Prognosis - Extremely poor - Crime is his only means 
of survival; gang influence is powerful. 
SCHEMA TYPE - SHOPLIFTER 
Criterial Attributes - Female mid-thirties; unem-
ployed, drifter; has been involved with drugs and 
prostitution, lengthy criminal record; unkempt. 
Report Demeanor - Consistent in reporting, manipu-
lating; changes address often; emotionally labile, 
histrionic. 
Supervision - Regular supervision (once per month 
in-person reporting); if noticeably improved or employed 
after 6 months-1 year, may report by mail for remainder 
of sentence; resources offered--employment service. 
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Table 10 
SHOPLIFTER (continued) 
Attributions - Internal - stable - intentional (emo-
tional problems, immaturity, unable to delay gratification, 
impulsive). 
Prognosis - Fair - If a steady job has been secured 
and a trusting relationship has been established with the 
officer, she will not readily resort to criminal behavior. 
semantic connections) or common-sensical combinations of 
separate pieces of case information. 
Additional evidence that confirms the validity of 
schemas (although admittedly highly inferential) comes 
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from the different strategies that subjects adopted to 
organize the information cards. It appears that officers 
approached the task by imposing their knowledge structures 
on the materials in a manner which may be analogous to the 
cognitive activity that takes place during the evaluation 
of offenders for referral and supervision. That is, when 
officers are assigned a new case, they process the infor-
mation contained therein by starting with conceptualiza-
tions of what may be present and continuing with a close 
examination of the case for data consistent with those 
conceptualizations. Officers' preexisting schemas of 
probationers guide the search for data until the particular 
characteristics of the case invoke one of their available 
categories. It is assumed that if a category is not read-
ily found, a new one is developed or an old one is modified 
(See Taylor, 1981 for a discussion of how stereotypes 
change). 
Consistent with the findings of Study 1, it was 
revealed that experienced officers were significantly more 
accurate than novices in recreating five of the eight 
schematic cases. This differential accuracy was primarily 
a function of the expert's ability to match the "treatment-
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inference" variables (report behavior, treatment and prog-
noses). Officers' knowledge of these areas derives from two 
sources: (a) experience in supervising cases through the 
entire range of an offender's sentence, and (b) practice 
with making decisions and receiving feedback about the 
appropriateness of monitoring levels and treatment inter-
ventions. As novice officers follow an increasing number 
of cases from inception to termination (i.e., gain exper-
ience), they begin to form more "complete" and elaborate 
schemas that contain information regarding case outcomes 
as well as probationer behavior and future criminality. 
Also, it was shown that officer assignment (criminal vs. 
municipal) can affect the type of offender categories that 
are developed. In other words, officers are more likely to 
possess schemas for criminals who occupy their caseloads 
(i.e., those with whom they have had direct contact). 
In summary, the results of Studies 1 and 2 provide 
convergent support for the existence of probationer schemas. 
The next and final stage in this series of investigations 
examined the effect of offender schemas on information 
processing and case judgments. 
Study 3 
Confidence, Ease, and Typicality Ratings 
Each subject's confidence and difficulty ratings 
summed across the four judgments for each case, and 
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analyzed with one-way repeated measures analyses of vari-
ance. Consistent with the predicted result, officers' 
ratings of confidence were significantly higher when judg-
ing schematic cases (M:= 6.44) than when judging mixed 
schematic (M = 5.04) or real (M = 4.85) cases, F(2,38) = 
32.41, £ <.01. Post-hoc tests using the Newman-Keuls 
procedure revealed no differences between the mixed and 
real cases. However, officers' ratings of confidence for 
both the mixed and real cases were significantly lower 
than their ratings of the schematic cases. The pattern of 
findings for the difficulty ratings was similar. Officers 
rated schematic cases (M = 1.59) significantly easier to 
judge than both mixed cases (~ = 2.30) and real cases 
(~ = 1.94), ~(2,38) = 7.98, £ <.01. Post-hoc tests indi-
cated that there was no difference between schematic and 
real cases; the mixed cases, however, were rated signi-
ficantly more difficult to judge than both schematic and 
real cases. Additional analyses were performed to test 
for differences in confidence and difficulty ratings among 
the four schematic and mixed cases. No significant differ-
ences were found (all Fs < 1, ns.) . 
Perhaps the mixed schematic' cases led to more 
problematic judgments because they portrayed more novel 
or complicated histories and/or contained information that 
may have been less expected or less consistent than the 
information presented in schematic cases (which by / 
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definition contain information that "typifies" a particular 
type of probationer) or in real cases (which basically 
comprised a sample of ordinary or common offenders). 
Results revealed that officers rated the schematic cases 
(~ = 6.45) as being significantly more typical than either 
the mixed cases (M = 4.65) or the real cases (M = 4.85), 
K(2,38) = 27.35, E <.01. Post-hoc comparisons of these 
means yielded significant differences between the schematic 
cases and both the mixed schematic and real cases; however, 
there was no statistically detectable difference between 
mixed and real cases. Finally, as expected, ratings of 
difficulty and confidence were negatively correlated for 
each of the three types of cases (all E's <.05). 
Report Behavior and Prognosis Item Responses 
Studies 1 and 2 revealed that officers' schemas of 
probationers contain inferences regarding report behavior 
and prognoses. If subjects were activating these schemas 
during the judgment task, it seems reasonable to expect 
that the ratings of schematic cases would be more consis-
tent than the ratings of mixed schematic cases inasmuch 
as the former were guided by shared pre-existing cogn~tive 
structures whereas the latter were essentially a product 
of officers' idiosyncratic responses to relatively unfamil-
iar offender histories. To test this hypothesis, each 
subject's summed ratings of the two report behavior items 
and the single rating of the prognosis item were recorded 
I 
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for each of the four schematic and four mixed schematic 
cases. The variances of the ratings were computed across 
subjects for each case and were then pooled within each of 
the two sets (Hays, 1913). F-tests were performed to deter-
mine whether the variances in the ratings of schematic and 
mixed schematic cases were different. Results indicated 
that judgments of report behavior for schematic cases were 
significantly less variable (cr 2 = 3.21) than judgments of 
report behavior for mixed schematic cases (cr 2 = 7.41), ~(16, 
36) = 3.21, E <.05. A significant difference in the var-
iances of the prognosis judgments was also found. Again, 
the ratings of schematic cases evidenced significantly less 
variability (cr 2 = 2.89) than the ratings of mixed schematic 
cases (cr 2 = 6.47), ~(16,36) = 2.24, E <.05. These data 
suggest that officers rated schematic cases by drawing upon 
a common knowledge base which represents particular types of 
offenders. 
Treatment/Supervision Item Responses 
Subject's written responses to the treatment/super-
vision item were examined by computing the mean number of 
information units for each type of case. An information 
unit was defined in the same manner as in Study 1. It was 
hypothesized that the assessments given for schematic 
cases would be more elaborate (i.e., contain more infor-
mation units) than those given for nonschematic cases. As 
suggested in Study 1, officers have developed a well-
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articulated treatment plan as a central and highly acces-
sible component of an offender schema. Hence, treatment 
inferences relating to schematic cases are presumably de-
rived from a storehouse of knowledge and prior expectations 
regarding appropriate intervention strategies for particular 
categories of probationers, whereas the inferences made con-
cerning mixed schematic and real cases would be formulated 
primarily or solely on the basis of the information presented 
in the case itself, and therefore would be less complete or 
extensive. Results failed to confirm this prediction. There 
were no differences in the mean number of information units 
between schematic (M = 6.55), mixed schematic (M = 6.25), and 
real cases (M = 6.70), F(2,38) < 1. This finding may be are-
flection of subjects' attempts to respond to each case as 
fully as possible. Again, officers may have viewed the task 
(cf., Study 2) as an occasion to test or demonstrate their 
"expertise"; hence, they made a deliberate effort to be 
thorough on the treatment/supervision item for every case. 
Response Time 
Response time for each case was defined as the inter-
val between the presentation of the judgment items and the 
subject's signal that he/she had completed the items. Time 
was recorded to the nearest minute. The data strongly sup-
ported the hypothesis that schematic cases (M = 3.80 min.) 
would be processed more quickly than mixed schematic (M = 
6.90min.) and real cases (M = 5.20 min.), F(2.38) = 34.68, 
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E <.01. Follow-up comparisons showed that schematic cases 
were processed more rapidly than both mixed schematic and 
real cases, and that real cases were processed more rapidly 
than mixed cases. As previously discussed, it appears that 
mixed schematic cases were viewed as more problematic than 
either schematic or real cases. This is consistent with 
the earlier finding which revealed that subjects rated the 
mixed schematic cases as more difficult to judge than both 
of the other two types of offender histories. 
Pearson product-moment correlations were computed 
between response times and subjects' ratings of difficulty 
and confidence. A significant positive relationship was 
found between response times and ratings of difficulty for 
each of the three types of cases (all E's <.05). Further, 
results indicated that officers were more confident when 
they responded more rapidly to schematic cases, r(38) = 
-.24, ns, whereas for nonschematic cases they were more 
confident when they took longer to make judgments, £(38) = 
.61, E <.05. These correlations are significantly differ-
ent, ~ = 2.00, E <.05. This difference is explicable under 
the following assumptions: If officers have previously 
stored inferences regarding schematic cases, judgments 
that are related to those inferences could be made quickly 
and confidently (cf., Pachella, 1974). In contrast, 
because officers presumably have not formed assessments 
about nonschematic cases, they may have first searched 
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their memory for judgment-related information for the 
decisions at hand. The time required for this process is 
a positive function of the extensiveness of the information 
search. If this is true, and if subjects report greater 
confidence in judgments that are based on a more thorough 
search of stored information and thus require more time to 
complete (cf., Sternberg, 1969), then the positive corre-
lation between confidence and response time for nonschematic 
cases would be expected. 
Summary and Implications 
In summary, the evidence reported in Study 3 suggests 
that schemas of probationers not only function to organize 
and structure knowledge, but they also affect the proces-
sing and assessment of cases. A schema-based model of 
offender judgments is grounded in the principles of cogni-
tive economy and efficiency. Along with descriptive in-
formation about criminals, schemas carry information 
relating to effective supervision strategies, and predic-
tions of expected report behavior and the risk of future 
criminal involvement. These bits of information, accessed 
via the schema itself when it is called up to assist in 
the examination of a case, are available in memory to 
serve as mediators for such routine officer decisions as 
changing report modality or frequency, filing petitions 
for violation, or selecting useful counseling techniques. 
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Hence, judgments that relate to schematic cases are made 
more rapidly and with greater ease and confidence, because 
officers are retrieving already-made inferences rather than 
retrieving a set of relevant facts and making an entirely 
new judgment based upon those facts. This conclusion is 
also supported by the correlation and variance data. 
In addition, the third study points to the problems 
inherent in constructing aschematic stimulus materials in 
the area of social cognition--a task for which existing 
methods are of limited value. The complex and highly 
varied nature of cases makes it extremely difficult to 
create histories that are entirely devoid of schema-evoking 
content. This is further complicated by the overlapping, 
"fuzzy'' nature of offender categories, and by the nature 
of schema variables themselves which are represented as a 
probablistic range of values. Therefore, one is faced with 
the challenge of developing an aschematic version of a 
schematic case which often does not exist or cannot be 
plausibly created. It is likely that "schemaness" is a 
property that is portrayed on a number of multi-variable 
continua. Hence, there is always the possibility that as 
a value becomes less schematic on a variable in one cate-
gory, it may move closer to the schematic value of that 
variable in another category. An interim solution to the 
problem was to use two different kinds of nonschematic 
comparison cases, one set created by combining schematic 
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cases and a second set selected to be representative of 
actual cases. Indeed, the mixed cases proved to be diffi-
cult to judge as shown by ratings and response times. Never-
theless, the issue of whether mixed cases were truly 
aschematic remains unresolved. Clearly, additional re-
search is needed to provide more definitive answers to this 
methodological dilemma. 
The problem of creating aschematic cases has more 
than methodological implications; it also reflects the 
loosely formulated nature of schema theory and the attendant 
"mushiness" of the schema concept (see Fiske & Linville, 
1980). In the field of social cognition, the goal of 
greater theoretical and definitional preciseness is both 
more necessary and more difficult to achieve. Nonetheless, 
the stimulus materials used in schema research can only be 
as useful, detailed, and meaningful as the conceptual 
frameworks that recommend their construction. Hence, more 
theoretical consideration should be given to articulating 
definitive criteria for identifying a package of informa-
tion in long-term memory as a schema. Guided by such 
advances in theory, investigators can then proceed to man-
ipulate and measure schematic var'iables with increased 
preciseness and validity. 
A final point to be addressed relates to the selec-
tion of dependent measures. Research in social inference 
and memory has demonstrated that schemas have important 
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effects on attention, recognition, recall, and judgment 
(see Chapter Two). A limitation of the third study was its 
failure to examine whether schematic processing would lead 
to differences in one or more of these factors. For 
example, additional research will be needed to clarify 
the impact of schemas on: (a) officers' accuracy in asses-
sing probationer risk; (b) the speed with which officers 
diagnose offender problem areas; (c) the actual develop-
ment of effective treatment strategies; and (d) the organ-
ization and retrieval of case information. (See Appendix 
C for the Analysis of Variance Tables of Studies 2 and 3.) 
CHAPTER V 
CONCLUSIONS 
Schematic Processing 
The present research offers converging evidence 
supporting the concept of offender schemas, i.e., cognitive 
generalizations about criminals that structure, summarize, 
and explain the diverse elements of probation cases. Sys-
tematic differences were found among experienced and non-
experienced officers which indicate that experts' schemas 
are: (a) richer in content (experts' schemas contained a 
significantly greater number of information units); (b) 
more meaningful (experts discussed a smaller number of 
schemas which seemed to be more central to their caseloads 
and to possess greater descriptive utility); (c) better 
articulated and formed (less probes were required to 
elicit information from experts during the interview, 
their descriptions were highly organized, and they were able 
to recreate cases more accurately); and (d) more clearly 
related to therapeutic and supervisory decisions (experts' 
schemas contained detailed plans for responding to par-
ticular types of offenders, and t?eir superior performance 
in the card sort task stemmed from their ability to iden-
tify correct "treatment-inference item" matches) . 
On the basis of reported findings, one may speculate 
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about the influence of schemas on probation officers' diag-
noses of offenders for treatment, and predictions about 
their future criminal activity. Results suggest the 
availability of organized categories of probationers that 
guide the processing of case information, contain inferences 
about the causes of crimes, and control the formulation of 
supervisory strategies and the selection of appropriate 
treatment modalities. If schemas actually exist, they 
probably direct the examination of an offender's case by 
dictating what key items should be reviewed, what can be 
ignored, how ambiguous material is to be interpreted, and 
how missing facts can be deduced. They may also contain 
one or more prototypical examples that are highly represen-
tative of the essential details of a case. In sum, know-
ledge organized in a schema operates to guide the perusal 
of probationer information so that an officer talks about 
"cases like these" and appears to know more about a case 
than has been read (cf., Taylor & Crocker, 1981). 
The schematic organization of knowledge relevant to 
probation officers' assessments of offenders is a natural 
outgrowth of the constraints imposed upon the officer by 
the task and by inherent limitations of memory, attention, 
and cognitive effort. Because the voluminous information 
about a probationer must be quickly evaluated and applied, 
the evocation and use of schemas offers an efficient way 
to handle case material. Thus, in functional terms, 
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schemas facilitate cognitive economy (Fiske & Kinder, 1981) 
in memory storage by providing simple mechanisms to struc-
ture and categorize the multiple, redundant input impinging 
on the officer (Cantor'& Mischel, 1979). If probation 
officers possess ready-made and well-structured knowledge 
about "types" of offenders, then their mental resources 
need not be exhausted by creating and developing cognitive 
representations of probationers in each encounter with a 
novel, incoming case. Thus, material stored in an offen-
der schema will remain more accessible over time for 
retrieval and comparison with future input. 
The cognitive economics afforded by schematic proces-
ing, however, may be a mixed blessing. On the one hand, 
categorizing criminals into meaningful groupings provides 
a solid foundation for efficient information processing and 
judgment. On the other hand, an undue reliance on precon-
ceived notions is potentially costly inasmuch as it encour-
ages a blanket ascription of the features of a particular 
schema to each presumed member, even when those character-
istics are not truly descriptive of the individual being 
evaluated. Such gratuitous imputations may constrain the 
subsequent activity of an offender as well as color the 
perceptions and responses of the officer (cf., Synder, 
1981; Synder, Tanke, & Berscheid, 1977). Further, the 
presence of schemas may lead officers to engage in a "con-
firmatory strategy" when testing hypotheses about various 
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probationers and their inferred traits and behaviors. By 
searching for "procrustean fits" to their cognitive group-
ings, officers may misjudge--and mistreat--criminals who 
poorly match their preconceptions. This tendency toward 
type 1 errors (accepting data as consistent with a schema 
when it is neutral or inconsistent) stands as a formidable 
obstacle in the way of necessary schema change. If, indeed, 
modification occurs (and there is some evidence to suggest 
. d ) 12 . . 1. k 1 b . t d 1t oes , 1t 1s 1 e y to e 1n response to repea e , 
incongruous information across a number of different cases 
(i.e., the bookkeeping model). 
In short, the advantage of schematic processing is 
that it results in rapid and informed judgments and prevents 
officers from being overwhelmed by case materials or by 
caseloads of often unmanageable proportions. The disad-
vantage is that it may culminate in an offender being 
assessed solely on the basis of the schema into which he/ 
she is placed, rather than on the basis of his/her unique 
circumstances or characteristics. 
Offender schemas can be viewed as probation officer's 
"implicit personality theories" (Schneider, 1973) about 
l2In Study 1, a number of officers reported that 
changes in the nature of offender schemas were possible. 
Change was most likely when information was highly discon-
firming, salient, repetitive, and dispersed. 
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what behavioral signs (e.g., offense committed, report 
demeanor) coexist with what dispositional qualities (e.g., 
low self-esteem, asocial personality), and about how these 
qualities tend to cluster and co-occur in various types of 
criminals (cf., Schneider & Blankmeyer, 1983). These 
theories are invoked whenever officers make decisions about 
a probationer's treatability and/or riskiness. The ques-
tion may be raised as to whether these schemas are entirely 
creations "in the heads" of criminal justice experts or 
if they have an independent grounding in reality. Research 
examining personality typologies and object categorizations 
suggest that there are significant, meaningful correlations 
among person attributes, and among object features in the 
real world (Mischel, 1981). For example, there is a 
strong, likelihood that gregariousness will co-occur with 
voluble, outgoing behavior in a particular kind of person 
(i.e., extravert), just as mellifluous songs, feathers, and 
wings tend to co-occur in a particular kind of animal 
(i.e., canary). Hence, it is likely that schemas are 
neither exclusively a product of experts' cognizing nor 
built altogether from the qualities of actual offenders. 
Instead, the contents of schemas are a function of the 
interaction between officers' perceptions, inferences, 
etc., and the nature of the offenders assigned to them for 
supervision and treatment. 
Information "in the heads" of experts and in the real 
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world combine to form a reasonably accurate and organized 
cognitive representation that is useful to officers in 
effectively performing their duties. Such structures 
probably develop via an abstraction and consolidation 
process whereby specific data relating to probationers is 
summarized into more general and parsimonious groupings in 
order to facilitate economy in the cognitive system. In 
sum, offender schemas allow for a quick and efficient 
processing of information, provide a basis for going 
beyond case history material in drawing inferences and 
making judgments, and affect how incoming information is 
interpreted and categorized. Finally, there is ample 
evidence that schemas also influence memory processes 
(Hastie et al., 1980), although the present investigations 
did not explicitly examine this issue. 
Practical Implications 
In addition to having theoretical significance, the 
results of the present research contain practical implica-
tions for prediction and diagnosis in the area of probation 
supervision. Recently, there has been a growing interest 
in formulating and applying various typologies to categor-
ize offenders for treatment and surveillance (e.g., Megar-
gee & Bohn, 1979). The use of classification techniques 
derives from the notion that a structured screening process 
will permit more accurate, consistent, and equitable 
decision-making. The cognitive schemas of probation 
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officers may serve as a useful starting point for the 
development of such assessment devices. They not only 
comprise distinctions among critical groupings, but they 
also provide differential treatment strategies, predictions 
of risk and prognoses for improvement and rehabilitation. 
Probation departments can better allocate their 
limited resources and better organize and monitor burgeon-
ing caseloads through the accurate identification of 
offenders who require a large share of agency staff time 
as well as those who demand fewer interventions and are 
less likely to recidivate. The achievement of these ends 
translates into greater effectiveness and efficiency in 
the provision of correctional services. 
Of course, the predictive and diagnostic power of 
schemas remains to be tested. In the event that they are 
found to be inaccurate, measures can be adopted to make 
probation officers aware of their misperceptions and to 
train them to utilize more objective strategies in cate-
gorization. It may also be demonstrated that schemas 
contain a "kernel of truth," in which case only the more 
useful aspects of officers' cognitive representations will 
be incorporated in the design of 'classification instru-
ments. 
Directions for Future Research 
The research reported in this work represents a 
necessary first step in identifying the existence and 
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contents of cognitive schemas in a specific group of pro-
fessionals within the criminal justice system. The 
current studies establish the usefulness of a schema 
approach in understanding how probation officers make 
rapid diagnoses for treatment and recommendations, and 
predictions about subsequent riskiness and criminal in-
volvement. They also suggest recommendations for future 
studies with basic and applied implications. 
One goal of future investigators should be the formu-
lation of a set of procedures for: (a) testing the exis-
tence of schemas, (b) differentiating between various 
types of schemas within a specific domain of knowledge, 
and (c) describing the interrelationships between the 
separate units of information constituting a given cogni-
tive representation. 13 This would require greater precise-
ness in operationalizing dependent measures of schematic 
processing and would certainly result in greater conceptual 
clarity (see Chapter One). The other side of the same 
coin involves an explication of what schemas are not (i.e., 
when and how nonschematic processing occurs, and how it 
differs from schematic processing) . The problem of creat-
ing aschematic stimulus materials (see Study 3) relates 
to this issue. Finally, the current work points to the 
l3study 1 suggests useful guidelines for uncovering 
schemas in an interview procedure. 
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importance of examining individual difference variables 
in schema research. More specifically, cognitive social 
psychologists should be encouraged to move out of the 
laboratory to examine now knowledge is organized among 
"experts," and how this organization actually affects 
behaviors (e.g., judgments, perceptions, hypothesis testing 
strategies) . 
Some potentially important directions for further 
investigation of offender schemas in the area of probation 
include: (a) a study of the particular case-relevant cues 
that trigger the evocation of a specific schema type (i.e., 
a study of how officers "match" probationers to categories); 
(b) a test of the effect of schemas on information proces-
sing and recall among probation officers; (c) an identi-
fication of factors that account for the differential rich-
ness of schema types; (d) an exploration of whether the 
relative frequency and/or detail of schematic categories 
are related to the actual prevalence of offender types in 
the probation population; and (e) a direct examination of 
how officers apply schematic knowledge in rendering judg-
ments about probationers. 
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APPENDIX A 
Name: Miss Buford 
Schematic Case Number 3 
"Female Welfare Fraud" 
194 
Descriptive Information: Miss Buford is a 23 year-old Black 
female convicted of two counts of welfare fraud, and sentenced 
to four (4) years probation. She was cooperative throughout 
the interview, appeared neatly dressed and was accompanied 
by three children, ages 7, 4 and 2. 
Prior Record: 
6/8/80 Disorderly Conduct 
5 Days Jail, $100 Fine 
7/16/81 Soliciting 
Dismissed 
9/18/81 Shoplifting 
Dismissed 
1/15/82 Soliciting 
1 Yr. Supervision 
Social/Psychological Profile: Miss Buford is a soft spoken 
and humble woman whose primary concern is the care and well-
being of her children. She has been dependent upon men most 
of her adult life and has lived with them in a number of 
seeming love-hate relationships. The offender described 
several incidents in which she was "beaten up bad" by her 
live-in boyfriends, who "make her do things against the 
law." She is unable to extricate herself from these situ-
ations because of her dependency needs, low self-esteem, and 
fear of retaliation which might also be directed at her 
children. Miss Buford was forced to quit high school at age 
16 to work to support her family. She soon became pregnant 
and began living with a man who threatened her into "turn-
ing tricks." After a short time, he left her and she sub-
sequently sought the comfort of three or four other men who 
treated her in a similar fashion .(physical/emotional abuse, 
manipulation and abandonment). Miss Buford reported that 
he·r current male companion showed her how to falsify appli-
cations to increase her monthly welfare income. She insists 
that she had to do it in order to "feed her little babies." 
Mixed Schematic Case Number 4 
"Suburb Kid/Gangbanger" 
Name: Mr. Anglet 
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Descriptive Information:· The offender, Mr. Anglet is a 2,0-
year old white male living in the suburbs and entering his 
third year in college. He arrived at the interview accom-
panied by his parents. Although he was a well-dressed, 
"clean-cut," intelligent young man, he answered many of the 
questions in an obviously sarcastic tone. ML Anglet seemed 
to resent his parents and openly ridiculed some of the 
remarks they made concerning his behavior. He was convicted 
of shoplifting and sentenced to a one (1) year probation 
term. 
Prior Record: 
1/18/81 
6/15/81 
7/24/81 
9/25/82 
1/17/83 
Theft 
Dismissed 
Vandalism 
Dismissed for Want of Prosecution 
Disorderly Conduct 
$100 Fine 
Simple Assault 
90 Days D.O.C. 
DWI 
License Suspended 
Social/Psychological Profile: Mr. Anglet presents himself as 
a typical juvenile delinquent, a tough kid who receives a 
sense of identity and self-worth, largely from an affilia-
tion with his peer group. He appears to be a product of his 
environment, i.e., in order "to fit in with the rest of the 
group," he must engage in criminalactivity. The offender's 
life centers around being with his friends and gaining their 
approval. Indeed, the streets are a proving ground for his 
masculinity. Mr. Anglet learned how to "make quick money" 
from his companions, who believe that the more conventional 
ways of earning a living are reserved for "suckers and 
wimps." He reported that he had abandoned attempts to find 
employment because "every place I went they turned me down 
without saying why." Breaking the law seems to give the 
offender a feeling of exhilaration and pride, and is a 
convenient outlet for pent-up anger and frustration. 
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Real Case Number 16 
Name: Mr. Tyro 
Descriptive Information: Mr. Tyro is a 38 year-old, Black 
male with a muscular build, dressed in a leather jacket and 
jeans. The offender swaggered into the interview and 
behaved in an aggressive, self-assertive manner throughout. 
He was recently convicted of assault and sentenced to a 
three (3) year probation term. 
Prior Record: 
9/24/74 
11/15/76 
2/27/79 
7/17/81 
Theft 
Dismissed 
Battery 
2 Yrs. Probation 
Possession of a Controlled Substance 
1 Yr. Supervision 
Burglary 
1 Yr. D.O.C. 
Social/Psychological Profile: The offender is a native of 
Selma, Alabama, but was reared in Chicago, Illinois, where 
he received a lOth grade education with largely inadequate 
school performance. He has never been married and is 
presently living with a woman who has recently given birth 
to a child. The offender reported that in the past year he 
has changed residence six times. Mr. Tyro has worked at a 
number of odd jobs (e.g., car wash attendant, cab driver) 
but has never remained in any of them for more than a six-
month interval. He has been unemployed since 1980. Despite 
his lack of formal education, Mr. Tyro is a smart, fast 
talking, street-wise man who showed that he can be quite 
affable. He seemed to go to great lengths to convey the 
impresion that he has "reformed himself" and is "no longer 
interested in committing crimes." In fact, he denies any 
responsibility for his present conviction although the 
record indicates clear evidence of his involvement. Mr. 
Tyro's past record, and reports by his former probation 
officer belie his good intentions. 
APPENDIX B 
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CASE ASSESSMENT QUESTIONS 
1. How typical is the above offender? That is, how closely 
does he/she resemble any members of your caseload? 
Circle one. 
not at all 
similar 
1 2 3 
neither similar 
or dissimilar 
4 5 6 
not at all 
similar 
7 
2. In his/her reporting behavior, how consistent is the 
offender likely to be? 
highly consistent 
1 2 
How confident are 
not at all 
confident 
1 2 
How easy was the 
not at all 
difficult 
1 2 
3 
neither consistent 
or inconsistent 
4 5 
you about the above 
neither confident 
or unconfident 
3 4 5 
6 
not at all 
consistent 
7 
judgment? 
highly 
confident 
6 7 
above judgment to make? 
neither easy extremely 
or difficult difficult 
3 4 5 6 7 
3. In his/her reporting behavior, how cooperative (e.g., 
follow the officer's directives, comply with conditions, 
participate in a rehabilitative plan) is the offender 
likely to be? 
highly 
cooperative 
1 2 3 
not cooperative 
or uncooperative 
4 5 
not at all 
cooperative 
6 7 
How confident are you about the above judgment? 
not at all 
confident 
1 2 3 
neither confident 
or unconfident 
4 5 6 
highly 
confident 
7 
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CASE ASSESSMENT QUESTIONS (Continued) 
How easy was the above judgment to make? 
not at all 
difficult 
1 2 3 
~either easy 
or difficult 
4 5 6 
extremely 
difficult 
7 
4. Briefly discuss the nature of the treatment and supervis-
ory strategies you would employ with the offender. 
Include a list of possible referrals and the frequency 
and mode of supervision you would adopt. 
How confident are you about the validity of the above? 
not at all 
confident 
1 2 3 
neither confident 
or unconfident 
4 5 6 
highly 
confident 
7 
How easy was it for you to make the above assessment? 
not at all 
difficult 
1 2 3 
neither difficult 
or easy 
4 5 
extremely 
difficult 
6 7 
5. How likely is the offender to satisfactorily finish 
his/her sentence (i.e., not be involved in future crime, 
comply with his/her conditions)? 
very likely neither likely not at all 
or unlikely likely 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
How confident are you about the above judgment? 
not at all neither confident highly 
confident or unconfident confident 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
CASE ASSESSMENT QUESTIONS (Continued) 
How easy was the above judgment to make? 
not at all 
difficult 
1 2 3 
neither easy 
or difficult 
4 5 6 
200 
extremely 
difficult 
7 
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Table I 
Two-Way Repeated Measures Analysis of Variance for Group 
Membership and Schema Type on Number of 
Correct Schema Type Matches 
Source of Variance 
Between Subjects 
A(Group Membership) 
Subjects Within Groups 
Within Subjects 
B(Schema Type) 
A X B 
B X Subjects Within 
Groups 
**£ <.01 
ss 
358.05 
217.80 
140.25 
497.75 
133.00 
43.00 
321.75 
df 
39 
1 
38 
280 
7 
7 
266 
MS 
217.8 
3.69 
19 
6.14 
1. 21 
F 
59.02** 
15.70** 
5.07** 
Table II 
Three-Way Repeated Measures Analysis of Variance for 
Assignment, Expertise, and Schema Type on Number 
of Correct Schema Type Matches 
Source of Variance 
Between Subjects 
A(Assignment) 
B(Expertise) 
A X B 
Subjects Within 
Groups 
Within Subjects 
C(Schema Type) 
A X C 
B X C 
A X B X C 
C X Subjects 
Within Groups 
*.e <.05 
**.e <.01 
ss 
96.85 
.40 
34.23 
.22 
62.00 
354.75 
151.30 
30.20 
19.37 
7.38 
14.64 
df 
19 
1 
1 
1 
16 
140 
7 
7 
7 
7 
112 
MS 
.40 
34.23 
. 
. 22 
2.87 
21.63 
4.31 
2.77 
1. 05 
1. 31 
F 
8.84** 
16.51** 
3.29** 
2.11* 
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Table III 
One-Way Repeated Measures Analysis of Variance 
on the Confidence Ratings 
Source of Variance ss df MS 
Between Subjects 124.73 19 
Within Subjects 764.00 40 
204 
F 
Type of Case 481.63 2 240.82 32.41** 
Residual 282.37 38 7.43 
NOTE. Ratings on the two schematic cases were combined 
for the analysis. 
**E. <.01 
Table IV 
One-Way Repeated Measures Analysis of Variance 
on the Difficulty Ratings 
Source of Variance ss df MS F 
Between Subjects 104.06 19 
Within Subjects 274.67 40 
Type of Case 81.23 2 40.61 7.98** 
Residual 193.44 38 5.09 
NOTE. Ratings on the two schematic cases were combined for 
the analysis. 
**£ <.01 
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Table V 
One-Way Repeated Measures Analysis of Variance 
on the Typicality Ratings 
Source of Variance 
Between Subjects 
Within Subjects 
Type of Case 
Residual 
ss 
14.99 
66.00 
38.94 
27.06 
df 
19 
40 
2 
38 
MS 
19.47 
.712 
206 
F 
27.35** 
NOTE. Ratings on the two schematic cases were combined for 
the analysis. 
**E. <.01 
~PPROVAL SHEET 
The dissertation submitted by Arthur J. Lurigio has been 
read and approved by the following committee: 
Dr. Emil J. Posavac, Director 
Professor, Psychology, Loyola 
Dr. John D. Edwards 
Associate Professor, Psychology, Loyola 
Dr. Fred B. Bryant 
Assistant Professor, Psychology, Loyola 
The final copies have been examined by the director 
of the dissertation and the signature which appears 
below verifies the fact that any necessary changes 
have been incorporated and that the dissertation is now 
given final approval by the Committee with reference 
to content and form. 
The dissertation is therefore accepted in partial 
fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of 
Doctor of Philosophy. 
